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BRIEF NOTE FROM THE NEW EDITOR
 I am honored to have been asked take the helm at our 
journal.  I hope to continue in the tradition of my friend and 
predecessor, Richard Fleischman who poured so much time and 
energy into this work and who I have not left alone since taking 
over.  He thought he retired – he did not.  
 My own publication background is almost entirely anti-
quarian.   This is a passion of mine – examining how people ac-
counted for themselves, their lives, their businesses.   More than 
that, what they accounted for – what did they value?  Often it 
was not necessarily what they valued but what they lacked that 
entered the records.   This provides a window into the past not 
granted by the ‘grand’ histories.   I will not abandon the world of 
the dusty and crumbling and small.
 However, I wish to encourage more critical articles to the 
journal.   We have a strong field of critical researchers to call on 
for both submissions and review.  Please do consider submitting 
and if you are attending conferences, please encourage present-
ers of promising papers to submit.  
 Where are the articles examining accounting’s role in the fi-
nancial crises the world has been suffering through?   Surely we 
should have something to say here.
 Let us not forget collaborative work.   Much of what we do 
could be done perhaps better with a sociologist, an anthropolo-
gist, an economist, a political scientist, a historian.    Bibliogra-
phies should make sense – they should be cross-disciplinary.  
 I hope to see many of you this July in Cardiff at the IPA or 
Newcastle at the World Congress.   If not England, perhaps in 
Washington, DC in August (what a perfect time to visit DC!).   
Gloria Vollmers
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ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS JOURNAL
Statement of Policy
 The Accounting Historians Journal is an international jour-
nal that addresses the development of accounting thought and 
practice. AHJ embraces all subject matter related to accounting 
history, including but not limited to research that provides an 
historical perspective on contemporary accounting issues.
 Authors may find the following guidelines helpful.
1. Authors should provide a clear specification of the research 
issue or problem addressed and the motivation for the study.
2. Authors should describe the method employed in the re-
search, indicating the extent and manner in which they intend 
to employ the methodology. Manuscripts are encouraged that 
draw on a variety of conceptual frameworks and techniques, in-
cluding those used in other social sciences.
3. Manuscripts that rely on primary sources should contain a 
statement specifying the original materials or data collected or 
analyzed and the rationale used in selection of those source ma-
terials. Authors should provide the reader information as to how 
these source materials may be accessed.
4. Authors who use a critical or new theoretical framework to 
examine prior historical interpretations of the development of 
accounting thought or practice should include a discussion of 
the rationale for use of that framework in the manuscript.
5. In performing all analyses, authors should be sensitive to 
and take adequate account of the social, political, and economic 
contexts of the time period examined and of other en viron-
mental factors.
6. While historians have long debated the ability to assign cau-
sation to particular factors, we encourage authors to address 
and evaluate the probable influences related to the problem or 
issue examined.
7. Authors should clearly state all their interpretations of re-
sults, and the conclusions they draw should be consistent with 
the original objectives of and data used in the study. Interpreta-
tions and conclusions should be clearly linked to the research 
problem. Authors also should state the implications of the study 
for future research.
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ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS JOURNAL
Guide for Manuscript Submission
 Manuscripts for review should be submitted by e-mail 
attachment to vollmers@umit.maine.edu and formatted in 
Microsoft Word. The identity of author(s) should not appear 
on the attached file — only on the accompanying e-mail trans-
mission. Additional correspondence may be sent to Professor 
Gloria Vollmers, DPC 342, College of Business, Public Policy 
and Health, University of Maine, Orono, ME, 04469; phone: 
(207) 581-1979; Fax: (207) 581-1956. There is no submission 
fee, although authors are urged to consider joining The Acad-
emy of Accounting Historians by completing the membership 
application form on the inside of the back cover. Papers which 
have been published, accepted for publication elsewhere, or are 
under consideration by another journal are not invited. The Ac-
counting Historians Journal will accept a variety of presentation 
formats for initial submission as long as the writing style is re-
flective of careful scholarship. Notwithstanding, authors should 
attend to the following guidelines: 
 1. An abstract of approximately 100 words on a page that 
includes the article’s title but no identification of the 
author(s).
 2. A limited number of content footnotes.
 3. A limited number of tables, figures, etc., appended at the 
conclusion of the text, but whose positioning in the nar-
rative is indicated.
 4. References are to appear in brackets within the text. Spe-
cific page numbers are mandatory for all direct quotes 
but are optional otherwise. 
 5. A bibliography of all references cited in the text. 
 6. Manuscripts should not exceed 10,000 words in length. 
 Upon acceptance or an invitation to revise and resubmit, au-
thors will be sent a style sheet which must be followed conscien-
tiously for all subsequent revisions of the paper. Once the article 
is accepted, the editor will request the submission of a diskette 
prepared in Microsoft Word. If time permits, authors will be 
sent galley proofs. However, the inclusion of additional material 
will be severely limited. 
 Authors will be provided with 3 copies of the AHJ issue in 
which the manuscript is published. Reprints may be ordered by 
arrangement with the publisher. 
9
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2012, Vol. 39, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2012
viii
NOTE FROM THE EDITOR EMERITUS 
 RICHARD FLEISCHMAN
2011 Manuscript Awards
I am pleased to announce the following winners of the an-
nual AHJ Manuscript Competition for Volume 38 (2011) which 
awards $300 and a plaque for the article judged best by the edi-
torial board and $100 for each of two others for excellence.
 WINNER: Jessie Dillard and Linda Ruchala, 
   “Veblen’s Placebo: Another Historical  
  Perspective on Administrative Evil”
 RUNNERS-UP: John Richard (“Dick”) Edwards, 
  “Accounting on English Landed  
  Estates during the Agricultural 
  Revolution – A Textbook 
  Perspective.” 
  Jill Hooks and Ross Stewart, 
  “Farmers, Politics, and Accounting: 
  The History of Standard Values: An  
  Accounting Convenience or Political  
  Arithmetic?”
Congratulations to the authors for these fine pieces of work.
It should be noted that every article in Volume 38 received at 
least two votes on the ballots submitted.
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Robert J. Kirsch
SOUTHERN CONNECTICUT STATE UNIVERSITY
THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
BOARD AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARD SETTERS: 
1973-2008
Abstract: Utilizing archival materials as well as personal interviews 
and correspondence with personnel of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards 
Committee /Board (IASC/B), including former Board chairmen and 
staff members, this paper examines the development of the working 
relationships between the FASB and the IASC/B from their earliest 
interactions in 1973 through the transformation of the IASC into 
the IASB and the Convergence Program rooted in the 2002 Norwalk 
Agreement up to 2008. 
INTRODUCTION
In 1973, two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) im-
portant to the future development of accounting standard set-
ting were established: the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) and the US Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB). Teegen, Doh and Vachani [2004, pp. 463-465] 
define NGOs as “private, not-for-profit organizations that aim to 
_________
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Prof. Dr. Klaus Hensel-
mann, Lehrstuhl für Rechnungswesen und Prüfungswesen, Betriebswirtschaftli-
ches Institut, Friedrich-Alexander Universität, Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany; 
Prof. Chris Nobes, Fellow ACCA, Professor of Accounting, School of Management, 
Royal Holloway University of London, UK; Mr. Kurt Ramin, Commercial Director 
(retired), International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, London, 
UK; Prof. Stephen Zeff, Professor of Accounting, Jones Graduate School of Busi-
ness, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA; Dick Fleischman and Gloria Vollmers, 
AHJ editors, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier ver-
sions of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
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serve particular societal interests by focusing advocacy and/or 
operational efforts on societal, political and economic goals, in-
cluding equity, education, health, environmental protection and 
human rights.” The emergence of NGOs as institutions filling 
voids where governments and firms have been unwilling or un-
able to meet consumer and citizen needs underlines their impor-
tance and justifies an examination of their role in globalization. 
Both the IASC (and its successor, the International Accounting 
Standards Board, or IASB) and the US FASB have proven to be 
vital promoters of the globalization of international financial ac-
counting standards.
This paper traces the evolution of the relationship be-
tween these organizations through analysis of correspondence 
preserved in the IASC files located in the archives of the IASC 
Foundation,1 as well as analysis of published documents of the 
FASB and the IASB. It is fleshed out with information from cor-
respondence and interviews with individuals who participated 
in the developments. The paper proceeds through the follow-
ing sections: The First Twelve Years; Deepening Contacts: The 
Next Ten Years; The FASB Seeks to Involve the IASC; The IASC/ 
IOSCO Core Standards Program; the G4+1; Restructuring the 
IASC; The Strategy Working Party; The FASB/IASB Convergence 
Program; Summary and Prospect; and Epilog.
THE FIRST TWELVE YEARS
The IASC was founded by the accountancy bodies of nine 
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland (UK), and the 
United States (US) as a private sector NGO. A part-time body of 
standard setters who met three or four times a year in various 
cities around the globe, it had a small, full-time secretariat at its 
London location.2 
1  On July 1, 2010, the IASC Foundation changed its name to the International Financial 
Reporting Standards Foundation. This paper employs the historically accurate names for the 
periods covered. 
2  “There is an important contrast between the IASC and the FASB. The IASC 
was set up by the accounting institutes (certain people in particular) who be-
lieved that the accountancy profession should set accounting standards. The US 
had gone through that experience and had moved on to the idea of an indepen-
dent standard setter. So the two bodies were constituted differently and so may 
have approached standard setting and standards on particular topics in different 
ways.” David Cairns, emails to the author, September 11, and December 15, 2011. 
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Table 1.
Chairmen and Secretaries(-General)
Chairmen of IASC Period Origin
Sir Henry Benson 1973 - 76 UK & Ireland
Joseph P. Cummings 1976 - 78 US
John A. Hepworth 1978 - 80 Australia
J.A. (Hans) Burggraaff 1980 - 82 Netherlands
Stephen Elliott 1982 - 85 Canada
John L. Kirkpatrick 1985 - 87 UK & Ireland
Georges Barthès de Ruyter 1987 - 90 France
Art Wyatt 1990 - 92 US
Eiichi Shiratori 1993 - 95 Japan
Michael Sharpe 1995 - 97 Australia
Stig Enevoldsen 1998 - 2000 Denmark
Tom Jones
Chairman of IASB
Sir David Tweedie
2000 – 01
2001 –11
US/UK
UK
Secretaries to 1983; Secretaries-General from 1984
Paul Rosenfield 1973 - 75 US
W.J. (John) Brennan 1975 - 77 Canada
Roy C. Nash 1977 - 79 US
Allan V.C. Cook 1979 - 81 UK
Geoffrey B. Mitchell 1981 - 85 Australia
David Cairns 1985 - 94 UK
Sir Bryan Carsberg 1995 - 2001 UK
Adapted from Robert J. Kirsch (2006), The International Accounting Standards 
Committee: A Political History. London: CCH/WoltersKluwer, Appendix 1, p. 381.
The FASB was founded in 1973. Its creation was based 
upon the recommendations of the 1972 Wheat Committee of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) to 
replace its predecessor, the eighteen-member Accounting Prin-
ciples Board (APB), which was controlled by the profession. The 
FASB was established to ensure that its seven full-time standard 
setters acted in the interests of financial statement users. The 
Board was composed of former auditors, preparers, and users of 
financial information [Miller, Redding and Bahnson, 1994, pp. 
36-38]; traditionally, one member came from academe.
The FASB’s authority derives from the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), which, since its founding in 1934, 
has looked to private-sector NGOs to provide directions for 
13
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financial reporting practices and now recognizes their standards 
as “authoritative” and “generally accepted” for purposes of US 
federal securities laws.3 With respect to non-public companies, 
the FASB’s authority comes from the AICPA and its require-
ments governing the responsibilities of auditors who are AICPA 
members.4 Thus, the FASB operates within a regulatory envi-
ronment that may limit its independence, whereas the IASC 
and, until recently, its successor, the IASB, did not. However, 
the need for the IASC to get its standards accepted by national 
bodies may have circumscribed its independence, or at least the 
independence of some of the organizations or representatives 
on its board. The same issue arises with the IASB.5 This is quite 
evident, for example, in the EU decision to endorse IAS 39 with 
reservations, i.e., “carve-outs.”
Table 2.
FASB Chairmen and Their Terms of Service 
Marshall S. Armstrong November 1, 1972 – December 31, 1977
Donald J. Kirk January 1, 1978 – December 31, 1986
Dennis R. Beresford January 1, 1987 – June 30, 1997
Edmund L. Jenkins July 1, 1997 – June 30, 2002
Robert H. Herz July 1, 2002 – September 30, 2010
Leslie F. Seidman October 1, 2010 –
Source: Charry D. Boris, Manager, Library Services, Financial Accounting Foun- 
dation.
3 See “Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Ac-
counting Principles and Standards,” Accounting Series Release No. 150, Decem-
ber 20, 1973, and “Policy Statement Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Des-
ignated Private-Sector Standard Setter,” Securities Act Release No. 33-8221, April 
23, 2003, available at www.sec/gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm.
4  Edmund L. Jenkins, letter to author, September 14, 2008.
5  “The IASC was not independent of the accountancy bodies although it did 
have the power to set its own standards without the approval of those bodies – 
but, of course, the bodies appointed the people who voted. The IASB has always 
been independent of the accountancy bodies. The IASB/IASCF structure was very 
much modelled on the then FASB/FAF structure – thanks to SEC pressure which 
you mention later – so, the IASB was and is as independent as the FASB - but, 
of course, the IASC did not derive its authority from any particular jurisdiction”; 
and “As you explain, both the IASB and FASB are susceptible to pressure/lobby-
ing from various sources – and both may find that those who give authority do 
not accept what they do. In other words, the SEC has not accepted some FASB 
requirements or proposals and specific jurisdictions have not accepted IASB re-
quirements. Similarly, the US Congress has objected to some FASB requirements/
proposals and the equivalent bodies in other jurisdictions have objected to some 
IASB requirements/proposals. The only difference between the FASB and the 
IASB is that the FASB is dealing with one jurisdiction whereas the IASB is dealing 
with multiple jurisdcitions which have varying traditions.” (David Cairns, emails to 
author, October 27, 2008, and September 15, 2011)
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In the first few years of the IASC’s basic standards phase 
there was limited contact between it and the FASB. What 
contact they had was rather formal. Consider the following ex-
ample. On September 14, 1973, IASC Secretary Paul Rosenfield 
wrote FASB Chairman Marshall Armstrong:
 …I am writing this letter to you in my private capac-
ity (italics added) and not as Secretary of the IASC to 
ask how liaison between the two bodies should be es-
tablished. Should the IASC be in direct formal contact 
with the FASB, or should formal contact be through the 
AICPA or other American bodies?
Armstrong’s September 18, 1973, letter of response to Rosenfield 
stated:
In my judgment, inasmuch as the AICPA is the member 
organization of the IASC, liaison with the FASB should 
be through the AICPA, rather than directly with us, 
although I hope that you will feel free to call on me per-
sonally if you feel I might be of assistance.6
Thus, Armstrong left the door open to direct communication. 
In the future, direct contact between the IASC and the FASB 
became routine. 
However, in the early years, the IASC, created by profes-
sional accountancy bodies rather than standard-setting bodies, 
insisted that contacts with national standard setters should be 
channeled through the related IASC national member body. This 
was still the case when Hans Burggraaff served as the fourth 
IASC Chairman, 1980-1982. When he visited FASB Chairman 
Don Kirk in May 1981, Burggraaff got prior permission from the 
AICPA President.7 When David Cairns joined the IASC as its Sec-
retary-General in 1985, it was explained to him that any contact 
between the IASC and national standard-setting bodies had to 
be made through the member accountancy bodies in that coun-
try.  He drew the ire of the Institutes in both Canada and the UK 
for talking directly to people in their respective standard-setting 
bodies. As he has noted, “The AICPA was perhaps more relaxed 
about this (perhaps because they did not expect the IASC and 
the FASB to reach a joint conclusion in private).”8 In those early 
years, it was generally thought within IASC that the accounting 
profession should set accounting standards and enforce their ac-
6  IASC Archive File, FASB.
7  Hans Burggraaff, email to author, September 8, 2008. 
8  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008.
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ceptance and application, and that it was capable of doing both.9 
While direct contacts between the FASB and the IASC were 
rare at this time, the FASB was very much aware of the IASC’s 
standard-setting work and the SEC’s reaction to it. Camfferman 
and Zeff [2007, pp. 157-160] recount a controversy among the 
Financial Executives Institute (FEI), the SEC, and the FASB 
over a proposal in IASC’s December 1974 Exposure Draft 3 
(E3), Consolidated Financial Statements, that all subsidiaries, 
not excepting banking, insurance, and finance subsidiaries of 
industrial parents, be consolidated. GAAP of the time excepted 
the inclusion of such subsidiaries. On June 10, 1975, John C. 
Burton, SEC Chief Accountant, wrote the AICPA that E3 was 
“not inconsistent” with GAAP and that the SEC would propose 
amendments to Regulation S-X “which will conform its consoli-
dation rules” to those in E3 if the FASB issued no statement to 
the contrary. After seeing Burton’s letter, FASB Chairman Arm-
strong wrote SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., that “the proposed 
action could seriously undermine” the FASB by weakening its 
recognized authority and causing a loss of financial support. 
Garrett responded to Armstrong [Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, 
pp. 159-160]: 
It seems clear that all efforts at an international level 
cannot be expected to adopt an American solution. It 
seems even clearer that proposed solutions at such a 
level may be considered for possible adoption [in the 
US] without upsetting the authority of the Board when 
the Board has not yet decided to deal with the issue.
In the same letter, Garrett commented:
The Commission [is] witnessing an influx of foreign 
registrants… [T]he adoption of international standards 
will achieve improved comparability in an environment 
which is currently riddled with exceptions. We there-
fore have viewed with favor the development of the 
IASC and our [Burton] letter was designed to express 
our support for their international objectives.
The two-year-old FASB took an egocentric posture, while the 
SEC had a broader view in supporting the work of the IASC, 
even at this early date. 
Reciprocal FASB/IASC meetings began to occur regularly 
in 1975. Camfferman and Zeff [2007, pp. 161-162] recount two 
FASB/IASC meetings in 1976 and 1977. On March 23, 1976, 
9  Hans Burggraaff, email to author, September 8, 2008. 
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an IASC steering committee chairman, Alex Mackenzie, met 
two staff members in the FASB’s office. Mackenzie reported 
that Marshall Armstrong had said, “As regards the problem of 
reconciling domestic and international standards his approach 
was ‘conference and not confrontation.’” The second meeting 
occurred in November 1977. On December 7, Armstrong wrote 
William P. Hauworth, II, Chairman of the AICPA’s international 
technical subcommittee, that the meeting with the IASC rep-
resentatives was helpful and that the FASB would consider the 
underlying reasoning of IASs 1-6 whenever the FASB undertook 
projects in which such positions would be “relevant.” 
On February 14, 1980, IASC Secretary Allan Cook met the 
FASB staff in Stamford, Connecticut. Following that meeting, 
Moshe S. Levitin, FASB Technical Associate, sent Cook a draft 
memorandum of the meeting for his review. In the section deal-
ing with the relationship of the FASB with the IASC, the draft 
indicated: 
Mr. Cook stated that because of recent criticism that 
IASC standards reflect the views of a small group, the 
IASC wants more input from bodies such as the FASB 
and the European Economic Community [EEC]. He 
indicated that the IASC Board will shortly consider for-
mal FASB involvement. Mr. Walters [FASB Board Mem-
ber] stated his belief that the FASB might be receptive 
to the idea of increased involvement in IASC activities. 
Perhaps a nonvoting permanent observer at IASC meet-
ings should be considered. Messrs. Cook and Nash [of 
the IASC] indicated that the matter will be discussed 
further among the IASC members and with the AICPA 
representatives.10
This quote reveals that the IASC staff coupled increased FASB 
participation in IASC activities with extension of the same 
privileges to the EEC; they would continue this strategy until 
both accepted observer membership on the IASC Board. It is 
also interesting that it was an FASB Member who first suggested 
the FASB become a permanent observer of the IASC Board. The 
FASB would repeatedly make the request in the years ahead.
Levitin’s draft memorandum next dealt with accounting 
for grants received from governments; it explained that the 
FASB staff had recommended waiting until the IASC issued its 
standard and then incorporate it into an FASB document which 
“would indicate tangible support for international harmoniza-
10  Kirsch (1996), pp. 157-158.
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tion of accounting standards.” 
On foreign currency translation,11 Levitin noted that Cook 
had stated the IASC’s desire to participate in and to assist with 
the current effort to harmonize FTC accounting standards in the 
US, Canada, and the UK. Subsequently, Cook received an invita-
tion to join the FASB’s Task Force on Foreign Currency.12 With 
the authorization of Chairman John Hepworth, Cook accepted 
the invitation.13
Despite the February 14, 1980, discussion of possible non-
voting observer member status for the FASB at IASC meetings, 
in June 1980 the IASC Board agreed to “not invite FASB as ob-
server.” It acknowledged the previous good efforts of the FASB 
staff on behalf of the IASC, but it was not yet ready to admit the 
FASB to Board member observer status.14 In the July 1982 issue 
of World Accounting Report (WAR), Peter Mantle reported that 
IASC Chairman Hans Burggraaff explained that the IASC had 
made a conscious decision “to seek a unification of the account-
ing profession, not of the standard setters (p. 5).” 
 [In the first part of my term] there was no urgency to 
liaise with national standard setters, and that was the 
case too as regards FASB. It was only in the second part 
of my term [that] the [IASC] Board began to realize 
that, in order to make our standards stick, we needed 
the support from all parties – preparers, users, standard 
11  In March 1979, the FASB appointed a 14-member task force to advise the 
Board with respect to its project to reconsider Statement No. 8, “Accounting for 
the Translation of Foreign Currency Transactions and Foreign Currency Financial 
Statements.” FASB Status Report, No. 83, March 15, 1979, p.1.
12  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008. “Allan Cook ...was the only 
IASC secretary to come from a large multinational company and had a particular 
interest in foreign currency translation. My understanding is that he played a 
major part in obtaining the resolution of the issue, in particular the approach 
taken in FAS 52.” 
13  In December 1981, the FASB Status Report announced that Statement No. 
52, a new foreign currency translation standard, replaced Statement No. 8. The 
Board acknowledged the assistance it received from the fourteen-member Advi-
sory Task Force, as well as observers representing the IASC, the UK and Ireland 
Accounting Standards Committee, and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants. 
14  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008. “While [the IASC] knew 
that the technical contribution of the FASB and the European Commission would 
be different, it had to involve them both for political reasons. This proved to be 
true when, eventually, the FASB and the European Commission later attended 
board meetings. The FASB often had substantive technical comments to make. 
The European Commission’s comments tended to be limited to the text (or the 
interpretation of the text) of the Fourth and Seventh Directives.”
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setters, regulators. And that made liasion with national 
standard setters necessary. To make them aware of our 
existence, to foster a positive and friendly attitude, to 
request input and comment on drafts, and to urge them 
to consider whether they could harmonize their stan-
dards with ours.”15
Thus, contacts between the two organizations continued. 
On May 31, 1981, IASC Chairman Burggraaff reported on a con-
versation he had had with FASB Chairman Don Kirk on May 13, 
1981:
[Regarding Accounting for Income Taxes] I suggested 
to constitute a working party, consisting of representa-
tives of US, UK, and Dutch standard setting bodies, 
chaired by a representative of IASC to explore…wheth-
er a common solution could be found. The fact that a 
joint approach to the treatment of foreign-currency-
translation had proved to be productive, had led the 
Board of IASC to believe that a similar approach to the 
annoying problem of deferred taxation might contrib-
ute to international harmonization.
Mr. Kirk pointed out that he was very much in favor 
of international harmonization. However, FASB had to 
adhere to its rules of due process, and he was not in a 
position to negociate [sic] international agreements.
Mr. Kirk will let me know in due course whether FASB 
would be inclined to participate in a working party.16
Contacts continued on other levels as well. On May 21, 
1981, Secretary Cook wrote Kirk that at a recent meeting the 
IASC Board agreed, at the discretion of the Chairman, to invite 
guests to attend Board meetings, and he invited him to the June 
1981 meeting. He stated that Burggraaff would be happy to in-
vite Kirk to speak if he chose to do so, even though guests would 
not normally be expected to participate in the discussions. Cook 
added, “You may like to know that a similar invitation is being 
sent to the European commission.” 
Kirk did attend.17 On July 2, 1981, he wrote to Burggraaff 
to thank him for the invitation. Kirk commented, “I was most 
impressed with the Committee members and with the caliber of 
15  Hans Burggraaff, email to the author, September 8, 2008.
16  IASC Archive File. FASB. Ultimately, the FASB and the IASC did cooperate on the 
development of their respective Income Tax Standards.
17  IASC Board Meeting Minutes, London, June 23-26, 1981. 
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the discussion.”
Further meetings followed. In January 1982 and November 
1983, IASC representatives visited the FASB in Connecticut. The 
November IASC delegation consisted of Chairman Steve Elliott, 
Secretary-General Geoffrey Mitchell, and Paul Rosenfield, now 
Staff Observer for the US. The IASC file note of the meeting is 
instructive. First, the delegation met with Ralph Walters, FASB 
Member, and Jim Leisenring, FASB Director of Research and 
Technical Activities. Elliott indicated that it was IASC’s wish 
that enterprises that traded internationally or whose securities 
were traded internationally would state that they complied with 
IASs.18 Elliott indicated that it was unfortunate that the FASB 
was not part of the IASC Board. He asked if there was some way 
in which the two standard-setting organizations could “become 
closer.” 
Later that day, Elliott met with Kirk and invited him to at-
tend a meeting of the IASC Board during 1984. Elliott raised the 
possibility of FASB becoming more closely involved in the work 
of IASC, perhaps through involvement in IASC’s Consultative 
Group.19 Kirk expressed interest in this suggestion and agreed to 
discuss the matter further.
Near the end of his term, in December 1983, FASB Mem-
ber Walters’s remarks at a meeting of the FASB and the Arthur 
Andersen Public Review Board were reflective of the situation 
at the time. Walters observed that the FASB had no official 
role or relationship with the IASC. The AICPA represented the 
US because the IASC comprised national professional bodies. 
He observed, “The FASB’s attitude toward the IASC has been 
a mixture of unofficial encouragement, moral support, and 
benign neglect.” The FASB staff monitored IASC activities and 
reviewed and commented upon IASC exposure drafts. But the 
Board did not normally consider or take a position on IASC 
standards. Limited contact and liaison had occurred between 
18  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008. “Both Stephen Elliott and 
John Kirkpatrick devoted a considerable amount of effort to persuading companies who traded 
internationally or whose securities traded internationally to state that their financial statements 
complied with IAS (as well as appropriate national standards). Elliott had announced this poli-
cy at the 1982 World Congress. Kirkpatrick (who was my first chairman) pushed this policy in 
every speech. It is not an easy policy to persuade national standard setting bodies to accept. It 
is doubtful that the FASB would have had any reason to support such a policy.”
19  In 1981, the IASC established the Consultative Group of outside experts. 
The Group met twice a year with the IASC Board and provided input on the 
IASC’s technical agenda, its work program, and its broader strategy. David Cairns 
has indicated that some Consultative Group members participated on IASC Steer-
ing Committees (Kirsch, 2006, p. 112). 
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the two groups, usually initiated by the IASC, whose chairman 
and secretary had visited the FASB a number of times. IASC 
had supplied representatives for FASB task forces on projects 
of strong common interest, such as foreign currency translation 
and income tax allocation. The FASB chairman had attended 
an IASC meeting in London in 1981. The vice chairman of the 
FASB is a member of an IASC steering committee on income tax 
allocation. “Overall, the FASB is aware of IASC activities and re-
acts positively to IASC’s requests but does not take the initiative 
in the relationship,” noted Walters. He continued:
The absence of the most influential standard-setting 
body in the free world from the IASC is an anomaly.20 
From time to time, leadership of the IASC has consid-
ered whether the FASB should become a member. The 
FASB has not sought or encouraged consideration of 
membership on the IASC. The Board’s Rules of Proce-
dure would make it difficult if not impossible for it to 
assume a voting membership on the IASC board.
The position of the FASB toward other international bodies, 
such as the United Nations and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, was to suggest they support 
the IASC and stay out of the standard-setting process. Walters 
observed, “International harmonization has a low priority at the 
FASB. The subject is not even mentioned in the statement of the 
FASB’s mission….It is inconceivable to me that the standard-
setting body for the US will not become involved in establishing 
international standards.”21
There were divisions within the FASB over participation 
20  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008. “There were some in the 
IASC that felt the same way. Others did not feel that way … because they believed 
the profession should control standard setting. The [following] response from 
Don Kirk places emphasis on the needs of users in financial statements in capital 
markets. The USA is, possibly, unique in that many entities are not required to 
file financial statements with some regulatory authority. Therefore, the FASB has 
concentrated on those companies that raise capital on US public markets. In con-
trast, the IASC developed accounting standards that had to apply to all companies 
(public and private). As the IASC shifted its focus to companies on international 
capital markets in the early 1990s, the co-operation between the IASC and the 
FASB increased.”
21  For the texts of Walters’s remarks and Kirk’s response, see FASB Status 
Report, No. 154, March 12, 1984, pp. 5-8. Support for Walters’s observation is 
evident by the absence of mention of the IASC or IAS in the paper Donald Kirk 
presented to the Arthur Young Professors Roundtable in May 1983. See: “The 
FASB After Ten Years: An Inside View: A Paper by Donald J. Kirk, Chairman, 
Financial Accounting Standards Board,” in Bricker and Previts, 2002, pp. 9-27. 
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with the IASC. This is reflected in FASB Chairman Donald J. 
Kirk’s response to Walters. Kirk observed that because of legal 
requirements and American expectations, the FASB must con-
centrate on its mission to develop standards for entities that 
issue financial reports in accordance with GAAP. With respect to 
direct participation by the FASB in the IASC, “that is not feasi-
ble under the IASC’s present charter and the Board’s own Rules 
of Procedure.” Were those circumstances to change, it would be 
awkward for the FASB to participate in setting standards that 
inevitably would differ in important respects from FASB’s own 
standards.
These were the formative years of both the FASB and the 
IASC. FASB had plenty to deal with domestically as its stan-
dards were criticized as too detailed and costly for small and 
mid-sized entities.22 The IASC was busy establishing its interna-
tional bona fides, introducing its initial standards, and measur-
ing their impact.23
DEEPENING CONTACTS: THE NEXT TEN YEARS
In 1986, the Financial Accounting Foundation announced 
the appointment of Dennis R. Beresford as FASB Chairman. 
Among the experiences Beresford brought to the Board was 
service as US IASC representative, 1982-84. With Beresford’s 
assumption of the Chairmanship, the FASB began to take a 
greater interest in international accounting matters.
Criticism of the IASC’s many permissible alternative ac-
counting treatments by members of the profession and national 
standard setters led to the launching of its Comparability/Im-
provements projects. At its March 1987 meeting, the IASC Board 
appointed a Steering Committee, chaired by Ralph Walters, 
now representing the AICPA on the IASC Board, to use the IASC 
Framework “to test the validity of alternative treatments and de-
cide whether they are acceptable.” This became the IASC’s Com-
parability Project, and led to E 32, Comparability of Financial 
Statements [Kirsch, 2006, pp. 182-184]. 
On July 3, 1987, Walters spoke to Secretary-General Da-
vid Cairns about a recent conversation he had had with FASB 
Chairman Beresford and Jim Leisenring about proposals for 
involving the FASB more in the work of the IASC. Among the 
proposals was one that “the FASB could appoint an observer to 
22  See: WAR, March 1982, October 1982, and December 1983.
23  See: WAR, September 1979, June 1983, and October 1984.
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the IASC Board.”
Before the World Congress of Accountants in Tokyo, Oc-
tober 11-15, 1987, the majority of the IASC Board did not take 
very seriously the possibility of inviting the FASB and the Euro-
pean Commission to serve as IASC observers. The non-US, non-
UK members were quite conscious of the asymmetry of means 
and reputation between the FASB and the IASC at that time. 
For many IASC Board members, it would have been interpreted 
as giving too much influence to the US point of view. But those 
who favored the invitation were helped by the following: (1) the 
AICPA sent representatives to the IASC Board who held personal 
opinions that did not always coincide with GAAP; and (2) the 
European delegates, who had a blocking minority, kept referring 
to the [European Community’s Accounting] Directives,24 but 
held different national interpretations of them. “The situation 
was becoming embarrassing, as the exercise was not to invent, 
but to choose (or to offer options) between proven methods.”25
At the Tokyo World Congress, outgoing IASC Chairman 
John L. Kirkpatrick and incoming Chairman Georges Barthès de 
Ruyter (Georges Barthès)26 agreed that they would offer two ob-
server seats to the FASB and the European Commission. “This 
was part of a very significant shift in policy lead by Georges 
Barthès. As soon as he became chairman, he emphasised the 
need for direct links between the IASC and important players: 
the FASB and the European Commission. He went to the FASB 
within two weeks of taking office.”27 Georges Barthès has ob-
served:
…we knew it would be easy with the FASB and very 
difficult with the Commission. But, politically, it had to 
be simultaneous. If not, the general feeling would have 
been that the IASC would become the international 
subsidiary of the FASB. Think of the difference of tech-
nical means between the two organisations! And it was 
already obvious that Europe would be a better “market 
opportunity,” at first, than the US. So the move was de-
24  Mainly the Fourth and Seventh Directives, which govern the contents of published 
financial statements. 
25  Georges Barthès de Ruyter, email to author, September 2, 2008. David 
Cairns, emails to author, September 11, and December 15, 2011, indicated that 
US and UK board members were likewise quite conscious of the assymetry of 
means and reputation between the FASB and the IASC at that time, but that all 
US and UK members “did not necessarily support inviting the FASB and the EC.”
26  WAR, January 1987.
27  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008.
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layed by the incapacity of the Commission to decide…28 
On October 26, 1987, Georges Barthès and David Cairns vis-
ited the FASB “in order to find ways of establishing a permanent 
link between the FASB and IASC.” Cairns minutes indicated: 
Georges Barthès observed that he would like to involve both the 
FASB and the EC more directly and permanently in the work 
of IASC. Beresford supported the idea of involvement in the 
Consultative Group and suggested that it might be more cost 
effective for such a FASB person to stay on as an observer to 
the Board meetings. Involvement in IASC Steering Committees 
was also discussed. Ways of increasing IASC involvement in the 
work of the FASB were considered including IASC taking part in 
FASB task forces and making nominations to the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Advisory Committee (FASAC).29
On March 11, 1988, Cairns visited the FASB for discus-
sions regarding invitations to the Consultative Group, national 
standard-setter meetings, and IASC’s Comparability Project. 
Cairns’s notes indicate that he “confirmed that the Board would 
not decide until June 1988 whether to extend a formal invitation 
to the FASB [and the European Commission] to join the Consul-
tative Group”; that the meeting participants thought that it was 
particularly appropriate that a national standard-setters meeting 
consider “the experience of standard-setting bodies with con-
ceptual frameworks”; and that a general discussion took place 
on various technical aspects of IASC’s Comparability Project, 
including pooling (uniting) of interests, investments, and joint 
ventures.
In the June 27, 1988, issue of Status Report, Beresford set 
forth his view of the role the FASB might take in achieving ac-
counting standards responsive to the needs of a global market-
place.30 Regarding the term harmonization, Beresford observed 
that it should not be seen as “a search for commonality at the 
price of settling on the lowest common denominator…[T]he 
FASB would support an objective that seeks to create superior 
international standards that would then gradually supplant na-
tional standards as the superior standards became universally 
accepted.” Beresford identified a number of obstacles that needed 
28  Email to author, September 13, 2008.
29  David Cairns, emails to author, October 27, 2008,and December 15, 2011. 
“The IASC made a nomination (Derek Bonham, the CFO of Hanson). I recall it being quite a 
difficult process to find somebody both suitable and available to participate in the US process.”
30  Remarks made to the IASC Board during its Toronto meeting, June 22-24, 1988, WAR, 
October 1988, p. 8. Venue confirmed by David Cairns, email to author, September 11, 2011.
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to be overcome for international accounting standards to be 
widely accepted: (1) the differing national objectives of financial 
reporting; (2) the wide spectrum of national standard-setting 
structures from predominantly government-set to predominantly 
private-sector standards; (3) nationalism; and (4) the particular 
economic, political, and social priorities of various nations. After 
acknowledging the criticisms of the FASB’s attitude toward IASs 
(variously described by others as “benign neglect,” “uninterested,” 
“uncooperative,” and “less than enthusiastic”), Beresford identi-
fied a number of actions that should help the FASB become 
more directly involved in improving international accounting 
standards. The FASB’s near-term international initiative included: 
(1) willingness to join the IASC Consultative Group; (2) expansion 
and strengthening relationships with national standard-setting 
bodies; (3) more systematic analysis of international accounting 
literature in connection with major FASB projects; (4) solicitation 
of more commentary on FASB exposure drafts from an interna-
tional perspective; (5) discussion with IASC leadership on hold-
ing an international conference of national standard setters on 
accounting conceptual frameworks; and (6) seeking accountants 
with foreign experience to join the FASB staff. Beresford com-
mented, “Injecting an international perspective into [the FASB’s 
due] process can help make the FASB a constructive player in the 
quest for superior international standards that are universally ac-
cepted.” He concluded, “International standards are not likely to 
be our highest priority for the foreseeable future but they will be 
a factor in our regular process. Their priority will rise as constitu-
ent needs increase….”31
On August 1, 1988, IASC Chairman Georges Barthès ex-
tended an invitation to Beresford to join the IASC Consultative 
Group. Sagely, he observed:
The Board is well aware that improvements in Interna-
tional Accounting Standards cannot be separated from 
developments in national requirements. Closer work-
ing relationships between IASC and national standard-
setting bodies will help increase the likelihood that dif-
ferent national standard-setting bodies reach the same 
solution to the same issues. Such a position is, without 
doubt, the best basis for International Accounting Stan-
dards.32
31  “FASB Viewpoints: Internationalization of Accounting Standards: The Role 
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board,” No. 195, pp. 3-6.
32  IASC Archive File, FASB.
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George Barthès noted the Board had decided to review its 
policy on the attendance of observers (notably, members from 
the Consultative Group) at Board meetings. Thus, he could not 
confirm whether the FASB representative would be able to at-
tend part of the Board meetings on a regular basis.
Ten days later, Beresford responded to Georges Barthès’s 
letter, “I believe we should defer a decision on accepting the in-
vitation until you have concluded your discussions regarding at-
tendance of observers at Board meetings.” Noting that the FASB 
had to carefully consider costs and would have difficulty justi-
fying sending someone to a one-day meeting overseas, he ob-
served that “a major objective of our participation is to hear the 
discussion of the projects by the Board members themselves.”33
Ultimately, on September 12, 1988, Georges Barthès wrote 
Beresford to extend the invitation for the FASB to attend Board 
meetings as well as Consultative Group meetings. In addition, 
he noted that a similar invitation had been extended to the Eu-
ropean Commission. On September 27, Beresford accepted the 
IASC’s invitation. FASB Board member James Leisenring was 
the initial appointee as FASB observer. World Accounting Report 
(October 1988) greeted FASB’s acceptance of IASC Consultative 
Group Membership as “a major development indicating a move 
away from its previous insular perspective.”
THE FASB SEEKS TO INVOLVE THE IASC
Rather quickly after accepting the IASC’s invitation, the 
FASB sought to involve the IASC in its own projects. Thus, less 
than a month later, on October 21, 1988, Beresford wrote Georg-
es Barthès asking him to nominate someone who could lend an 
international perspective to the FASB’s task force looking into 
recognition and measurement phases of its project on Financial 
Instruments and Off-Balance Sheet Financing.
The FASB continued to press the IASC to hold a conference 
of national standard-setters on Conceptual Frameworks.34 In 
conjunction with the 1990 United Nations meeting,35 the FASB 
agreed to a formal IASC visit at which the IASC would report on 
33  IASC Archive File, FASB.
34  Meetings at the FASB, Norwalk, Connecticut, July 18, 1989.
35 David Cairns, email to author, September 11, 2011. “It was ‘in conjunction 
with’ only in the sense that I and (probably) Georges Barthès were in New York for 
that meeting. In the same way that the FASB had cost constraints, the IASC also 
had budget constraints. As the relationship developed, the IASC made specific 
visits to the FASB unrelated to other commitments in the US.” 
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what its Board intended for its Exposure Draft on Comparability 
(E32).
At the July 25, 1989, Financial Accounting Standards Ad-
visory Committee meeting, E32 featured prominently in the 
discussions. In his notes on the meeting, David Cairns reported 
that among the issues were the question of implementation and 
the need for compromises that would not result in the weaken-
ing of national standards. Noting that IASs were well above the 
lowest common denominator, Cairns emphasized the important 
role national standard-setting bodies could play in IASC and the 
need for change in IASC itself. Further, he stressed that the com-
parability project was part of a wider improvements project that 
IASC was carrying out.36
In early 1991, the FASB’s Financial Accounting Founda-
tion (FAF) asked the FASB Board to prepare a strategic plan for 
FASB international activities. On March 5, David Mosso, former 
two-term Board member and current FASB senior staff person, 
faxed Arthur Wyatt, IASC Chairman, a copy of the draft strate-
gic plan for his review. In his thoughtful comments welcoming 
FASB’s development of a strategic plan for international involve-
ment, Wyatt, an American and former FASB member, 1985-87, 
observed:
…I believe that the ultimate resolution of the standard-
setting dilemma internationally will not lie in the hands 
of the standard setters, but will lie in the hands of the 
regulators….
…I believe that [the FASB] has gone too far in [the] 
direction [of the detailed rules approach] and that the 
most significant responsibility for fair financial presen-
tations must rest with preparers and auditors. If such a 
development were to take place, accounting standards 
would have to be more flexible than they are in the 
United States and thus be somewhat more like those 
we find in many other countries. Greater flexibility, of 
course, poses real problems for regulators, but in my 
view the direction in which we have been moving in 
the United States is doomed to failure. There simply 
isn’t any way for the FASB, or any other private sector 
standard-setting body, to bear the responsibility that is 
properly borne by those who prepare financial state-
ments and those who audit them.37
36  IASC Archive File, FASB.
37  IASC Archive File, FASB.
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Wyatt concluded that the IASC appeared to be a structure that 
had promise for achieving improvements over a shorter time 
span than other alternatives one could develop.
On March 12, 1991, Cairns met with FASB’s Jim Leisenring, 
David Mosso, and Jeannot Blanchet (the person with interna-
tional experience that the FASB recruited to deal with interna-
tional matters)38 to discuss FASB’s draft strategic plan. Among 
the items discussed were FASB/IASC cooperation on earnings 
per share (EPS) and business combinations, annual meetings of 
national standard setters, and the effectiveness of FASB involve-
ment in IASC’s Consultative Group. Cairns’s notes39 record that 
“DHC [Cairns] recognized problem. Added that reconsidering 
role of Consultative Group – may need to move away from focus 
on IASC Board’s current agenda.” Subsequently, Cairns noted, 
“My acknowledgement of problems with consultative group 
meetings was a general concern that the IASC was not getting 
the sort of input it wanted from the consultative group.” 40
In August 1991, the FASB published its plan for interna-
tional activities in its Status Report.41 Paragraph 3 gave the two 
assumptions upon which the plan was based: domestic financial 
reporting needs would continue to be the FASB’s first prior-
ity, and its international activities would be conducted within 
its charter and mission statement. Paragraph 4 reiterated the 
FASB’s position that “[t]he ultimate goal…would be a body of 
superior international accounting standards that were accepted 
in all countries as GAAP for general purpose external financial 
statements.” Paragraph 5 laid out the principal goals of the 
FASB’s international strategy: (1) “[t]o make financial state-
ments more useful for investor and creditor decision making by 
increasing the international comparability of accounting stan-
dards concurrently with improving the quality of accounting 
standards”; and (2) “[t]o enhance the FASB’s standard-setting 
process, and resulting standards, by gaining new insights and 
ideas from other national and international standard setters and 
from financial statement users, preparers, auditors and educa-
tors in other countries.” 
38  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008.
39  Notes of a meeting at the FASB, Norwalk, 12th March 1991, on the FASB’s 
draft Strategic Plan for involvement in International Activities. IASC Archive File. 
FASB.
40 David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008.
41  Drafts of the FASB plan were discussed with the IASC, the FASAC, the 
technical partners of the Big Six accounting firms, representatives of the SEC, 
and the AICPA. 
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In paragraph 6, the FASB outlined the standard-setting ef-
forts it would take to achieve these goals, including: (a) consid-
eration of foreign national and IASC standards in domestically 
oriented FASB projects; (b) engagement in joint multinational 
standards-setting projects on mutually selected topics; (c) con-
sidering the adoption of foreign national or IASC standards 
judged to be superior to their US counterparts; (d) convincing 
other countries, or the IASC, to adopt specific US standards 
judged to be superior; (e) attempting to reach agreement on a 
choice of existing standards to which neither US standards nor 
other national or IASC standards were demonstrably superior; 
and (f) continuing to encourage equality of financial statement 
requirements for foreign and domestic companies in their utili-
zation of US capital markets.
Paragraph 9 laid out the FASB’s near-term focus: (1) cooper-
ate with IASC, Canada, and other national standard setters in 
the consideration of accounting for financial instruments; (2) 
participate in an international conference on a common frame-
work of accounting concepts; (3) review the differences between 
US standards and those of the IASC and other major countries; 
(4) identify a project with promise for reaching quickly broad 
international agreement, such as determining the EPS de-
nominator; and (5) consider adopting IAS 20, Accounting for 
Government Grants.42 World Accounting Report [October 1991, 
p. 1] greeted the plan  by noting that “the FASB is set to become 
a major player in international harmonization, after 20 years of 
only occasional flirtations” with non-US standard setters and the 
IASC.
In the June 30, 1992, issue of FASB Status Report, Beresford 
recounted the progress the FASB had made in the implementa-
tion of its plan and its internationalization efforts. The FASB 
had amended its mission statement to add an international 
dimension, nearly a decade after former Board member Walters 
had commented upon it. It had formed an informal advisory 
group to advise it on international matters, and, over the previ-
ous two years, had systematically given more attention to the 
accounting and research studies of other countries. It supported 
the IASC in its efforts to harmonize accounting internationally, 
had sent detailed comment letters on various IASC Exposure 
Drafts, and had offered its assistance to the IASC on its agenda 
projects, such as earnings per share. In terms of its relations 
42 “FASB’s Plan for International Activities,” No. 223, August 31, 1991, pp. 6-8. 
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with other countries, Beresford reported that the FASB sup-
ported the “mutual recognition” thrust of the SEC, especially 
with respect to Canada and the United Kingdom. In addition, 
it had invited the representatives of selected countries to attend 
a meeting at its offices following the October 1992 World Con-
gress of Accountants in Washington, D.C.43 
Forty participants attended the two-day conference.44 
Among them were: David Cairns, IASC Secretary-General; Eiichi 
Shiratori, incoming IASC Chairman; Edouard Salustro, Presi-
dent of the Fédération des Experts Comptable Européens (FEE); 
John Hegarty, FEE Secretary-General; Karel Van Hulle, Europe-
an Commission; and standard setters from Australia, Germany, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom. Items discussed included a 
review of the Brussels Conference on the need for a common 
conceptual framework, country-by-country reviews, cooperative 
efforts to improve accounting standards, and future meetings.45
On May 4, 1993, FASB Chairman Beresford and Canadian 
Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) Chairman Paul Palmer 
sent a joint letter to IASC Chairman Eiichi Shiratori to suggest 
that the IASC’s recent decision to reconsider IAS 14, Business 
Segments, presented “an excellent opportunity” for the staffs of 
the IASC, FASB and AcSB “to share information and insights 
on the issues that will be addressed as these projects unfold.” 
As a consequence of this cooperation, the IASC’s revised IAS 
14 (1997) was more similar to the FASB’s original business 
segments standard than the revised FAS 131.46 There would be 
future cases in which, despite collaboration, the FASB and inter-
national standard setters would arrive at different approaches.
In December 1994, Beresford reported that the FASB had 
undertaken an evaluation of its Strategic Plan for international 
activities, and had essentially reaffirmed it with some revisions. 
He noted that in the original plan the FASB had listed as one of 
43  Status Report, No. 232, pp. 6 – 10.
44  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008: “It was this meeting which, to 
all effects, led to the creation of G4. Around this time, the FASB and the IASB also decided to 
co-operate on earnings per share. The IASC had already made significant progress 
and the FASB began the project on the basis that it would conform GAAP with the 
IASC’s thinking, as the FASB made clear in its project proposal”
45  “FASB Hosts Meeting of World Standard Setters,” FASB Status Report, No. 
237, November 30, 1992, pp. 2-3; for an interesting summary of the divisions 
evident at the meeting, see K. Atchley, 1992, pp. 154-155.
46  David Cairns, email to author, September 11, 2011. “This is a view (perhaps 
a myth) which seems to have grown up during the last few years. At the time the 
revised IAS 14 was approved the message was that it was close to FAS 131.” (See 
the history of IAS 14 in Cairns, 1999, pp. 741-744).
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its focal points “to encourage the equality of financial statement 
requirements for foreign and domestic companies in their utili-
zation of US capital markets.” In the revised plan, this became 
a specific objective, rather than a broad area of interest. Beres-
ford acknowledged that the movement toward international 
comparability should be comprehensive and that “the FASB 
should, where possible, contribute to the process at all levels.” 
He reported further that the FASB had revised the premise that 
domestic financial reporting needs would continue to be its first 
priority and that of other national standard setters. In light of its 
experience, the FASB concluded that its obligation to its domes-
tic constituents demanded “that it attempt to narrow the range 
of difference between US and foreign standards,” working with 
other standard setters around the world “to the extent necessary 
to achieve greater comparability.”47
THE IASC/IOSCO CORE STANDARDS PROGRAM48
As noted above, the IASC had been criticized for years for 
standards that were said to approach the lowest common de-
nominator. The first attempt to address such criticism, its Com-
parability/Improvements projects, had met with only limited 
success.
In the course of IASC’s history, one of its most important 
external relationships was that with the International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The relationship had 
begun in 1986, and a close liaison had developed during the 
Comparability/Improvements projects (1987-1994). With the 
passage of time, each organization devoted more and more time 
and resources to advancing their common cause: the issuance 
by IASC and endorsement by IOSCO of a core set of IASs that 
could be employed to prepare the necessary financial reports for 
cross-border listing of corporate securities. When the comple-
tion of the Comparability/Improvements projects in 1993 did 
not result in IOSCO endorsement, the executive officers and 
Board of IASC had been collectively very disappointed, and re-
lations between IOSCO and IASC Chairman Shiratori became 
strained.49 
47  “Notes from the Chairman,” FASB Status Report, No. 259, p. 2.; and “High-
lights of Financial Reporting Issues: FASB’s Plan for International Activities,” 
FASB Status Report , No. 262, pp. 6 – 10.
48  Excerpted from Kirsch, 2006, various chapters, updated with further re-
search.
49  David Cairns, email to author, September 11, 2011. “There were a lot of 
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There was clear evidence that the FASB was critical of as-
pects of the IASC’s approach to meeting IOSCO’s requirements 
in terms of both technical content and due process [Camfferman 
and Zeff, 2007, pp. 338-340]. During Cairns’s time as Secretary-
General, there was tension between the views of the IOSCO rep-
resentatives on the Improvements Project and the comments of 
the FASB. His last two years saw evidence of tensions between 
the position of the FASB and that of the US Board representa-
tives on financial instruments. Cairns recalled occasions “on 
which the FASB observers openly criticised US [Board] repre-
sentatives for supporting certain positions.”50
On July 5, 1995, the newly appointed IASC Secretary Gen-
eral, Sir Bryan Carsberg, informed Shiratori that IOSCO had 
responded with enthusiasm to the IASC’s draft revised work pro-
gram, and that IOSCO had prepared a draft press release stating 
that the proposed wording seemed “very helpful.” As a result, on 
July 9 the Board of the IASC and the Technical Committee of 
IOSCO issued the following joint press release:
The [IASC] Board has developed a work plan that the 
[IOSCO] Technical Committee agrees will result, upon 
successful completion, in IAS comprising a comprehen-
sive core set of standards. Completion of comprehen-
sive core standards that are acceptable to the Technical 
Committee will allow the Technical Committee to rec-
ommend endorsement of IAS for cross border capital 
raising and listing purposes in all global markets. IOS-
CO has already endorsed IAS 7, Cash Flow Statements, 
and has indicated to the IASC that 14 of the existing 
International Accounting Standards do not require ad-
ditional improvement, providing that the other core 
standards are successfully completed. 
The press release was greeted with a measure of caution by 
IASC. The October 30, 1995, minutes of the Executive Commit-
tee reported that the wording of the agreement with IOSCO was 
such that IOSCO would not have to make a firm commitment 
to endorse IASs even after satisfactory completion of IASC’s 
work program. Nevertheless, the general view was that it would 
be difficult for IOSCO not to endorse international standards 
IOSCO people who agreed with what ES [Eiichi Shiratori] said – the problem was 
the SEC both from the perspective of the IASC and other members of IOSCO.” 
50  David Cairns, email to author, October 27, 2008. “Following the July 1995 
agreement [between the IASC and the IOSCO Technical Committee], there were 
some very strong criticisms by the FASB about the IASC’s approach to completion 
of core standards.”
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upon successful completion of the IASC work program because 
of the way IOSCO had raised public expectations. As Martinez-
Diaz [2005, p.11] has noted, “it was widely understood that the 
rejection of [the Core Standards] by the IOSCO—and by its most 
powerful member, the SEC—would severely limit the future of 
IASC standards.”
While far from perfect, the IASC/IOSCO press release would 
be referred to by both organizations in the years ahead as proof 
of their good intentions and as a rationale for the steps they 
would take. It would prove to be a defining document in their 
long-running collaboration.51
There was division within IOSCO about the course it should 
take. Should it endorse the IASC’s standard-setting process, 
or should it endorse standards one by one? Should it demand 
the completion of the whole body of minimum International 
Accounting Standards? And, should it insist upon the establish-
ment of an IASC interpretation mechanism?
On July 12, 1995, three days following issuance of the IASC/
IOSCO joint press release announcing the Core Standards 
Program, and shortly before the FASB notified the SEC of its in-
tention to undertake a comparative study of US and IASC Stan-
dards, FASB Chairman Beresford sent Carsberg a copy of a draft 
of a letter to the SEC for his review and comment. In the draft 
letter, Beresford noted that “[t]he IASC improvements project 
has narrowed the range of differences from US GAAP, but many 
differences remain, even in the newly adopted standards.”52 On 
July 20, Carsberg responded that he hoped the IASC could be in-
volved in the project “by seeing drafts at an early stage and hav-
ing the opportunity to comment on them,” and that he would 
like to see the findings feed into mutual efforts to eliminate or at 
least narrow the differences. Once the FASB comparison project 
was completed, Carsberg wrote Beresford, “our standards are 
being revised [in connection with the Core Standards Program] 
and we shall certainly be considering your catalogue of differing 
requirements in making decisions about our revisions.”53 
51  “Put at its most basic, the new end game involves IASC moving its stan-
dards near enough to US GAAP to be acceptable to the SEC as providing equiv-
alent transparency and thereby shareholder protection, while at the same time 
staying far enough away from GAAP to win the support of the rest of the world.” 
WAR, August/September 1995, p. 1. 
52  IASC Archive File. Chairman, Secretary-General Correspondence.
53  In late 1996, Beresford noted that the SEC might consider IASC standards 
for use without reconciliation to GAAP by foreign companies in US capital mar-
kets as early as 1998. Beresford commented: “Using IASC standards without 
33
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2012, Vol. 39, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2012
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201224
In an April 11, 1996, press release, the SEC indicated that 
it supported the IASC’s objective “to develop…accounting stan-
dards that could be used for preparing financial statements 
used in cross-border offerings.” It noted that there were three 
key elements to the IASC’s program and the SEC’s acceptance of 
the results: (1) a core set of comprehensive, generally accepted 
accounting pronouncements; (2) high quality standards result-
ing in comparability, transparency, and full disclosure; and (3) 
rigorously interpreted and applied standards. Once the IASC 
had completed its Core Standards Project, fulfilling these key el-
ements, it was the Commission’s intention “to consider allowing 
the utilization of the resulting standards by foreign issuers offer-
ing securities in the US.” Thus, the SEC did not agree automati-
cally to accept the IASC’s core body of standards, but expressed 
its “intention to consider” them [Kirsch 2006, p. 301].
IASC and IOSCO progress on the Core Standards Pro-
gramme presented interesting challenges to the SEC (the stron-
gest IOSCO member) and the FASB. They were confronted with 
deciding whether and how the SEC should endorse IASs, as well 
as contemplating the role of the FASB following that endorse-
ment. On March 27, 1997, FASB Chairman Beresford minuted 
a recent Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) meeting with 
the SEC. Those minutes make it clear that in early 1997 SEC 
Chairman Levitt was unsure which position the Commission 
should take in endorsing IASC’s core standards, an incremental 
approach or a total package approach. It is also clear that Levitt 
was interested in preserving the FASB as a standard setter while 
supporting the internationalization of accounting standards, 
that the FAF and the FASB were interested in seeing the IASC 
improve all its standards, and that there was dissatisfaction with 
some public statements made by IASC’s leaders. 
In February 2000, the SEC issued Concept Release: Interna-
tional Accounting Standards54 to request input on “whether the 
reconciliation to US GAAP would shift the burden to US investors attempting 
to compare investment opportunities among foreign and domestic companies 
competing for capital on the same market. The FASB’s comparison Report can 
help those investors sort out the differences,” in FASB Status Report, No. 168C, 
December 23, 1996, p. 1.
54  As early as September 2, 1998, Paul Leder (SEC and IOSCO Working Party 
No. 1 Chairman) and Mary Tokar (SEC) briefed Sir Bryan Carsberg in London. 
On September 28, 1998, Carsberg wrote a memorandum to the Executive Com-
mittee members to outline their proposals: “…SEC would start its processes in 
the United States by issuing a “Concepts Release” [sic] before taking a position 
on endorsement in IOSCO fora. Publication of the Concepts Release would show 
continuing momentum and determination to move ahead with decisions….then, 
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IASC standards: 1. constitute a comprehensive, generally ac-
cepted basis of accounting; 2. are of high quality; and 3. can be 
rigorously interpreted and applied.” The SEC received 93 com-
ment letters ranging from statements indicating that IASs were 
principles of high quality requiring no reconciliation to GAAP 
to the opposite extreme that they were of lesser quality requir-
ing full reconciliation. US commentators generally fell into the 
GAAP rule-based/reconciliation group; non-US commentators 
more often fell into the principles-based group.55 
Following analysis of the comment letters received in con-
nection with the concept release, the SEC continued to monitor 
international accounting standard-setting developments. There 
was a change in the Commission’s leadership following the 
SEC’s receipt and analysis of its February 2000 Concept Release. 
Arthur Levitt departed and was replaced by Harvey Pitt, who 
was shortly replaced by Christopher Cox. The SEC’s position on 
IASs was in limbo for quite a while. Finally, in October 2002 the 
SEC supported the FASB/IASB Norwalk Agreement formalizing 
their commitment to the convergence of GAAP and internation-
al accounting standards (see below). 
THE G4+156
In the early 1990s, a powerful grouping had come into op-
eration: the G4+1. Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman, recalled 
that it “started accidentally” when, in his capacity as Chairman 
of the UK’s Accounting Standards Board, he had a meeting with 
FASB Chairman Beresford in which the two of them agreed it 
would be a good idea to set up a joint group. Street [2005, p. 10] 
described the meeting as occurring at the FASB’s Norwalk office 
in 1992; John Denman, Accounting Standards Director of Cana-
da’s Accounting Standards Board (AcSB), joined the discussion 
and the three agreed to work together—hence, in Tweedie’s view, 
taking the first step in the development of the “Group of 4.” 
Originally, the standard setters of Australia, Canada, the United 
if things were still looking positive, a detailed rulemaking proposal in the United 
States to meet the formal requirements for moving to accept our Standards for 
cross-border listings.”
55  The 48 comment letters that were filed electronically are available at www.
sec.gov/rules/s70400.htm; hard copies of all comment letters are available in the 
SEC’s Public Reference Room, File No. S7-04-00. For IASC’s analysis of the com-
ment letters, see: “Mixed Views on IASC Standards,” IASC Insight, June 2000, pp. 
12-13. 
56  Excerpted from Kirsch, Chapter 8, and updated with further research.
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Kingdom, and the United States (the G4) sent representatives,57 
and IASC members were invited to participate as observers 
(G4+1). The group met several times each year and progressed 
from background studies to “position papers” that could have 
been used to prepare exposure drafts. Turf wars developed as 
both IASC and some G4 representatives entertained global ac-
counting visions. Some G4 members began to ponder possible 
alternatives to IASC. Among those considered were G4, an ex-
panded G4, or an expanded FASB [WAR, May 1996, p. 1].
IASC Chairman Michael Sharpe (1995-97) and Secretary-
General Carsberg, recognizing the way the wind was blowing, 
advocated restructuring the IASC so that it would become a 
quality international accounting standards setter. They suc-
ceeded in convincing the IASC to appoint the Strategy Working 
Party (SWP). Once that was formed, the agenda of G4+1 meet-
ings included a discussion of IASC’s restructuring [Street 2005, 
pp. 65-67]. 
For its part, the IASC was closely interested in the work of 
the G4+1 from its beginning in early 1993, following the discus-
sions at the FASB in 1992.58 On January 30, 1996, Members of 
the Executive Committee discussed the role of G4+1 and its 
relationship with IASC. Carsberg saw it “as an important chal-
lenge in communication to build up relationships with standard 
setters in other countries so that the G4 countries would not be 
seen as excessively influential.”59 
The Executive Committee meeting minutes show a con-
tinual interest in the G4+1, including its work on financial 
instruments,60 pooling accounting,61 performance reporting,62 
and share-based payments.63 The IASC participated in G4+1 
57  Street [2005, pp. 10 and 13-14] indicated that G4 was not intended to be an 
“Anglo-American club.” All countries with an accounting standard-setting body 
were extended an invitation to join. However, only the G4 standard setters self-se-
lected. Street cites Jim Leisenring’s explanation that this was due to their interest 
in international financial reporting and their desire to solve accounting problems 
using the IASC Framework’s concepts. Street reported that Herman Marseille of 
NIvRA, the Dutch standard setter, attended one G4+1 meeting, but NIvRA decided 
not to join due primarily to resource constraints and the fact that its Board mem-
bers were part-time. 
58  David Cairns, email to the author, September 11, 2011.
59  Executive Committee, January 30, 1996.
60  Paris, October 29, 1997.
61  Niagara-on-the-Lake, Canada, July 5, 1998.
62  Zurich, November 8, 1998, Washington D.C., March 15, 1999, and Venice, 
November 14, 1999.
63  Executive Committee, Copenhagen on June 18, 2000.
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discussions, issued G4+1 discussion papers with its own wrap-
around covers,64 and re-opened existing standards or initiated 
new ones. Michael Sharpe has noted that the G4+1 was very 
helpful to the IASC. There was a risk, however, that unless the 
IASC got its own act together, G4+1 could develop a life of its 
own.65 
RESTRUCTURING THE IASC66
A number of internal and external factors triggered the 
recognition by IASC Chairman Sharpe and Secretary-General 
Carsberg that the IASC needed to consider its future mission 
and structure once the IASC/IOSCO Work Programme had been 
completed. One need was to improve relations with national 
standard setters to realize a “complete harmonisation between 
international standards and standards used for domestic report-
ing.” This could be achieved, on the one hand, through “work-
ing with governments and governmental agencies to encourage 
official adoption of international standards” and, on the other, 
“[w]orking with national standard setters to co-ordinate agendas 
and attempt to agree common solutions.” Another factor for 
considering the IASC’s future mission and structure was a desire 
to enhance the global representativeness of the Board by enlarg-
ing its country membership seats.67  
Before the Executive Committee meeting in June 1996 Cars-
berg released an agenda paper, Future Strategy of IASC,68 for the 
Executive Committee and Advisory Council to discuss at their 
forthcoming joint meeting. That meeting69 was the scene of a 
lively debate, after which the participants agreed that Carsberg 
should draft terms of reference for a working party to consider 
the future strategy of the IASC.
June 1996 was an eventful month for the IASC. In addition 
to its joint Executive Committee and Advisory Council meet-
ings, it participated in the World Standards Setters meeting. On 
June 21, FASB Chairman Beresford delivered a series of eight 
64  David Cairns, email to author, September 11, 2011. “[O]nly the covers 
...were different – the same happened in each G4 country.” 
65  Michael Sharpe, email to author, March 22, 2004. At its 2001meeting in 
London, given the imminent commencement of the IASB, the G4+1 decided to 
disband and cancel its future activities. G4+1 COMMUNIQUÉ, Number 10, Ja-
nuary 2001. 
66  Excerpted from Kirsch [2006, Chapter 10], and updated with further re-
search.
67  Plans for IASC, Advisory Council Papers – July 1995, Agenda Paper IV.
68  Executive Committee Papers – June 1996, Agenda Paper X.
69  Executive Committee and Advisory Council, Frankfurt, June 9, 1996.
37
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2012, Vol. 39, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2012
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201228
suggestions for IASC procedural changes to reinforce the IASC’s 
importance in the internationalization of accounting: (1) hold 
meetings open to the public; (2) consider additional procedures, 
such as public hearings on proposals and field testing, to ensure 
that it received and considered the best possible input; (3) better 
educate its members on the intricacies of matters under consid-
eration; (4) send materials to Board members “well in advance” 
of meetings (some Board members complained they had too 
little time to consider them) for careful analysis by home coun-
try associates and for development of carefully reasoned posi-
tions; (5) greatly increase the size of its staff to do the technical 
support work for its steering committees; (6) resolve the matter 
of implementation guidance for IASs; (7) find a way to “reduce 
the inherent conflict of interest when an all-part-time Board 
sets standards its own members must follow and audit”; and 
(8) be realistic in its work plans and commitments to develop a 
complete set of IASs. Beresford felt it was “highly unrealistic” 
to expect to complete the Core Standards Programme by March 
1998.70 Many of his suggestions were implemented by the IASC/
IASB, including open public meetings, implementation guid-
ance with the creation of the interpretations committee, IASB’s 
greatly increased staff compared to IASC’s, and elimination of 
the “inherent conflict of interest” with the introduction of the 
largely full-time IASB. In the coming years, Beresford’s public 
comments were repeated and elaborated upon in public and pri-
vate by the FASB and SEC members who participated, officially 
and unofficially, in the work of the IASC’s Strategy Working 
Party. 
THE STRATEGY WORKING PARTY71
At the September 1996 Executive Committee meeting, Cars-
berg introduced an agenda paper72 that presented his proposal 
for the establishment of a Strategy Working Party (SWP). The 
Executive Committee and the Board approved the SWP’s terms 
of reference. IASC Chairman Sharpe and Secretary-General 
Carsberg asked Ed Waitzer, a lawyer and former Chairman of 
70  Dennis R. Beresford, “Outline: World Standards Setters.” Beresford sent 
the outline of his remarks to the 1996 World Standard Setters meeting to the 
author with a letter dated August 11, 2008. See also: Jim Kelly, “IASC/IOSCO—A 
Hand on the Brake,” WAR, April 1997, p. 2.
71  Exerpted from Kirsch [2006, Chapter 10], and updated with further re-
search.
72  Strategy Working Party. Executive Committee Papers, Agenda Paper VI.
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the Ontario Securities Commission and of the IOSCO Technical 
Committee, to become chairman of the SWP, and he accepted. 
In August 2001, Carsberg commented, “[W]e felt pretty sure that 
Ed Waitzer…was somebody in good standing with the SEC…
who could go to the SEC and talk about things and at the same 
time be well received there but take a somewhat independent 
view.”73
At the SWP’s first meeting on July 21-22, 1998, in London, 
Carsberg described the IASC’s core standards agreement with 
IOSCO and the SEC’s response. Former SEC Chairman David 
Ruder then discussed the likelihood that the SEC would accept 
the IASC’s core standards once they were completed. Ruder 
emphasized that “the SEC will act cautiously and wish to retain 
oversight authority over the setting of accounting standards 
used in the securities market.” During this meeting, the SWP 
began to use the term “convergence,” which ultimately came to 
supplant “harmonization” in the IASC’s deliberations and publi-
cations [Camfferman and Zeff, 2007, pp. 450-454]. 
The European Commission expressed support for a large 
(27-member), geographically representative part-time Board, 
with a full-time Chairman. The SEC supported a FASB-like full-
time Board with at least seven technically expert members. SEC 
Chief Accountant Lynn Turner played an important role in push-
ing the SEC’s position, often behind the scenes.74 G. Michael 
Crooch, Arthur Andersen Partner and IASC Executive Commit-
tee member, knew Turner and talked with him frequently about 
strategy.75 FASB Chairman Edmund Jenkins likewise worked 
behind the scenes to encourage the IASC’s restructuring.76 Key 
G4 players favored a full-time, small, independent international 
board with technical expert members; any other model would 
result in the G4 pursuing an alternative solution [Street 2005, 
pp. 73-76].
Secretary-General Carsberg quickly came to support the 
SEC’s position; his Chairman, Stig Enevoldsen, had to be con-
vinced to abandon the European preferred model. In the end, 
Enevoldsen came to support the full-time Board, provided it had 
some part-time members to represent real world thinking on 
current business developments.77
73  Sir Bryan Carsberg, interview, August 2001.
74  Michael Sharpe, email to author, July 1, 2004. 
75  G. Michael Croché, interview, March 19, 2007. 
76  Edmond Jenkins, letter to author, September 14, 2008..
77  Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman, and former Strategy Working Party 
member, interviews, January 9 and 15, January 2002. Confirmed by G. Michael 
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Enevoldsen and Carsberg had visited several European 
countries, Japan, and the United States. They participated in 
discussions at SWP, at the May and November meetings of the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) Council, at 
meetings of G4+1 standard setters, and at the G10 Group of pro-
fessional accounting bodies. They had several meetings with the 
Chief Accountant of the SEC and with the EC Director General 
of DG XV, the EU’s Directorate for Financial and Company Law. 
The details of their unicameral model had been developed dur-
ing these meetings. They hoped
that the SEC will support the recommended model. 
We believe that it has the main features which the SEC 
sees as essential to an acceptable international standard 
setter. ...The FASB appears to have the same views as 
the SEC.78 The SEC has threatened to encourage this 
[formation of a competing standard-setting body] if it is 
not satisfied with our proposals.…Board members will 
wish to consider the probability of formation of a com-
peting body and its consequences for IASC.
Regarding the European Commission:
The European Commission holds a different view of 
the preferred IASC structure from that of the SEC....
Board members will wish to assess the risk of loss of 
support for IAS in Europe following adoption of the 
recommended model and, in doing so, will consider the 
significance of the fact that many European companies 
in practice can use US GAAP for their group accounts 
at present.
At this point, Michael Crooch (then US IASC Board repre-
sentative for the AICPA who later succeeded James Leisenring 
on the FASB) began some extensive telephone diplomacy with 
the SEC and the SWP Chairman. A detailed compromise was 
put together on which the SEC was willing to issue a supportive 
press release. However, this meant that the IASC Board was un-
Crooch, former IASC Executive Committee member, who noted that Enevoldsen 
and Carsberg had independent views. Because both wanted high-quality inter-
national accounting standards, and they disagreed about the appropriate orga-
nizational model; this was a difficult time for both of them. Interview of Crooch, 
March 19, 2007.
78  Stig Enevoldsen, interview, June 20, 2003, indicated that the G4 put tre-
mendous pressure on Carsberg and him, reminding them that they could create 
their own standard setter. Also, the FASB put tremendous pressure on the IASC, 
threatening to become the international standard setter. However, Enevoldsen ob-
served, “The IASC had the brand.” 
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able to change anything of significance. Nevertheless, the Board 
unanimously supported the proposed structure at its November 
15-19, 1999, meeting in Venice.
Anthony T. Cope,79 FASB member and observer at the IASC 
Board who served on the IASC’s Strategy Working Party along 
with Financial Accounting Foundation Trustee David Ruder, 
wrote in late 1999: “The FASB is pleased that the IASC Board 
has accepted the recommendation of its Strategy Working Party 
to restructure.”80 Cope had good reason to be pleased. He and 
Ruder had held out successfully for a small, independent inter-
national standard-setting board. They were aided by the fact 
that there were also a few “non-Anglo-Saxons” on the SWP who 
accepted what their “Anglo-Saxon” friends were proposing. The 
EC had been contesting the bid by the SEC to have more influ-
ence on international standard setting. However, an uncompro-
mising EC letter convinced the SWP that it could not accept the 
EC’s demands, and its decisions were unanimous.81 
Cope recalled that at the IASC Board meeting (November 
15-19, 1999) in Venice, where the Board approved the new 
structure and constitution, Michael Crooch made the presenta-
tion; there were many trans-Atlantic calls during the course of 
the meeting. The Executive Committee could announce at the 
meeting that the SEC approved, while Cope could say the FASB 
supported the deal.82 At its December 1999 meeting, the IASC 
Board voted unanimously to appoint the members of the Nomi-
nating Committee to select the initial trustees to implement the 
proposed new structure. The European Commission was not 
represented, nor was there a Japanese member.
In a January 13, 2000, news release,83 the Nominating Com-
mittee announced that it had had its first meeting and initiated 
79  IASC Chairman Michael Sharpe invited Anthony Cope to serve on the 
Strategy Working Party. Cope, a non-accountant, felt that he represented users 
of accounts and the interests of the global capital markets rather than the FASB 
specifically. He saw himself as a strong voice for a small, independent board. In-
terview, September 9, 2007.
80  “FASB Supports Proposed New Structure for IASC Board,” FASB Status 
Report, No. 204C, December 17, 1999, pp. 2-3.
81  Georges Barthès de Ruyter, email to author, September 2, 2008.
82  Anthony Cope, September 9, 2007. Michael Crooch, interview, March 19, 
2007, reported that IASC Chairman Tom Jones had asked him to make the presen-
tation; at the time, Crooch wondered whether it was a good idea for an American 
to make the presentation since some Board members were concerned with the 
amount of US influence. Former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner confirmed 
these details, telephone interview, April 9, 2009.
83  IASC Electronic Archives.
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its search and selection process for the nineteen trustees of the 
restructured IASC. SEC Commissioner Arthur Levitt was named 
chairman of the Nominating Committee. That first meeting was 
held in Levitt’s Conference Room at the SEC. At its second meet-
ing, held in France, the SEC indicated its interest in recruiting 
well-known and highly qualified people to the IASCF Trustees. 
Levitt agreed to recruit Paul Volcker, who subsequently agreed 
to chair the Trustees. 
The meeting of the member bodies of IASC occurred on 
May 24, 2000, in Edinburgh, Scotland. Enevoldsen urged the 
member bodies to support the creation of the new structure. 
The Assembly voted unanimously in favor of the recommenda-
tion for the adoption of the new constitution.84 The trustees es-
tablished two subcommittees, one to develop plans for assured 
and adequate financing, and a second to oversee the process of 
selecting board members.85 A June 29 press release reported that 
the Trustees unanimously agreed that Sir David Tweedie, UK 
Accounting Standards Board Chairman, should become IASB 
Chairman. 
The trustees’ nominating committee86 held interviews for 
new board members in 2000, which Sir David Tweedie observed. 
The trustees announced the names of the new board on January 
25, 2001;87 Table 3 lists their names and characteristics. That 
the basis of selection of new Board members was technical ex-
pertise is clear. Eight of the fourteen members were either rep-
resentatives88 or observer members89 of the old Board, yielding 
significant continuity. David Tweedie, IASB Chairman, has com-
mented that “a key feature of the [IASB] was the number who 
came from a standard-setting background. The Board had to be 
able to punch at the same weight as the FASB and, therefore, 
couldn’t afford to have a steep learning curve in front of it.”90
Having generated donation commitments of more than 
84 Minutes of the Ordinary Meeting of the Assembly of Member Bod-
ies of the International Accounting Standards Committee, May 24, 2000, 
Edinburgh. 
85 Press Release: Shaping IASC for the Future: First Meeting of IASC Trustees 
and Appointment of New IASC Board Chair, June 29, 2000. IASC electronic ar-
chives.
86  Chaired by Ken Spencer, trustee and Australian representative on the old 
Board.
87 Press Release: IASC Trustees Announce New Standard-setting Board to Reach 
Goal of Global Accounting Standards.
88  Jones, Gélard, McGregor, Schmidt, Tweedie, Yamada.
89  Cope, Leisenring.
90  Email to author, August 14, 2008.
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$75 million over five years, on March 15, 2001, the Trustees an-
nounced they had activated the new constitution. FASB Chair-
man Jenkins, on the formal implementation of the IASB, stated, 
“It is a critical and welcome event in establishing an indepen-
dent global standard setter to provide high-quality financial 
reporting standards to serve our global markets.”91
Table 3.
Characteristics of the New IASB Board Members
Former IASC Board 
Name Country* Member or Liaison Classification
   Observer
Sir David Tweedie UK Yes  No Academic/Std. Setter
Thomas E. Jones UK/USA Yes  No Analyst 
Mary E. Barth – PT USA No  No Auditor/Academic
Hans-Georg Bruns Germany No  Yes Preparer 
Anthony T. Cope  UK/USA Yes  No Analyst 
Robert P. Garnet S. Africa Yes  No Preparer/Analyst
Gilbert Gélard France Yes  Yes Auditor/Preparer 
Robert H. Herz - PT USA/UK No  No Auditor 
James Leisenring USA Yes  Yes Standard setter 
Warren McGregor Australia No  Yes Standard setter 
Patricia O’Malley Canada No  Yes Standard setter 
Harry K. Schmid‡ Switzerland Yes  No Preparer 
Geoffrey Whittington UK No  Yes Academic/Std. Setter 
Tatsumi Yamada Japan Yes  Yes Auditor
PT = part time.
*The first country is the country of birth; the second country indicates the Board 
member had many years of professional service there.
The first three months of 2001 were taken up with efforts 
to wind down the old IASC and to get the new IASC Founda-
tion and its Board up and running. In February 2001, a get-
acquainted meeting for the new Board was held. Robert Herz, 
then part-time IASB Member and later FASB Chair, attended 
that meeting, and recalls that the Board Members discussed the 
objectives of the IASB. They agreed that the IASB’s goal would 
be to adopt a single set of high-quality international financial 
reporting standards.92
91  “FASB Supports IASB’s Efforts,” FASB Status Report, No. 217B, February 
28, 2001, pp. 1 and 3.
92  Interview, March 19, 2007.
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THE FASB IASB CONVERGENCE PROGRAM
In the early days of its life, the IASB had elaborate protocols 
for dealing with national standards setters; the FASB was just 
one of many national standard setters. Over time, however, the 
working relationships between the two Boards evolved to the 
point at which, by 2007, most of the major standards projects 
were joint efforts of both.93 In January 2002, IASB Chairman 
Tweedie indicated that he saw the IASB’s two main objectives as 
(1) convergence of US and international standards and (2) the 
IASB’s Improvements Project. Regarding convergence, Tweedie 
observed, “We must converge—not just adopt GAAP.” He noted 
that at that point the IASB was involved in joint projects with 
the standard setters of the UK (Performance Reporting), the US 
(Business Combinations), and France (First Time Application). 
He also observed that, regarding the IASB’s own Improvements 
Project, the Board was addressing IOSCO’s concerns about 
the Core Standards. The IASB would be “ripping apart” 14 
standards with the goal of arriving at a much better set of Core 
Standards by the end of 2002. Tweedie made it very clear that 
his objective was a single set of high-quality global accounting 
standards, at least as good as GAAP, and better whenever possi-
ble.94  In a follow-up interview, he observed, “Convergence does 
not mean moving to the US standard; it means both of us [the 
IASB and the FASB] changing.” When asked whether he thought 
the SEC would ever endorse the Core Standards and eliminate 
the reconciliation requirement, Tweedie replied:
We are picking off the convergence issues. We have 
done all the big reconciliation issues already. So, the 
more we can move those two together over the next 2 or 
3 years, reconciliation gains irrelevance....That, I think, 
will solve the problem for them [the SEC].95 
Edmund Jenkins, the FASB’s fourth Chairman, succeeded 
Beresford on July 1, 1997. His term saw growing demands for 
cross-border listings, escalating competition among stock mar-
kets, financial crisis in Asia—all forces pushing the demand for 
international accounting standards [Martinez-Diaz 2005, pp.12-
14]. Jenkins had to deal with US accounting scandals, such as 
93 Sue Bielstein, FASB Director of Major Projects and Technical Activities, 
interview, March 19, 2007. 
94 Interview, January 9, 2002.
95 Interview, January 15, 2002.
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Enron,96 which induced many Americans to examine the rules-
based/principles-based debate and look at IASs with new eyes 
[Eaton 2005, pp. 7-11].
Like his predecessor, Jenkins was an internationalist. He 
was FASB Chairman in 1999 when the Board issued jointly 
with the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) an important 
booklet, “International Accounting Standard Setting: A Vision 
for the Future.” The report’s stated objective was: “[To] discuss…
how the FASB’s role may continue to evolve and how its struc-
ture and process may change over time in the context of the 
FASB’s objective and goals for participating in the international 
accounting system of the future.”97 “The timing of this report, 
during the final deliberations in the IASC over its proposed 
structure, suggests…an attempt to apply pressure to the IASC to 
restructure along the lines that were agreeable to FASB” [Eaton 
2005, pp. 6-7].
Jenkins and the FASB paid close attention to international 
accounting developments and actively participated in them. Jen-
kins wrote the author as follows:
 The FASB’s involvement and leadership in the 
G4+1’s efforts to improve the IASC, the work of the 
SWP, and the final efforts to convince the IASC to 
change itself into the IASB were crucial to the success 
of those efforts. [T]here was strong support from oth-
ers: Australia (Ken Spencer); the UK (David Tweedie); 
France (Georges Barthès), but it was Tony Cope, Mike 
Crooch and David Ruder—with Lynn Turner [SEC 
Chief Accountant] and me working behind the scenes—
who made it happen in 2001.98
Jenkins’s successor was Robert H. Herz, a former part-time 
member of the IASB and Senior Technical Partner of Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers. Coming straight from the IASB, Herz assumed 
the helm of the FASB in July 2002—a time of great challenge to 
that standard-setting body due to the many accounting scandals 
of the late 1990s/early 2000s, passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, SEC activism, and the establishment of the Public Com-
panies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). During Herz’s 
chairmanship, SEC activism in international accounting issues 
96 Tweedie noted to the author that Enron had not hurt the IASB. It had actu-
ally made people in the US more receptive to international accounting standards. 
Interview, January 15, 2002.
97 Introduction, p. vii.
98 Letter to author, September 14, 2008.
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was heightened as it interacted with the FASB and the IASB, 
eased reconciliation and listing requirements for IASB compli-
ant filers, and the like. 
The FASB would experience a shift in emphasis to greater 
commitment to and involvement in international convergence 
activities under Herz’s leadership. Ed Jenkins reminded the au-
thor, “[I]nternational activities at the FASB picked up in the lat-
er part of 2002 [at] the time Bob Herz became chairman of the 
FASB….[T]he newly restructured IASB was then in a position 
for the first time to work constructively on convergence issues.” 
Herz had a strong international interest and background;99 
gradually, he moved the FASB in the direction of closer coopera-
tion with the IASB. On the FASB Board, Herz indicated that all 
six of his Board colleagues supported convergence. He noted 
that Board members G. Michael Crooch, Katherine A. Schipper, 
and Gary S. Schieneman all had experience in the international 
arena. And he mentioned that on the IASB Board he could not 
recall a member who did not support convergence. Thus, on 
both sides of the Atlantic people were in place to assist the rap-
prochement of the two Boards. 
In the summer of 2002, Herz convened meetings at the 
FASB to develop action plans, including one on convergence 
which ultimately led to the Norwalk Agreement later that year. 
Herz and Tweedie got along very well together. Herz comment-
ed, “Maybe we are like-minded. We are both Chartered Accoun-
tants.” The two men were in weekly contact by telephone, and 
email. Herz estimated that in 2006, as a result of their attending 
conferences, joint FASB/IASB meetings, and other meetings, 
they met each other about 15 times per year.100 
In his August 2002 “Chairman’s Notes,” Herz mentioned 
that the FASB met with members of the IASB and representa-
tives of the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant to discuss 
undertaking a project to accelerate international convergence 
by seeking to eliminate some of the existing areas of difference 
between GAAP and IASs.”101
Joint meetings were an effective way for the two Boards to 
discuss major issues and reach common views. However, such 
meetings required significant preparation. The Boards met twice 
99  Herz spent his teenage years in Argentina, studied and worked in the UK 
where he became a Chartered Accountant, and worked on PricewaterhouseCoo-
pers’ Global and US boards. Interview, March 19, 2007. 
100  Interview, March 19, 2007.
101  Financial Accounting Series No. 235: The FASB Report, August 30, 2002, 
p. 2.
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a year: at the IASB, London, in April, and at the FASB, Norwalk, 
Connecticut, in October. Senior staff members met and put 
together a proposed agenda that was reviewed by both Boards. 
Chairmanship of the meeting was shared between FASB’s Herz 
and IASB’s Tweedie.102 There were 21 members at joint meet-
ings: seven FASB members103 and fourteen IASB members.104 
Although the Boards were meeting together, each one voted 
separately on each issue. That is, a proposal was accepted only if 
it achieved the required majority support of each Board.105 
On September 18, 2002, the IASB held a joint meeting with 
the FASB at its headquarters in Norwalk. The main purpose of 
the meeting was to discuss projects that the two Boards were 
already working on jointly or would address jointly in the future 
in order to increase the international comparability of financial 
reporting. Prior to the meeting, the staffs of both Boards devel-
oped a proposed scope for the Short-Term Convergence Proj-
ect.106 Following that meeting, on October 2, the FASB added a 
102  Robert Herz, interview, March 19, 2007.
103  As of July 1, 2008, FASB had only five members. The voting requirements 
were 3-2, a simple majority. The FASB Chair had decision-making authority to set 
the FASB’s technical agenda. The FAF observed that the Chair’s technical agenda 
setting authority would give the FASB “the ability to initiate and more quickly 
respond to pressing issues….This has the added benefit of further facilitating 
and improving the interface with the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB).” See Financial Accounting Foundation, “Request for Comments on Pro-
posed Changes to Oversight, Structure, and Operations of the FAF, FASB, and 
GASB,” December 18, 2007, pp. 4-5. 
104  The IASCF Trustees, in their second five-yearly constitutional review, pro-
posed expanding the size of the IASB to 16 members effective January 1, 2010. 
While the IASCF Trustees believed that the Constitution’s “emphasis on ‘profes-
sional competence and practical experience’ should remain paramount,” their 
Proposal for Change made explicit a geographical component to Board member-
ship with (a) four from Asia/Oceania; (b) four from Europe; (c) four from North 
America; (d) one from Africa; (e) one from South America; and (f) two appointed 
from any area, subject to maintaining overall geographical balance. With the 
growing number of countries adopting IFRSs, the Trustees determined to amend 
the Constitution with respect to the Board’s size and geographical diversity. Thus, 
paradoxically, the Trustees returned to the geographical representation idea of 
the Strategy Working Party’s bicameral model. On January 29, 2009, the Trustees 
issued a press release to announce amendments to the IASCF Constitution to: es-
tablish a link to a Monitoring Board of public authorities; expand the IASB from 
14 to 16 members by 2012 while ensuring geographical diversity; enhance liaison 
with investor groups; directly address G20 recommendations; and provide free 
core standards through its public website. 
105  J. Michael Crooch, interview, March 19, 2007.
106  “FASB-IASB Joint Meeting Supports Convergence,” Financial Accounting 
Series No. 236: The FASB Report, September 30, 2002, p. 1. Bielstein, interview, 
March 19, 2007.
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short-term international convergence project to its agenda.107 
A milestone was reached when, on October 29, 2002, the 
two Boards issued the Norwalk Agreement. In it, they pledged 
their best efforts to make their existing financial reporting stan-
dards fully compatible as soon as practicable and to coordinate 
their work programs to ensure that compatibility was main-
tained through (a) aiming the short-term project at removing a 
variety of individual differences between GAAP and Internation-
al Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), (b) removing other 
differences between GAAP and IFRSs by addressing concur-
rently new, discrete, substantial projects (mutual undertakings), 
(c) continuing progress on the joint projects they were then un-
dertaking, and (d) encouraging their respective interpretive bod-
ies to coordinate their activities. In addition, both Boards noted 
that the intended implementation of the IASB’s IFRSs in several 
jurisdictions (the EU member countries) on or before January 1, 
2005, would require that they pay attention to the timing of the 
effective dates of new or amended reporting requirements.
Before and after the Norwalk Agreement, the Boards devel-
oped various ways of working together to achieve their shared 
convergence goals. The FASB’s principal cooperative efforts in-
cluded (1) joint projects conducted with the IASB, (2) the short-
term Convergence Project, (3) liaison IASB member on site at 
the FASB offices, (4) FASB monitoring of IASB projects, and 
(5) explicit consideration of convergence potential in all Board 
agenda decisions. Each is discussed briefly below.
1. Joint projects conducted with the IASB. Joint proj-
ects were those that the two standard setters had 
agreed to conduct simultaneously in a coordinated 
manner, with the objective of issuing common 
standards. In 2008, the FASB and IASB were con-
ducting joint projects to address a common Con-
ceptual Framework, Revenue Recognition, Business 
Combinations,108 and Financial Statement Presenta-
tion. 
2. The short-term convergence project. The scope of 
the short-term convergence project was limited 
107  The next day, the Wall Street Journal reported: “The board that sets US 
accounting standards formally approved a project to study potential areas of con-
vergence between US and international accounting rules.” “FASB Backs Project 
To Study Unification Of Accounting Rules,” October 3, 2002, p. C9.
108  Business Combinations, Part II, was completed with the issuance of FAS 
141R (revised in 2007) and a revised IFRS 3 (issued in January 2008).
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to those differences between GAAP and IFRSs in 
which convergence around a high-quality solution 
was achievable in the short-term, usually by choos-
ing between the existing IFRS and GAAP guidance. 
By 2008, progress had been made by both Boards, 
including: (1) the FASB issued new or amended 
standards that (a) introduced a fair value option 
(SFAS 159) and (b) adopted the IFRS approach to 
accounting for research and development assets ac-
quired in a business combination (SFAS 141R); and 
(2) the IASB published new standards on borrowing 
costs (IAS 23 revised) and segment reporting (IFRS 
8). With the 2006 Memorandum of Understanding 
the two Boards shifted their emphasis from short-
term to long-term projects. That emphasis remained 
with the 2008 update to the 2006 MoU.109 
3. Liaison IASB member on site at the FASB offices. 
James J. Leisenring, a former FASB Board mem-
ber, was the IASB member to fill the role of liaison 
Board member to the FASB.110 The role was created 
by the IASB to facilitate information exchange and 
increase cooperation between the FASB and the 
IASB. FASB Chairman Herz interfaced regularly 
with Leisenring, who also attended board and se-
nior staff meetings. Herz observed that Leisenring 
effectively represented the IASB’s views and tried 
not to let his own views color his representations of 
them.111
4. FASB monitoring of IASB projects. The FASB Board 
and staff monitor IASB projects, both to gain in-
sights into IASB thinking on issues and to provide 
the IASB with FASB insights. Monitoring was 
principally achieved through monthly IASB update 
meetings led by IASB liaison member Leisenring 
and held the week after the IASB meeting. They 
provided the FASB Board and staff the opportunity 
to learn about IASB decisions and to provide any 
109  Sue Bielstein, interview, January 23, 2009.
110  Leisenring was the only IASB liaison Board member to the FASB. This 
formal liaison role was eliminated when his term as an IASB member ended, 
presumably because the Boards’ close working relationship and frequent joint 
meeting schedule eliminated the need for it. Sue Bielstein, email to author, No-
vember 16, 2011. 
111  Robert Herz, interview, March 19, 2007.
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insights from a US standard-setting perspective.112 
5. Explicit consideration of convergence potential in all 
board agenda decisions. All topics formally consid-
ered for inclusion on the FASB’s agenda needed to 
be assessed for the possibilities for cooperation with 
the IASB.
At their joint meeting in April 2004, the two Boards agreed 
that, in principle, joint projects were the most practical means 
of achieving the goal of common standards. Consequently, they 
reached the decision that new standards in major areas should 
be developed through joint projects. Both considered how they 
should approach major projects underway by one but not the 
other (for example, the FASB had a project underway on li-
abilities and equity that the IASB was not directly involved in, 
and the IASB had an active project on accounting for insurance 
contracts). FASB Board member Ed Trott proposed a modified 
joint approach to those projects under which one Board would 
take the lead in developing a discussion paper. After considering 
constituent input on the paper, the project would become joint 
and the Boards would work together to develop common Expo-
sure Drafts and final standards.113 
Another milestone in the Boards’ working relationship 
occurred in late 2004. At the FASB/IASB joint meeting in Nor-
walk on October 19-20, both decided to add to their agendas a 
joint project on a conceptual framework to be based upon and 
build from the existing FASB Concept Statements and the IASB 
Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial 
Statements. The two Boards concluded that differences between 
their existing frameworks might impede development of com-
mon standards in current and future projects.114 On July 6, 2006, 
they published the first draft chapters of their joint conceptual 
framework.
In 2005, SEC Chief Accountant Don Nicolaisen put forward 
a “Roadmap” for the removal of the reconciliation requirement 
by 2009 for non-US companies that use IFRSs and register in 
the US.115 That Roadmap identified several milestones to be 
112  Sue Bielstein, interview, March 19, 2007.
113  Sue Bielstein, interview, March 19, 2007, and “FASB and IASB Discuss 
Plans for the Future,” Financial Accounting Series No. 256: The FASB Report, May 
28, 2004, pp. 1 and 6.
114  The FASB Report. November 30, 2004.
115  For a look at the Roadmap, see Nicolaisen’s “A Securities Regulator Looks 
at Convergence,” www.sec/gov/news/spch040605dtn.htm, and Northwestern Jour-
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achieved before the SEC staff would recommend removal of 
the reconciliation requirement. One of those milestones was 
progress by the IASB and FASB on their convergence work pro-
grams. 
Also in 2005, the SEC adopted an accommodation to permit 
foreign private issuers that were first-time adopters of IFRS, for 
the first year of reporting under IFRS, to file two years instead 
of three years of IFRS financial statements in their SEC fil-
ings.116 (IAS 1, ¶ 38 requires two years of comparative data.)
Following the issuance of the Roadmap, the FASB and IASB 
decided to develop and issue a document on the scope of their 
joint work program and the progress expected to be achieved 
by 2008. Representatives of both organizations consulted rep-
resentatives of the European Commission and the staff of the 
SEC, with the Boards’ respective advisory councils and other 
interested parties.117 On February 27, 2006, the FASB and IASB 
issued a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), “A Roadmap 
for Convergence between IFRSs and GAAP—2006-08” to com-
municate their convergence work program.118 
In developing the MoU, the two Boards agreed on the fol-
lowing principles:
• Convergence of accounting standards can best be 
achieved through the development of high-quality, 
common standards over time.
• A new common standard should be developed that 
improves the financial information reported rather 
than trying to eliminate differences between two 
standards in need of significant improvement.
• Serving the needs of investors means replacing 
weaker standards with stronger standards.
On February 27, 2006, the SEC welcomed the FASB/IASB 
MoU. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, who had for weeks pub-
licly stressed the SEC’s commitment to the “roadmap” said, “The 
SEC is working diligently toward the goal of eliminating the ex-
isting IFRS to GAAP reconciliation requirement. Achieving that 
nal of International Law & Business. Spring 2005. V. 25 (no. 1), pp. 661-686.
116  “First-time Application of International Financial Reporting Standards,” 
Securities Act Release No. 33-8567, April 12, 2005.
117  “FASB and IASB Publish Memorandum of Understanding,” Financial Ac-
counting Series No. 278-B: The FASB Report, March 31, 2006, pp. 1and 3.
118  Sue Bielstein, interview, March 19, 2007.
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goal depends on the contributions of many parties, including US 
and international standard setters. This important step by IASB 
and FASB will help ensure that investor protection remains 
paramount in these efforts.”119 
A key issue at the April 2008 joint meeting of the two Boar-
ds was updating the 2006 MoU.120 On September 11, the Boards 
issued a joint progress report121 which noted that, at their joint 
April meeting, they confirmed their commitment to developing 
common, high-quality standards and agreed on a pathway to 
completing the MoU projects by 2011.
On June 20, 2007, in a move that the IASB had been hoping 
for and expecting,122 the SEC approved for public comment a 
proposed rule to accept foreign private issuers’ financial state-
ments prepared according to the English language version of 
IFRS as published by the IASB without requiring reconciliation 
to GAAP.123  
On November 2, 2007, in a two-part letter addressed to Ms. 
Nancy M. Morris, Securities and Exchange Commission, FAF 
Chairman Robert E. Denham and FASB Chairman Robert H. 
Herz wrote, “Board members and trustees strongly support the 
proposal…that US public companies transition to an improved 
version of international accounting standards” (italics added). 
The main points were: (1) investors would be better served if 
all US companies used accounting standards issued by a single 
global financial reporting standard setter; permitting extended 
periods of choice between GAAP and IFRS would result in a 
two-GAAP system that would create unnecessary complexity for 
users of financial statements; (2) the FAF, FASB, SEC, and other 
affected parties should work together to develop a “blueprint” 
for transitioning US companies to IFRS— an “‘improve-and-
adopt’ process”; and (3) the SEC should seek international coop-
eration to identify and implement changes necessary to sustain 
the IASB and to secure it as the independent global body that 
promulgates high-quality international accounting standards. 
119  www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-27.
120  David Tweedie, email to author, August 14, 2008.
121  Press Release, IASB and FASB publish update to 2006 Memorandum of 
Understanding. With the 2006 MoU the two Boards shifted their emphasis from 
short-term projects to long-term projects. That emphasis remained with the 2008 
update to the 2006 MoU. Sue Bielstein, January 23, 2009.
122  Anthony Cope, email to author, August 26, 2008.
123  “Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Pre-
pared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards without 
Reconciliation to GAAP,” Securities Act Release No. 33-8818, July 2, 2007. 
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Stable and sustainable funding was required, including staff-
ing mechanisms for the IASB, as well as agreements to end the 
jurisdictional review and endorsement processes that require 
endorsement of each IFRS after the IASB issues it.124 
On December 21, 2007, the SEC released a final rule permit-
ting such foreign private issuers to file their financial statements 
without reconciliation so long as they complied with IFRS is-
sued by the IASB.125 The SEC allowed IFRS-compliant interim 
financial statements, and extended indefinitely the two-year ac-
commodation.126
Even before the SEC issued the final without-reconciliation 
rule for foreign private issuers employing IFRS, in light of the 
ongoing FASB/IASB convergence activities and the movement 
outside the US toward acceptance of IFRS financial statements, 
the Commission issued a concept release127 on allowing US issu-
ers to prepare IFRS-compliant financial statements as a basis of 
financial reporting.128 
On August 27, 2008, the SEC issued a press report that the 
Commission had voted to issue a proposed roadmap that could 
lead to the use of IFRS instead of GAAP by US issuers begin-
ning in 2014. The proposed multi-year plan would establish a 
number of milestones that, if achieved, could lead to the use of 
IFRS by US issuers in their SEC filings. After reviewing the sta-
tus of the proposed milestones, the Commission would decide 
in 2011 whether adoption of IFRS was in the public interest and 
would benefit investors. Chairman Cox said, “The increasing 
worldwide acceptance of financial reporting using IFRS, and US 
investors’ increasing ownership of securities issued by foreign 
companies that report financial information using IFRS, have 
led the Commission to propose this cautious and careful plan.129
Although the New York Stock Exchange had reached a high 
124  Financial Accounting Foundation, December 18, 2007, pp. 2, 3, 7 and 11.
125  Also, without EU carve-outs. Hans Burggraaff, email to author, September 
8, 2008. 
126  “Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Pre-
pared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards without 
Reconciliation to GAAP,” Securities Act Release No. 33-8879, December 21, 2007. 
127  This concept release came as a surprise to the IASB. Anthony Cope, email 
to the author, August 26, 2008.
128  “Concept Release on Allowing US Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements 
Prepared in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards,” Re-
lease No. 33-8831, August 7, 2007.
129  “Press Release: SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting Stan-
dards to Help Investors Compare Financial Information More Easily,” sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-184.htm.
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of over 14,000 in October 2007, by September 2008 a world-
wide credit and liquidity crisis had engulfed capital markets and 
raised questions about the application of fair value reporting 
in inactive markets. In the midst of these developments, the 
fair value controversy heated up to such an extent that the SEC 
Office of the Chief Accountant and the staff of the FASB felt 
compelled to issue a clarifying press release on September 30, 
2008.130 Based on the fair value measurement guidance in FAS 
No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, the SEC and FASB staffs in-
tended their joint clarifications to help preparers, auditors, and 
investors address the urgent fair value measurement questions 
in the depressed economic environment.131 Within days, the 
IASB staff concluded that the SEC-FASB clarification was “not 
an amendment to FAS 157…but rather provides additional guid-
ance for determining fair value in inactive markets…and consid-
ers it consistent with IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement.”132 In order to converge its standards with 
the FASB’s, the IASB short-cut its own due process. It issued 
an amendment to permit reclassifications of financial assets 
under certain circumstances (October 13); proposed enhanced 
disclosures of financial instruments (October 15); and published 
guidance for the application of fair value in illiquid markets (Oc-
tober 31).133 
The worldwide recession of 2008 did not dissuade the SEC 
from moving ahead with the issuance of its Roadmap for the 
potential use of IFRS financial statements by US issuers. On 
November 14, 2008, the SEC posted the proposed Roadmap on 
its website (sec.gov). It set forth seven milestones, including the 
implementation of the mandatory staged use of IFRS by US is-
suers.134
130  Shortly thereafter, the FASB issued an FSP that included the guidance in 
the press release, making it authoritative. Sue Bielstein, March 2009. 
131  Press Release: SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and FASB Staff Clarifi-
cation on Fair Value Accounting, www.fasb.org/news/2008-FairValue.pdf . 
132  See: International Accounting Standards Board Press Releases: “IASB 
Staff position on SEC-FASB clarification on fair value accounting,” October 2, 
2008, and “IASB announces next steps in response to credit crisis,” October 3, 
2008, at www.iasb.org. 
133  The IASB was criticized heavily for short-circuiting its due process. World 
Accounting Report commented, “In an astonishing volte-face, the IASB has had 
to bow to political pressure and abandon both a key tenet of IAS 39 and its own 
due process….[The IASB’s] independence and credibility have been called into 
question, and the banking lobby has once again demonstrated its political clout.” 
(pp. 2-3) 
134  Proposed Rule: Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial Statements Prepared 
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The SEC proposed to amend its rules to permit a limited 
number of US companies (estimated to be 110 in 37 IFRS indus-
tries) to voluntarily use IFRS for their annual reports, beginning 
with filings in 2010. In the event the SEC ultimately decided not 
to issue a rule requiring all US listed companies to use IFRS, 
these companies would be required to return to the use of GAAP. 
Nevertheless, by the end of 2008 a sea change had occurred 
in US financial reporting regulation, with the SEC permitting 
foreign private issuers to report according to IFRS without rec-
onciliation to GAAP, and with the possibility that the SEC would 
soon require US listed companies to gradually shift to the use of 
IFRS. 
In addition, the working relationship between the FASB 
and the IASB in 2008 was different than it was in the early days 
(2001), when each board had its own projects and there were 
few joint projects. By 2008, staff members were crisscrossing 
the Atlantic as they worked together on several joint projects. 
The Boards’ respective agendas were quite similar and both had 
regularly scheduled joint meetings.135 
The year 2008 ended with the world deep in recession. On 
December 30, the FASB and the IASB announced the member-
ship of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group (FCAG), which they 
had established to consider financial reporting issues arising 
from the global financial crisis. The two Boards would jointly 
consider any FCAG recommendations; any decisions by them 
would “be subject to appropriate and thorough due process.” 
Thus, the global economic recession had driven the Boards 
to even closer cooperation as they struggled individually and 
together to respond quickly to the accounting issues that had 
arisen from the crisis. In the USA, a new president, Barack H. 
Obama, was elected. In January 2009, he would replace George 
W. Bush. A new wind would blow across the US capital. In De-
cember 2008, the implications for convergence remained to be 
seen.
SUMMARY AND PROSPECT
The US Financial Accounting Standards Board and the 
International Accounting Standards Committee were formally 
established in 1973. In the early years, these two NGOs tended 
in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards by US Issuers (Release No. 
33-8982; Nov. 14, 2008), pp. 9-37.
135  James Leisenring, IASB Member and Liaison to US FASB, interview, June 
15, 2007.
55
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2012, Vol. 39, no. 1 [whole issue]
Published by eGrove, 2012
Accounting Historians Journal, June 201246
to operate more or less in their own spheres. Over time, the 
relationship between them evolved from distant to IASC Board 
observer, from occasional partner to full partner holding regu-
lar joint meetings with the IASB.136 By 2008, virtually all of the 
FASB’s major projects were being developed in partnership with 
the IASB, whose standards had achieved wide acceptance. By 
2008, 113 countries had either required IFRS, intended to re-
quire IFRS, or permitted their use.137 
As the two groups grew closer together, the role of FASB’s 
overseer, the SEC, became more and more pronounced. Since 
adoption of IAS/IFRS by the US has been a major objective of 
the IASC(B), the SEC, which has the legal responsibility for ac-
counting standards in the US, was bound to take a significant 
role in the developments.138 It was a major player in the IASC’s 
restructuring efforts in 1998-2000; and it had a pronounced 
impact on the subsequent convergence efforts of the IASB and 
FASB. It even drafted the “roadmap” for acceptance of IFRS 
statements without reconciliation to GAAP, which, following its 
publication, further influenced the convergence efforts of both 
Boards.
In the beginning, the FASB was charged with the for-
mulation of high-quality financial accounting and reporting 
standards for the US capital markets; the SEC recognized the 
FASB’s standards as “authoritative” and “generally accepted” for 
purposes of US federal securities laws. The IASC saw its mission 
as the establishment of high-quality international accounting 
standards that could be used for world capital markets. Its ef-
forts were not overseen139 nor subject to approval of a single 
regulator.140 In the early years, the FASB’s standards were often 
regarded by others as well as by itself as the finest in the world. 
On the other hand, the IASC often felt it necessary to defend 
itself against the charge that, since it allowed a number of al-
ternative accounting treatments, its standards were the lowest 
136  David Cairns, email to author, September 11, 2011. “[A] downside to this is 
that some other countries think the US has too much influence on IFRS.”
137  David Tweedie, email to author, August 14, 2008.
138  David Cairns, email to the author, September 11, 2011.
139  This changed in 2010 with the establishment of an independent Monitor-
ing Group. 
140  David Cairns, email to author, September 11, 2011. “But the role of the 
monitoring board is different from that of the SEC in the US. The parallel to the 
SEC’s role in the US would be, for example, an international regulator with not 
only authority over the IASB but also authority over financial reporting require-
ments in all jurisdictions.” 
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common denominator. 
The standards orientations of these two important NGOs 
have often been perceived as decidedly different. The US FASB 
has been accused of promulgating high-quality, extremely de-
tailed, complicated rules-based standards. The IASC/IASB has 
prided itself on its inclination to issue principle-based standards 
that, over time, have been enhanced as a result of various im-
provement projects to become high-quality standards. With the 
accounting scandals in the US in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the US Congress charged the SEC to study the appropriateness 
of principles-based standards for the US. Moreover, the FASB 
conducted a study of the appropriateness of such standards. 
Under the Chairmanship of Robert H. Herz, the FASB embarked 
on a three-pronged approach to standard setting: improvement, 
simplification, and convergence. Improvement involved better-
ing the accounting literature, leading to the FASB’s Codification 
Project. Simplification involved not only having the FASB as the 
single standard setter, but also codification of the existing US 
accounting standards and relevant SEC guidance, and trying to 
improve the understandability of new accounting standards is-
sued by the FASB. Convergence was launched with the Norwalk 
Agreement of 2002.141
Over time, the goals of these two NGOs converged. The 
FASB expanded its mission to encompass high-quality financial 
accounting standards for the US and working toward the goal 
of common standards for the world’s capital markets. In addi-
tion, both the FASB and the IASC (later IASB) saw the need to 
converge their respective standards in order that a worldwide 
set of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles could evolve. 
By 2008, each organization was involved intimately with the 
other in a multiyear effort to that end. While the goal of their 
convergence efforts was common standards, they sometimes fell 
short of that objective. At times, those differences resulted from 
factors unique to one jurisdiction or another that would take 
time to resolve. For example, when the IASB revised its inven-
tory standard, it eliminated the last-in first-out (LIFO) method 
of inventory valuation. In 2008, LIFO was still an accepted US 
inventory valuation method that seemed unlikely to go away 
any time soon due to the LIFO conformity rule of the US Inter-
nal Revenue Service, which required use of LIFO for financial 
141  Ellen M. Heffes, “For FASB’s Herz: ‘The Ultimate Destination—A Single 
Set of Common Standards,’” Financial Executive. v. 23, no. 6, July/August 2007, 
pp. 12-14.
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reporting purposes when used for tax reporting.142 Thus, while 
convergence was indeed occurring, differences persisted. 
The efforts of the IASB since 2001 had been sufficiently suc-
cessful that they had convinced both their supporters and their 
critics, including the SEC, that International Accounting Stan-
dards/International Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) 
had become a set of high-quality accounting standards suitable 
for use by global companies to list on US exchanges without 
reconciliation to GAAP. The SEC even went so far as to issue a 
Concept Release in 2007 to investigate whether US-based issuers 
should be permitted to file and report using IAS/IFRS instead 
of GAAP financial statements for listing on US capital markets, 
and to propose, in 2008, a roadmap for achieving their adoption 
by US firms. Still, in 2008, there existed the simultaneous use of 
both sets of standards in the US. However, SEC actions in 2007 
and 2008 had affirmed the prescient observation of former IASC 
Chairman Arthur Wyatt that “the ultimate resolution of the 
standard-setting dilemma internationally…will lie in the hands 
of the regulators…”(see above.) This certainly had proven to be 
the case in the US.
Once the FASB and the IASB gradually bring their con-
vergence efforts to completion over the next number of years, 
what lies ahead? Will the simultaneous use of the two sets of 
standards, GAAP and IFRS, continue into the long future? (This 
seems less likely for listed companies, with the August 2008 SEC 
proposal to permit US issuers to use IFRS.) Will the IASB con-
tinue to promulgate high-quality standards now that the original 
members have retired from the Board? If the world’s capital 
markets perceive a decline in the quality of IFRSs in the future, 
will the FASB become the de facto international standard setter, 
assuming that GAAP retains its reputation for high quality and 
that international opposition to American GAAP ceases?
Will the FASB continue to exist if US-based listed compa-
nies switch, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to wholesale use 
of IFRSs?143 Will there continue to be a need for a US national 
accounting standard setter, perhaps smaller in size, to serve the 
needs of non-public companies that might choose to continue 
to use GAAP? Will the FASB continue to provide advice to the 
142  David Tweedie, email to author, August 14, 2008. “If the US adopts the 
IFRS then LIFO will be an issue but this issue is already being considered by the 
[Internal] Revenue Service.” 
143  Sue Bielstein observed that, to date, no national standard setter has been 
eliminated in those countries which have adopted IASs/IFRSs. Interview, January 
23, 2009. 
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IASB?
What will be the role of the SEC in a world of harmonized 
financial accounting standards for filing, reporting, and listing 
on US exchanges? What role will the US Congress perceive to 
be the proper one for the SEC in a world of converged financial 
reporting standards?
Whatever answers to these questions emerge, it is clear 
that interesting times are likely to lie ahead for FASB and IASB 
standard setters as they wrestle with present and future financial 
accounting standard setting and reporting challenges.
EPILOG
Since December 31, 2008, there have been a number of 
personnel changes. For example, the Obama Administration 
named Mary Shapiro Chairman of the SEC. During the fourth 
year of his second five-year term, Robert Herz, FASB Chairman, 
resigned, effective September 30, 2010; he was succeeded by 
Leslie Seidman. Sir David Tweedie, IASB Chairman, completed 
his second five-year term on June 30, 2011; he was succeeded by 
Hans Hoogervorst.
The FASB/IASB International Convergence Project has 
continued, although progress has not been as rapid as originally 
hoped. Following their joint meeting in London on April 11-14, 
2011, the two Boards reported on the progress of their joint con-
vergence work. Since their earlier November 2010 report, the 
IASB and the FASB have: 
1. Completed five projects: The Boards have reached important 
decisions on a number of projects and reduced the number of 
remaining priority MoU projects to three (revenue recognition, 
leasing, and financial instruments). Publication of standards 
that are converged or substantially converged on fair value 
measurement, consolidated financial statements (including dis-
closure of interests in other entities), joint arrangements, other 
comprehensive income, and post-employment benefits were 
expected in 2011.
2. Given priority to the remaining MoU areas and insurance ac-
counting: In November 2010, the Boards decided, in order to 
achieve timely completion, to give priority to their joint work on 
three MoU projects—financial instruments, revenue recognition 
and leases—and on accounting for insurance contracts.
3. Extended the completion target beyond June 2011: At their 
meeting in April 2011, the Boards extended the timetable for the 
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remaining priority MoU convergence projects and for insurance 
beyond June 2011. The Boards revised their work plan to focus 
on completing the three remaining priority convergence projects 
in the second half of 2011. For insurance contracts, the IASB 
planned to complete its project by the end of 2011, while the 
FASB planned to issue an exposure draft in a similar timeframe. 
With the progress made since November 2010, the Boards 
neared the completion of their MoU program, which began in 
2002. The short-term projects identified for action in their 2006 
MoU and updated 2008 MoU have been completed or come 
close to completion.
Of the longer-term projects, only three of the priority 
convergence projects remain for which the Boards have yet to 
finalize the technical decisions: financial instruments, revenue 
recognition, and leasing.
In 2008, the Boards set the target date of June 30, 2011, to 
finalize the MoU projects. At their meeting in April 2011, they 
agreed that they would spend additional time beyond June to 
complete this joint work. They were committed to completing 
the work in the remaining MoU areas during the second half of 
2011. This objective was consistent with the recommendations 
of G20 made at their 2009 Pittsburgh Summit.144
In the belief that it was necessary to specify the work re-
quired to incorporate IFRS into the US financial reporting sys-
tem for US issuers, including the scope, timeframe, and method-
ology for any such transition, in February 2010 the SEC directed 
the staff of the Office of the Chief Accountant to develop and 
carry out a Work Plan. This Work Plan was to set forth specific 
areas and factors to consider before potentially transitioning 
the current financial reporting system for US issuers to a system 
incorporating IFRS. Assuming that the Commission determined 
in 2011 to incorporate IFRS into the US domestic reporting 
system, the SEC concluded that the first time US issuers would 
report under such a system would be approximately 2015 or 
2016.145
144  Progress report on IASB-FASB convergence work, 21 April 2011, www.
fasb.org.
145  Commission Statement in Support of Convergence and Global Accounting 
Standards, Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 33-9109, February 
24, 2011, pp. 13-14.
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Call for Nominations
The Academy of Accounting Historians
2012 Vangermeersch Manuscript Award
For the attention of prospective and recent
post-graduates in accounting history
In 1988, The Academy of Accounting Historians established an 
annual manuscript award to encourage scholars new to the field 
to pursue historical research.  An historical manuscript on any 
aspect of the field of accounting, broadly defined, is appropriate 
for submission.
 Eligibility and Guidelines for Submissions
Any accounting faculty member, who holds a full-time appoint-
ment and who received his/her masters/doctorate within seven 
years previous to the date of submission, is eligible to be con-
sidered for this award.  Coauthored manuscripts will be consid-
ered (if at least one coauthor received his/her master/doctorate 
within the last seven years).  Manuscripts must conform to the 
style requirements of the Accounting Historians Journal.  Previ-
ously published manuscripts or manuscripts under review are 
not eligible for consideration. Each manuscript should be sub-
mitted by August 1, 2012 in a Word file as an e-mail attachment 
to the chair of the Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Commit-
tee, Professor Richard K. Fleischman (fleischman@jcu.edu). A 
cover letter, indicating the author’s mailing address, the date of 
the award of the masters/doctoral degree, and a statement that 
the manuscript has not been published or is not currently being 
considered for publication should be included in the submission 
packet.
 Review Process and Award
The Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee (Dick Ed-
wards, Dick Fleischman, and Lee Parker) will evaluate submit-
ted manuscripts on a blind-review basis and select one recipient 
each year.  The author will receive a $500 (U.S.) stipend and 
a plaque to recognize his/her outstanding achievement in his-
torical research.  In the case of coauthored manuscripts, only 
the junior faculty member(s) will receive prizes.  The winning 
manuscript will be published in the Accounting Historians Jour-
nal after an appropriate review.  The award will be given annu-
ally unless the Manuscript Award Committee determines that no 
submission warrants recognition as an outstanding manuscript.  
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THE OLD DU PONT COMPANY’S 
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM LASTING
A HUNDRED YEARS: AN OVERLOOKED 
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
Abstract: Accounting historians have not yet realized that there ex-
isted another complete accounting system before the formation of 
the modern accounting system of today which Johnson and Kaplan’s 
Relevance Lost characterizes by the “integration” of cost and financial 
accounts supported by “inventory costing.” In that earlier accounting 
system, cost and profit calculations were made in a past particular 
ledger account or accounts, namely trading account(s), where ac-
counting practices opposed to “inventory costing” and “integration” 
were used. The historical existence of that accounting system is 
overlooked by accounting historians. The example of the old Du Pont 
Company (DPC) this paper presents will bring it to light.
Cost and profit calculation were made in four trading accounts in the 
double-entry ledger at the old DPC as it was purchased by the new 
DPC in 1902. One of its trading accounts dated back to 1804 when the 
old DPC started production of gunpowder. Early cost and profit calcu-
lations in that trading account were examined by the new DPC’s staff 
in the early 1940s. They prepared schedules showing the cost data, 
sales revenues, and profit measurement recorded in the early trading 
account. These schedules give evidence that the old DPC recorded the 
costs incurred and used the cost data to compute profit for financial 
accounting purposes, but in different ways from today’s “inventory 
costing” and “integration.” This old DPC’s accounting system resulted 
from the application of the double-entry system to industrial account-
ing and was in use throughout the nineteenth century. By revealing 
the historical existence of that overlooked accounting system, this 
paper will show that accounting history may be described as evolu-
tion of the traditional accounting system made through double-entry 
bookkeeping in which the trading account was of vital importance 
and the transition from that traditional accounting system to the 
modern integrated accounting system supported by inventory costing.
_________
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INTRODUCTION
Johnson and Kaplan [1987] describe accounting history 
as evolution of management accounting and the formation of 
“inventory costing” supporting the “integration” of cost and fi-
nancial accounts as a turning point of that evolution. This paper 
will show that accounting history may be described as evolution 
of cost and profit calculation for financial accounting purposes 
and that the formation of “inventory costing” supporting “inte-
gration” may be regarded as a turning point of this evolution.
Johnson and Kaplan [1987] give the definition of the inte-
gration of cost and financial accounts as follows: “The term inte-
gration meant that all amounts reported in financial statements, 
whether they were period expenses or end-of-period assets, had 
to be traceable to original (i.e., historical) cost of recorded trans-
actions [p.131; emphasis in original]. This “integration” was 
supported by “inventory costing − a bookkeeping procedure that 
manufacturing accountants follow to separate the production 
expenses of an accounting period from the cost of manufactured 
product inventories at the end of the period” [p.130]. Inventory 
costing that Johnson and Kaplan refer to is today’s costing for 
financial accounting purposes. According to Johnson and Ka-
plan [1987, p.130], “inventory costing “ was promoted by public 
accountants after 1900. Before that, “inventory costing” was not 
executed and “manufactured inventories” were valued “with 
dollar amounts that originated outside the books of account” 
[p.131]. Johnson and Kaplan strongly contend that before 1900 
“inventory costing” supporting “integration” was lacking in the 
chapter sub-titled “Relevance Lost” in their book. Three points 
may be made regarding that Johnson and Kaplan’s observation.
It should be noted, at first, that Johnson and Kaplan charac-
terize the modern accounting system of today by the integration 
of cost and financial accounts supported by inventory costing.
Second, Johnson [1972, p.469] find “a completely inte-
grated double-entry cost accounting system” at Lyman Mills in 
the mid-nineteenth century. That is based on the fact that the 
two mill accounts in Lyman Mills’ home office (general) ledger 
constituted “trading accounts” which contained “entries for 
non-manufacturing expenses and sales in addition to entries for 
manufacturing expenses” to “provide profit and loss data use-
ful in determining the semi-annual dividend to shareholders” 
[p.471].1 Johnson’s contention that Lyman Mills had a integrated 
1 Lyman Mills had “a double-entry general ledger..., as well as a double-entry 
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accounting system is definitely denied by Johnson and Kaplan 
[1987]. They note that “Lyman Mills did not compile cost ac-
counting data in their mill accounts in order to attach cost to 
product inventory for financial reporting purposes” [p.28]. Thus 
Johnson and Kaplan present the Lyman Mills case as one that 
gives evidence that “inventory costing” supporting “integra-
tion” did not existed before 1900. However, it should be noted 
that they still acknowledge that cost data were used to compute 
profit in the trading accounts for financial accounting purposes 
noting that Lyman Mills’ trading accounts “provided profit and 
loss data useful in determining the semiannual dividend to 
shareholders” [Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, p.28]. In short, 
Johnson and Kaplan deny the presence of “inventory costing” 
and “integration” at Lyman Mills in the mid-nineteenth century, 
on the one hand, and acknowledge the presence of costing for 
financial accounting purposes different from inventory costing, 
on the other.
Third, although they acknowledge the presence of costing 
for financial accounting purposes before 1900, Johnson and Ka-
plan [1987] minimize this fact and finally renounce acknowledg-
ing this fact in the chapter sub-titled “Relevance Lost” in their 
book.2 They treat costing practices before 1900 only from the 
angle of management accounting. Thus they describe account-
ing history as evolution of management accounting.
Of the three points above, only the third point influenced 
accounting history research. Historical studies from the angle of 
management accounting, represented by Fleischman and Parker 
[1997], flourished after the publication of Johnson and Kaplan 
[1987].3 The second point above was completely neglected by the 
historical studies on management accounting and by accounting 
history studies in general. The objective of this paper is to shed 
light on that neglected issue of accounting history research. This 
factory ledger”[Johnson,1972, p.469]. Fujimura [2003] specified the relationship 
between the two kinds of ledgers which Johnson [1972] failed to do.
2  The following passage is found in the chapter the Lyman Mills’ case is treat-
ed. “...they provide cost information that is systematically and reliably reconciled 
with profit and loss. But Lyman Mills managers did not invest resources in the 
compilation of this information in order to prepare their semiannual financial 
reports” [Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, p.30]. The last sentence gives the impres-
sion that Johnson and Kaplan deny any use of costing for financial accounting 
purposes. However, it only means that inventory costing was not executed. As 
the preceding observation suggests, they acknowledge that cost data were used 
to compute profit.
3 See Fleischman [2009] which is the most recent review article on studies of 
management accounting history.
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paper treats the system of cost and profit calculation for finan-
cial accounting purposes found at the old Du Pont Company 
(DPC) that lasted a hundred years from the American Industrial 
Revolution. As seen later, the old DPC used a trading account 
or accounts that recorded costs to compute profit for financial 
accounting purposes.4 Costing for financial accounting purposes 
performed in the trading account, namely that past practice op-
posed to “inventory costing” for today’s integrated accounting 
system, is the issue this paper addresses.
This issue, which relates to the second point above, has 
been completely neglected by accounting historians. To be sure, 
some authors such as J. R. Edwards and T. Boyns paid atten-
tion to the financial accounting aspect of earlier accounting 
practices. However, they did not address the trading account, 
nor did they treat costing for financial accounting purposes. For 
example, Boyns, Edwards, and Nikitin [1997], which includes 
the summaries of earlier works of themselves and others, noted: 
“for the period and firms studied, there was a single, integrated 
accounting system”[p.16]. They used the word “integrated” to 
indicate that they found a financial accounting aspect in earlier 
accounting practices. However, the use of the word “integrated,” 
at the same time, means that they were indifferent to the differ-
ence between costing practices of the past and inventory cost-
ing for today’s integrated accounting system. It further means 
that they were indifferent to costing for financial accounting 
purposes itself. In fact, their interest was only in “the practice 
of cost calculation...for managerial purposes [Boyns, Edwards, 
and Nikitin, 1997, p.16]. They did not address the issue of cost-
ing for financial accounting purposes, nor did they approach the 
process of profit calculation for financial accounting purposes, 
which was recorded in the trading account. They showed no 
interest in the trading account which is the key account to rec-
ognize the past particular accounting system for what it was. 
In fact, in the case studies made by Edwards and Boyns [1992] 
and Edwards, Boyns, and Anderson [1995], they did not notice 
the presence of trading accounts although some accounts in the 
cases may be regarded as trading accounts. This is because their 
research focused only on costing for management accounting 
purposes. The trading account and the issue of costing for finan-
cial accounting purposes were outside their interest. From their 
approach, evolution of accounting attaining to today’s integrated 
4  The precise definition of the trading account will be given when treating the 
old DPC’s early trading account.
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accounting system can not be described; besides, the question 
as to when and how today’s integrated accounting system was 
formed can not be posed. In this sense, their studies are not his-
torical studies.
The preceding discussion indicates that there is a serious, 
unbelievable gap in accounting history research. The system 
of cost and profit calculation for financial accounting purposes 
that existed before the advent of today’s integrated accounting 
system remains unknown. Accounting historians have never 
imagine that there existed another system of cost and profit cal-
culation for financial accounting purposes in earlier times. The 
historical existence of another accounting system was suggested 
by Johnson and Kaplan [1987] as the second point noted earlier 
and by Fujimura [2000; 2007], but they have not drawn the least 
attention of accounting historians. The gap remains. The objec-
tive of this paper is to fill this gap in accounting history and 
by that, to present a new understanding of accounting history, 
based on the example of the old DPC.
There are complete series of double-entry ledgers and 
journals of the old DPC from its founding year, 1801, through 
its end, February 1902, among the old company’s numerous 
accounting records comprising the collection Accession 500, Se-
ries I housed in the Hagley Museum and Library (formerly the 
Eleutherian Mills Historical Library). These books of account 
have been available since before Chandler and Salsbury [1971], 
for the purpose of describing the early history of the new DPC, 
searched the documents housed, at that time, in the Eleutherian 
Mills Historical Library. However, except Roxanne T. Johnson 
[1989], academics have paid little attention to the old DPC’s 
books of account. R. T. Johnson examined the ledgers, the jour-
nals, and other books of account of the early nineteenth century 
DPC, but could not notice the presence of a trading account. 
As a result, she could not comprehend the accounting system 
of the old DPC at all. Her failure reflects the existing state of 
accounting history research that still continues. The trading ac-
count was not in her mind as were and are the other accounting 
historians.
In order to find out the presence of trading accounts, the 
writer surveyed all the ledgers of the old DPC and made closer 
examinations of the first two volumes covering the years 1801-
1816 and the last two volumes covering the years 1891-1902.5 
In its early years, DPC opened only one trading account in its 
5  See References at the end of this paper.
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ledgers, which was named “Factory.” In its last two ledgers, 
there were four trading accounts: in addition to the long lasting 
“Factory” account summarizing the operating activities of the 
black powder mills in Wilmington, the “Wapwallopen Mills” ac-
count for the black powder mills on Wapwallopen Creek, Penn-
sylvania, the “Iowa Powder Mills” account for the black powder 
mills in Mooar, Iowa, and the “Gun Cotton Works” account for 
the smokeless powder works at Carney’s Point, New Jersey.6 The 
profits or losses determined in the four trading accounts were 
transferred to the “Profit and Loss” account to which the divi-
dends paid were debited.
The writer was not the first to examine the old DPC’s trad-
ing accounts. It was done by the new DPC’s staff a long time 
ago. Documents showing that the new DPC’s staff examined 
the old DPC’s books of account are found in a huge collection, 
The Longwood Manuscripts, Group 10, Papers of Pierre S. du 
Pont (1870-1954), housed in the Hagley Museum and Library. 
This collection was what Chandler and Salsbury [1971] used as 
their “basic source of information” [p.615]. As well as the docu-
ments used by Chandler and Salsbury, the collection includes 
the documents pertaining to the historical studies of the old 
company’s accounting records made by anonymous staff of the 
new DPC, to whom the traditional accounting system must have 
been of the near past. The studies cover the whole period of the 
old company’s existence, and almost all documents are undated. 
Among these documents are found two sets of schedules cover-
ing the old company’s early years, one covering the years 1802-
1809, and the other the years 1810 -1815. Each set includes a 
balance sheet, a profit and loss statement, a schedule showing 
a process of profit determination in the “Factory” account, a 
schedule summarizing the cost debited to the “Factory” account, 
and a schedule summarizing the sales credited to the “Factory” 
account, as well as a schedule calculating a return on invest-
ment. This paper uses the schedules covering the years 1802-
1809. As will be seen later, the schedules suggest that the old 
DPC’s trading account, namely the “Factory” account, by record-
ing costs on its debit and sales on its credit, played a central role 
in profit measurement as did the mill trading accounts in Lyman 
Mills’ home office ledger. An accounting system such as that 
found at the mid-nineteenth century Lyman Mills, which was 
6  The “Wapwallopen Mills” account was opened in May 1859, the “Iowa Pow-
der Mills” account in September 1888 and the “Gun Cotton Works” account in 
December 1892 [Ledgers C, No.9, and No.10].
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characterized by the use of the trading account, was found at 
the early nineteenth century DPC. The records in the “Factory” 
account will show that there was another costing for financial 
accounting purposes different from inventory costing for today’s 
integrated accounting system.
As evidenced by the ledgers noted earlier, trading accounts 
were used at the old DPC until it was purchased by Coleman, 
Alfred, and Pierre S. du Pont. After purchasing the old company, 
Pierre S. du Pont examined the old company’s books of account 
[Chandler and Salsbury, 1971, pp.54-55]. No one has ever indi-
cated that Pierre questioned the old company’s trading accounts. 
The use of the trading account was a common practice at that 
time. That old company’s accounting system dated back to the 
early nineteenth century, when Chandler [1977] described “the 
traditional enterprise” prevailed. This paper addresses such a 
long lasting accounting system. This long lasting accounting 
system existed before the advent of today’s integrated account-
ing system. It is such an accounting system that has been over-
looked by accounting historians. Therefore, the revelation of the 
historical existence of another accounting system will lead to the 
overall revision of the existing understanding of accounting his-
tory. This paper will present a new understanding of accounting 
history, about which some discussion will be made at the end of 
this paper.
OWNERS’ EQUITY AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROFITS
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, the old DPC, was, 
at first, organized in Paris on April 21, 1801 for the term expir-
ing January 1, 1810, in order to establish a powder works in the 
United States. Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, as “the Superintendent 
of the Manufactory (le Directeur de la Manufacture),” was re-
sponsible for constructing and running the powder works [“Acte 
d’association (deed of association),” LMSS].7 In accomplishing 
these tasks, he transferred the French gunpowder technology 
to the United States [Stapleton, 2006]. The powder works was 
constructed on a land of 65 acres on the Brandywine River, four 
miles upstream from Wilmington, Delaware, which was pur-
7  An English translation is in R. T. Johnson [1989, Appendix A]. Another Eng-
lish translation entitled “Original Articles of Partnership” is in LMSS. The two 
English versions are a little different from each other and do not translate all the 
articles of the French original version. Hereafter only the French version will be 
referred to.
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chased in 1802 and production started in 1804 [Kinnane, 2002].8 
The deed of association (Acte d’association) stipulated that 
books be closed and profit be distributed every year. However, 
except an incomplete one, the closing process occurred only at 
the end of the term of association on December 31, 1809.
Table 1 is the balance sheet prepared by the new DPC’s staff. 
The old DPC itself did not prepare separate financial statements 
at that time. Instead, the old company on December 31, 1809 
closed the balance sheet accounts to the “Balance” account in 
the ledger in accordance with the continental system, which 
listed all balance sheet accounts with their balances; and the 
corresponding entries were made, beforehand, in the journal 
[Ledger “A” and Journal B].9 The balance sheet in Table 1 re-
produces and condenses the entry in the “Balance” account in 
Ledger “A” as well as the corresponding entries in Journal B. 
The item “All Others” on the debit side in Table 1 shows the total 
of 59 accounts’ balances and the item “All Others” on the credit 
side that of 19 accounts’ balances. The balance sheet shows two 
groups of figures, namely those presented in 1910 annual report 
and those resulting from a more thorough analysis of the ledger 
made in 1943. That means that the balance sheet was prepared 
in 1943. Therefore, the new DPC’s staff made thorough examina-
tions of the early accounting records of the old DPC in the early 
1940s. It seems that the other five schedules covering the years 
1802-1809 that were noted earlier were also products of the 
study of that time, although the balance sheet and the other five 
schedules are contained in different boxes (see References at the 
end of this paper).
8 The purchase of land in 1802 may be confirmed by Journal B. The beginning 
of production in 1804 may be confirmed by Factory Book (see References at the 
end of this paper)..
9 About the continental system, see Dicksee [1921, Chaps. V and VI]. The deed 
of association stipulated: “Le Directeur de la Manufacture suivra dans les Comptes 
les principes de comptabilité établis en France par l’Administration des Poudres et 
Saltpêtres” (The superintendent of the Manufactory will follow the principles of 
accounting established in France by the Administration des Poudres et Salpêtres in 
the Accounts). The Administration des Poudres et Salpêtres (the Office of Powder 
and Saltpeter) ran the state-owned powder works [Stapleton, 2006, pp.230 and 
232-233]. Littleton [1933, pp.82 and 132] describes the balance account in the led-
ger as the old practice that was to be replaced by “separate financial statements.” 
Jones [1985] notes the use of balance accounts by welsh industrial enterprises 
from the 1740s to 1830. The similar practice is noted by Edwards and Boyns 
[1992, p.169] concerning the Derbyshire and Nottingham Company in 1750-1765.
70
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss1/8
61Fujimura, The Old Du Pont Company
Table 1 (Debit Side)
E. I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY
BALANCE SHEET
DECEMBER 31,1809
Figures Presented
In
1910 Annual Report
Figures Resulting From
More Thorough Analysis
of Ledger (in 1943)
ASSETS
Cash $1,911.66 $1,911.66
Accounts Receivable 31,914.11 32.318.57
Bauduy, Peter $ 5,792.62 $ 5,792.62
Cazenove, A. C. 3,033.36 3,033.36
Girard, A. 5,865.52 5,865.52
McCall, Arch 4,888.42 4,888.42
Parent, Chas. 2,792.99 2,792.99
All Others (various debtors   
   with small balances)    9,541.20    9,945.66
Bills Receivable 1,130.00 1,130.00
Inventories 31,521.95 25,808.98
Brimstone(5,179#) 336.63 (a) 336.63
Cooperage 321.00 (b) 321.00
Charcoal Wood 432.00 (a) 432.00
Gunpowder(38,994#) 21,780.64 (b) 21,780.64
Saltpetre (12,777#) 2,938.71 (a) 2,938.71
Mortgage (c)    5,712.97 (a)           ---00
                                      
TOTAL WORKING CAPITAL $ 66,477.72 $ 61,169.21
Plants and Properties $ 42,750.00 $ 42,750.00
Real Estate $ 12,000.00 $ 12,000.00
Houses 9,100.00 9,100.00
Plants    21,650.00    21,650.00
Mortgage (c) − “Angelica (N.Y.) property
                           and store goods”              ---00     $ 5,712.97
TOTAL ASSETS $ 109,227.72 $ 109,632.18
Original Notes:
(a) Classified as Materials totaling $9,420.31.
(b) Classified as Finished Product totaling $22,101.64.
(c) On October 31, 1834, $4,712.97 was written off to Profit and Loss; on December 31, 1850
       the balance of $1,000.00 was charged to Estate of E. I. duPont.
Note: # means weight in pound.
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Table 1 (Credit Side)
Figures Presented
In
1910 Annual Report
Figures Resulting From
More Thorough Analysis
of Ledger (in 1943)
LIABILITIES
Accounts Payable $ 20,987.36 $ 23,118.50
Accrued Wages (Workmen) $ 2,279.42 $ 2,279.42
Bidermann, Jacques 1,043.99 1,043.99
Broom, Jacob (balance due
on purchase of land)   ---00 1,091.05
Buck, A 1,545.96 1,545.96
DuPlanty, R. 487.97 487.97
DuPont, E. I. 11,792.69 11,792.69
DuPont, V. deNemours &
Company 149.23 149.23
Necker, Germani 266.25 266.25
All Others (various creditors
with small balances) 3,421.85    4,461.94
Bills Payable (3 months ma-
turity) 6,900.00 6,900.00
Mortgage (Jacob Broom - bal-
ance due on purchase of land)       1,091.05             ---00 
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITES $ 28,978.41 $ 30,018.50
Capital Stock (18 Shares at
  $2000. each) 36,000.00 36,000.00
Shares Amount
E. I. DuPont     1 $ 2,000.00
DuPont Farther
& Company   12 24,000.00
Jacques Bidermann     1 2,000.00  
P. Bauduy     4     8,000.00
  18 $36,000.00
Surplus 44,249.31* 43,613.68*
Net Profit for period 1802 to 1809, Incl.                                         
TOTAL LIABILITIES $ 109,227.72 $ 109,632.18
Original Note:
* Difference between $44,249.31 and $43,613.68 or $635.63 represents interest credited 
during December 1810 (applicable to period 1802-1809) to various accounts (Surplus 
being charged).
Source: LMSS, Group 10, Series A, File 418-3, Box 392.
The net profit recorded in the 1910 annual report is the 
same as that recorded in the “Balance” account although the 
asset and liability numbers it lists are a little different. On the 
other hand, DPC’s staff of the early 1940s determined the net 
profit $635.63 less than the original number in the “Balance” ac-
count. This is because they determined the number given to “All 
Others” under the heading “Accounts Payable” $635.63 greater 
than the original data. Except these two modifications, the 1943 
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data in Table 1 faithfully reflect the original data in the “Bal-
ance” account.
As Table 1 shows, DPC’s staff of the early 1940s who pre-
pared the balance sheet used the words “capital stock.” A note 
made by DPC’s staff that exceptionally bears a date (March 25, 
1941) points out as follows: “The original organization of E. 
I. du Pont de Nemours & Company April 21, 1801 was more 
in the form of a modern corporation than that of a modern 
partnership.”10 The records in the ledger show these two natures 
[Ledger “A”]. Each partner (shareholder) had two kinds of per-
sonal accounts. One was a capital account called “account in 
Co.” and the other a current account called “account proper.” 
(The personal accounts under “Capital Stock” in Table 1 are ac-
counts in Co. and the corresponding personal accounts under 
the headings “Accounts Payable” or “Accounts Receivable” are 
accounts proper). In the ledger also, an account (temporarily) 
recording the contributed capital was opened, which was named 
“Stock.” At first, the “Stock” account was credited with the 
total capital, $36,000, with the explanation “by Sundries; Amt. 
Subscribed for,” and the corresponding debits were made to the 
partners’ current accounts (accounts proper). Then the “Stock” 
account was debited with $36,000 and the corresponding credits 
were made to the partners’ capital accounts (accounts in Co.). 
All these transactions were dated April 21, 1801, the founding 
date. The “Stock” account temporarily symbolized a nature of 
corporation but was immediately cleared to zero. The capital 
was recorded in the partners’ (shareholders’) capital accounts. 
The “Stock” account revived at the end of the period as an ac-
count functioning as a retained earnings account. $44,249.31 
on Table 1 that the 1910 annual report recorded as “Surplus” 
was the net profit of the first accounting period credited, on 
10 “Interest of Management in the Affairs of the Partnership of E. I. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Company 1801-1899” [ LMSS]. The deed of association stipulated 
that the liability of the partners be limited to their investment in the association. 
(The related article is only found in “Acte d’association” [LMSS]). But “‘Laws of 
Delaware, 1797,’ have no provisions for Partnerships or Corporations,” accord-
ing to a note made by the new DPC’s staff which bears a date (March 25, 1941) 
[“Original Partnership of 1801,” LMSS]. On the part of France, its Code of Com-
merce was promulgated only in 1807, which recognized the following four types 
of business entities: société en nom collectif corresponding to general partnership, 
société en commandite simple corresponding to limited partnership, société en 
commandite par actions which was a type of corporation with a top executive 
or executives with unlimited liability and which still existed today, and société 
anonyme corresponding to the ordinary corporation which was under the govern-
ment’s authorization until the 1867 law.
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December 31, 1809, to the “Stock” account and recorded in the 
“Balance” account as the “Stock” account’s balance [Ledger “A”]. 
At the beginning of the next year, the “Balance” account was 
not opened. Instead, the “Stock” account served as the opening 
balance account before serving as the retained earnings account 
in the new accounting period. To the “Stock” account, under 
the date of January 1, 1810, the total credit accounts’ opening 
balances were debited and the total debit accounts’ opening bal-
ances were credited with the explanations “to Sundries” and “by 
Sundries.” Each balance sheet account made a corresponding 
credit or debit to record its opening balance [Ledger “B”]. That 
process was, at the same time, the process of distributing all the 
net profit in the first accounting period. (Note that the “Stock” 
account did not function as a retained earnings account at that 
moment). The distributed profits were virtually credited to the 
partners’ accounts through the above process. The credits were 
made not to the partners’ capital accounts but to their accounts 
proper. The opening balance of each partner’s account proper 
was determined (except the “DuPont, Father & Company” ac-
count that had no balance) by adding its (credit or debit) ending 
balance of the preceding year and its distributed profit. This 
process is detailed in Journal B.11
Table 2 reproduces the “Statement of Profit & Loss” which, 
as noted earlier, seems to have been prepared by the staff of the 
early 1940s. The statement reproduces and condenses the en-
tries in the “Profit & Loss” account in the Ledger “A” with some 
modifications. It shows $65,485.66 as “Operative Earnings from 
Sales.” That is the amount the new DPC’s staff considered to be 
that of the profit that should have been determined in the trad-
ing account in the ledger, the “Factory” account. The profits ac-
tually determined in the “Factory” and “Profit & Loss” accounts 
in the ledger are referred to in the following section.
 As shown in Table 2, the “Statement of Profit & Loss” is ac-
companied by the schedule on the distribution of the net profit 
which is originally recorded by entries dated January 1, 1810 in 
Ledger “B” and an entry in Journal B. The distribution of profit 
noted earlier was, in reality, made in this way. The deed of as-
sociation stipulated the mode of profit distribution as follows: 
11 The account proper of only one partner (P. Bauduy) showed a debit bal-
ance, $5,792.62, at the end of the preceding year (see Table 1). As a result, the 
sum debited and credited to the “Stock” account on January 1, 1810 should have 
been $103,839.56 ($109,632.18 – $5,792.62). Journal B shows this amount, but 
the “Stock” account in Ledger “B” did not. One possible interpretation is that it 
was a simple error.
74
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss1/8
65Fujimura, The Old Du Pont Company
Table 2
E. I. Du PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY
STATEMENT OF PROFIT & LOSS
PERIOD 1802 to 1809 INCLUSIVE
(PRODUCTION COMMENCED MAY 1, 1804)
OPERATIVE EARNINGS FROM SALES  (Schedule “A”) $65,485.66*
EXPENSE
Discount on Bills Payable and Bills Receivable 3,955.90
Interest 15,773.02
DuPont, Father & Company - Interest on Shares $4,608.75
DuPont, Father & Company - Interest on Shares
  (credited to account of E. I. duPont) 3,781.77
Jacques Biderman - Interest on Shares 1,043.99
Peter Bauduy 1,618.55
Peter Bauduy - Interest on Shares 2,298.63
E. I. duPont - Interest on Shares 200.41
E. I. duPont - Interest on Private Account 798.31
DuQuesnoy - Interest on Shares 466.66
Necker Germani - Interest on Shares 740.19
Miscellaneous      215.76
Miscellaneous Charges    2,143.06
TOTAL EXPENSE $21,871.98
Net Profit for the Period 1802 to 1809
    (Distributed as below) $43,613.68
Original Note: * $65,485.66 equals 12.1% earned per
annum on average investment of $95,612.44. (For
calculation of Average Investment see attached statement)
DISTRIBUTION OF NET PROFIT
SHARES OF
CAPITAL SHARES OF PROFIT
DuPont, Father &
Company   12 12/30 as  Partner $17,445.47
Jacques Biderman     1 1/30 as  Partner $1,453.78
Peter Bauduy     4 4/30 as  Partner $ 5,815.15
3/30 as  Other 4,361.37 10,176.52
E. I. duPont     1 1/30 as  Partner 1,453.78
9/30 as  Manager 13,084.13 14,537.91
                                   
  18  30/30 $43,613.68
Source: LMSS, Group 10, Series A, File 418-3, Box 391.
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18/30 to the “shareholders (actionnaires),” 9/30 to the “Head of the 
Manufactory (chef de la Manufacture),” namely E. I. du Pont, and 
3/30 to “one of the architects of the Establishment (un des auteurs 
du Projet et de l’Etablissement)” who had not yet been determined. 
The distribution was made in conformity with this stipulation 
(the 3/30 were distributed to P. Bauduy). However, as noted ear-
lier, the total distributed profit recorded in the ledger and journal 
is not $43,613.68 but $44,249.31. In any case, the distribution of 
profit was made in the way shown on the bottom of Table 2. As it 
shows, profit measurement for profit distribution was performed 
at the early old DPC. This paper is concerned with its accounting 
system fulfilling such a financial accounting function.
PROFIT MEASUREMENT IN A TRADING ACCOUNT
The “Factory” account of the old DPC, as a trading ac-
count, had much the same features as did the two mill trad-
ing accounts in Lyman Mills’ home office ledger. Lyman Mills’ 
home office ledger mill accounts were inventory accounts in 
the sense that they recorded finished goods inventories as their 
beginning and ending balances. Such inventory accounts were 
debited with manufacturing and non-manufacturing expenses 
and credited with sales. Credited with sales, Lyman Mills’ home 
office ledger mill accounts recorded profit or loss and became 
trading accounts [Fujimura, 2007, p.171]. Dicksee [1921, p.93] 
described the specific feature of the trading account as “partly 
real and partly nominal.”
Table 3
Factory Account (Condensed and Modified)
(From May 16, 1804 to December 31, 1809)
Saltpeter $122,111.77 Sales & Others $292,422.33
Brimstone 4,664.86 Purifying Saltpetre 2,974.43
Workmen 2,279.42 Real Estate 2,381.38
Factory Book 67,713.29 Cooperage 321.00
Others 51,750.94 Charcoal Wood 432.00
Profit     71,791.50 Gun Powder     21,780.64
$320,311.78 $320,311.78
Note: The first entry in this account (pertaining to gunpowder delivered to sundries) is 
dated May 16, 1804. The entries over eleven folios in the original account are condensed 
into the above account by the writer. The following modifications are made to the original 
entries. “Gun Powder” (the finished goods inventories) is, in reality, not credited to the 
original account. In the above account, by crediting $21,780.64 of “Gun Powder,” the prof-
it is stated larger by the same amount than it is in the original account. That means the 
profit should be $50,010.86 in the original account. However, the actual debited amount 
of the profit was $50,010.85½. Correspondingly, the amount the writer gave to “Others” 
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should become 51,750.94½. In fact, there is an entry recording an amount with the third 
decimal place among the entries included in “Others.” It is the amount $50,010.85½ that 
is transferred from the “Factory” account to the “Profit & Loss” account. In the latter ac-
count, there is another entry recording an amount with the third decimal place. By this 
number, the third decimal place of the profit figure is adjusted. Therefore, the profit of 
$50,010.85½ may be presented as $50,010.86 from the beginning (therefore as $71,791.50 
in this table). Correspondingly, the writer gave $51,750.94 to “Others.”
Sources: Ledger “A” [Accession 500]; Journals A and B [Accession 500].
The same feature might be indicated to the “Factory” ac-
count in the ledger of the old DPC. The account in Table 3 is 
what the writer prepared by summarizing the entries in the 
“Factory” account in Ledger “A” from 1804 to 1809. Many of the 
debit entries in the “Factory” account relate to manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing expenses. “Gunpowder is a mixture of 
saltpetre, charcoal and sulphur, usually in the proportions of 
75:15:10” [Crocker, 1999, p.3]. Of the three kinds of materials, 
saltpeter and brimstone (sulphur) consumed were debited to 
the “Factory” account. They were transferred from the materials 
inventory accounts called “Saltpetre” and “Brimstone” [Ledger 
“A”]. In this first accounting period, and in this accounting pe-
riod only, most cash expenditures were first recorded in a blotter 
named “Factory Book” and mistakenly in another blotter named 
“Factory Building Book” for the years 1806 and 1807. These blot-
ters detail expenditures but only the yearly totals are recorded 
in the journal and ledger. The total of six years is $67,713.29, 
which is shown as the sum of the item “Factory Book” in Table 3 
[Journals A and B and Ledger “A”].12 Among these expenditures 
are those concerning charcoal wood, cooperage, and wages. 
The expenditures related to obtaining charcoal wood (cutting, 
transportation, or purchase) and to cooperage are detailed in 
the blotters,13 where the wages are recorded on a monthly basis. 
In order to record these items on an accrual basis, the charcoal 
wood and the cooperage (barrels and kegs) remaining unused 
12 The yearly totals are recorded in the journals and ledger as follows: on Feb-
ruary 11,1806 for the total expenditures of each of the years 1804 and 1805, on 
December 31, 1808 for the total expenditures of each of the years 1806, 1807, and 
1808, and on December 31 1809 for the total expenditures of the year 1809. The 
total of the six years amounts to $67,713.29, while the expenditures recorded in 
the Factory Book and Factory Building Book amount to $68,635.51. The expen-
ditures relating to the difference between this $68,635.51 and $67,713.29 seem to 
have been debited to the “Factory” account separately and therefore included in 
“Others.”
13 Charcoal making was part of gunpowder making. Therefore, charcoal wood 
is recorded as materials. According to Crocker [1999, p.20], “Gunpowder was tra-
ditionally packed in oak barrels and kegs of various sizes...Most powder mills had 
their own cooperage, and this employed a large portion of the workforce.”
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were credited and the accrued wages payable (“Workmen”) 
were debited to the “Factory” account as shown in Table 3. The 
counterbalancing entries were made to the accounts “Charcoal 
Wood,” “Cooperage,” and “Workmen” which were opened only 
for this purpose [Ledger “A”].
On the other hand, most of the credit entries in the “Facto-
ry” account relate to sales as shown in Table 3. “Gun Powder” is 
the ending finished goods inventory. Of the remaining four items 
on the credit of the “Factory” account, “Cooperage” and “Char-
coal Wood” have been referred to. “Purifying Saltpetre” rep-
resents an amount charged to a personal account, “U. S. Navy 
Department,” for purifying saltpeter, which should be deducted 
from the expenses debited to the “Factory” account. $2,381.38 
recorded as “Real Estate” shows the total payments made to 
the previous landowner and recorded in the blotters mentioned 
earlier. This amount was credited to offset the expenditures 
included in those of the item “Factory Book” in Table 3 and was 
transferred to the company’s fixed asset account, “Real Estate.”14 
Therefore, in principle, the “Factory” account records expenses 
on its debit side and sales and the ending finished goods inven-
tory on its credit side in this first accounting period. Thus, the 
resulting profit is recorded on its debit side.
However, the actual entries in the “Factory” account in the 
ledger did not fully comply with the trading account format. The 
finished goods inventory, “Gun Powder” in Table 3, is not cred-
ited to the “Factory” account. Therefore, the actual profit deb-
ited to this account is $50,010.86 ($71,791.50 – $21,780.64).15 It 
is this amount that is transferred to the “Profit & Loss” account. 
In the account in Table 3, the writer modified the original data 
so as to indicate that the “Factory” account shows the complete 
trading account format potentially.
In Ledger “A”, instead of crediting the “Factory” account 
with the ending finished goods inventory, a special account 
named “Gun Powder” was opened only to record the ending 
finished goods inventory amounting to $21,780.64, and this on 
the debit side, of course. The counterbalancing credit was made 
to the “Stock” account which, as noted earlier, functioned as a 
retained earnings account at the close of the first accounting pe-
riod. To the credit of the “Stock” account also, the debit balance 
of the “Profit & Loss” account, $22,468.67, was transferred. The 
14 This “Real Estate” account corresponds to the item “Plants and Properties” 
in Table 1.
15 In fact, $50,010.85½. See the note in Table 3.
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“stock” account’s total credits, $44,249.31 = $21,780.64 + $22, 
468.67, represents the net profit of the first accounting period. 
That amount is recorded as the “Stock” account’s balance in the 
“Balance” account. It is that amount that was accepted as the 
net profit of the first accounting period by the new DPC’s staff of 
around 1910 as shown in Table 1.
Therefore, the finished goods inventory produced a profit 
equivalent to its value only by its existence in the books. This 
treatment of the finished goods inventory indicates that E. I. du 
Pont and his bookkeeper knew that the normal or standard ac-
counting methods of the time required that the finished goods 
inventory be credited to the “Factory” account in accordance 
with the ordinary trading account format. If they had done so, 
the profit determined in the “Factory” account and transferred 
from this account to the “Profit & Loss” account would have 
been $71,791.50, as Table 3 shows, and the profit transferred 
from the “Profit & Loss” account to the “Stock” account would 
have been $44,249.31, the full amount of the net profit in the 
first accounting period. Because they knew that was a normal 
practice, E. I. du Pont and his bookkeeper could treat the whole 
value of the finished goods inventory as profit.
The preceding discussion emphasizes the necessity of dis-
tinguishing between a normal practice and an actual practice. 
It may be said that the old DPC’s case just seen suggests that the 
trading account format represented a normal practice at that 
time. In fact, the entries in the “Factory” account came to fully 
comply with the trading account format from the accounting 
period January 1 to August 31, 1818 [Ledger “C”].
THE OLD DU PONT COMPANY’S ACCOUNTING METHODS
RECOGNIZED BY THE NEW DU PONT COMPANY’S STAFF
The entries in the “Factory” account in the first account-
ing period are made over eleven folios. It is not easy for an 
outsider to read all of these entries correctly and to determine 
the total sales and expenses of the period. These amounts are 
provided by the following schedules prepared by DPC’s staff of 
the early 1940s: “Statement of Operative Earnings from Sales” 
reproduced in Table 4 and “Cost of Manufacture” reproduced in 
Table5. The amount of sales on the row “Grand Total” in Table 4, 
$251,585.74, represents the total net sales in the first accounting 
period. That suggests that the item “Sales & Others” in Table 3, 
which is created by the writer, comprises the amounts to be off-
set by the correcting debit entries included in the item “Others” 
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Table 4
SCHEDULE “A”
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY
STATEMENT OF OPERATIVE EARNINGS FROM SALES
 PERIOD 1802 TO 1809 INCLUSIVE (PRODUCTION 
COMMENCED MAY 1,1804)
QUANTITY
(POUNDS)
SALES COST OF SALES
OPERATIVE
EARNINGS
FROM SALES
AMOUNT
PER   
POUND AMOUNT
     PER 
POUND AMOUNT
   PER
POUND
GUNPOWDER
Agents 332,215 $131,175.72 $.3949 $88,312.60 $.2658 $42,863.12 $.1291
Others 143,040 58,310.99 .4077 40,256.17 .2814 18,054.82 .1263
U. S. Government 54,287 20,254.50 .3731 15,871.73 .2924 4,382.77 .0807
TOTAL
GUNPOWDER
529,542 $209,741.21 $.3961 $144,440.50 $.2728 $65,300.71 $.1233
GUNPOWDER
(MANUFACTURED 
WITH U.S.
SALTPETRE)
U. S. Government 57,413 $6,184.34 $.1077 $5,264.90 $.0917 $919.44 $.0160
REMANUFACTURED
GUNPOWDER 
(U.S. GOVERNMENT)
Navy and War
Departments
265,900 $21,784.19 $.0819 $24,383.64 (a)   $.0917 ($2,599.45) ($.0098)
Francis Breuil, 
Philadelphia, Pa. 40,000 13,600.00 .3400 11,694.68 (b)     .2924 1,905.32 .0476
Samuel McCall, 
Philadelphia, Pa. 3,450 276.00 .0800 316.36 (a)     .0917 (40.36) (.0117)
TOTAL
REMANUFACTURED
GUNPOWDER
309,350 $35,660.19 $.1153 $36,394.68 $.1176 ($734.49) ($.0023)
GRAND TOTAL 896,305 $251,585.74 $.2807 $186,100.08 $.2076 $65,485.66 $.0731
Original Note: See separate 
statement showing details of 
sales by years
Original Notes: (a) Assumed to have been remanu-
factured without Saltpetre. (b) Assumed to have 
been remanufactured with Saltpetre furnished by 
the Company. ($8,026.59 covers cost thereof).
Source: LMSS, Group 10, Series A, File 418-3, Box 391.
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Table 5 (Top Half)
COST OF MANUFACTURE
1802  TO  1809  INCLUSIVE
(OPERATIONS COMMENCED MAY 1, 1804)
DETAILS OF MANUFACTURING COSTS
Salaries $13,296.16
E. I. duPont (April 1, 1804 to September
 30, 1809 at $1800 per annum) $9,900.00
Charles Dalmas (April 1, 1804 to June
 30,1809 at $600 per annum) 3,100.00
Charles Parent 161.16
Charles Cazeau      135.00
Wages (Including boarding of hands) 27,915.94
Saltpetre (534,511 lbs.) 122,111.77
Brimstone (99,957 lbs.) 4,664.86
All Other Costs 39,891.99
Peter Bauduy -- Commissions, etc. 9,047.90
U. S. Government (Credit for purifying
Saltpetre) (2,974.43)
Legal Expenses, etc. -- Charles Munns’
Suit 1,135.73
Depreciation of Factory Buildings, etc. 6,305.84
Miscellaneous  26,376.95
                              
Total $207,880.72
ALLOCATION OF MANUFACTURING COSTS
Production
Pounds     Salaries    Wages   Saltpetre
  Brim-
  stone
   All Other
   Costs
          Total
          Costs
      Per
Pounds
GUNPOWDER
Sales by Agents 332,215 $4,722.75 $9,915.65 $66,663.86 $1,656.94 $14,169.43 $97,128.63 (a)    $.2924
Sales to Others 143,040 2,033.45 4,269.33 28,703.10 713.42 6,100.90 41,820.20(b)      .2924
Sales to U. S. Government 54,287 771.74 1,620.31 10,893.49 270.76 2,315.43 15,871.73 .2924
Inventory in hands of 
Agents December 31,1809 33,150 471.26 989.43 6,652.04 165.34 1,413.90 9,691.97 (c)      .2924
Inventory in our own Mills, 
etc. December 31,1809 5,844 83.08 174.42 1,172.69 29.15 249.27 1,708.61(d)      .2924
568,536 $8,082.28 $16,969.14 $114,085.18 $2,835.61 $24,248.93 $166,221.14
Per Pound $.0142 $.0298 $.2007 $.0050 $.0427 $.2924
GUNPOWDER (MANUFACTURED WITH U.S. SALTPETRE)
Sales to U. S. Government 57,413 $816.18 $1,713.61 -- $286.35 $2,448.76 $5,264.90 $.0917
REMANUFACTURED GUNPOWDER (U.S. GOVERNMENT)
Sales to Navy and War
Departments 265,900(f) $3,780.02 $7,936.34 -- $1,326.19 $11,341.09 $24,383.64 $.0917
Sales to Francis Breuil,
Philadelphia, Pa. 40,000(e)      568.64 1,193.88 $8,026.59 199.51 1,706.06 11,694.68 .2924
Sales to Samuel
McCall, Philadelphia, Pa. 3,450(f)        49.04 102.97 -- 17.20 147.15 316.36 .0917
309,350 $4,397.70 $9,233.19 $8,026.59 $1,542.90 $13,194.30 $36,394.68 $.1176
GRAND TOTAL FOR
THE PERIOD 935,299 $13,296.16 $27,915.94 $122,111.77 $4,664.86 $39,891.99 $207,880.72 $.2223
Original Notes: (e) Assumed to have been remanufactured with Saltpetre furnished by the
                                Company.
                           (f) Assumed to have been remanufactured without any Saltpetre.
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Table 5 (Bottom Half)
created also by the writer, which are often referred to as “return 
entries” in the ledger [Ledger “A”].16 The data shown under the 
16 R.T. Johnson [1989, p.70] notes: “Initially, the record keepers credited all 
powder distributions directly to the ‘Factory account.’ For direct sales to custom-
ers or company principals, this constituted an accurate recognition of revenue.... 
Transfers of powder to agents for disposal on behalf of the company did not con-
stitute a completed earnings process, however, and therefore should not have 
been credited to the ‘Factory’ account until the agents sold the powder to a third 
Saltpetre consumed 534,511  lbs.
Less Estimated loss in refining, etc. 
(14.61%)
  78,109   ''
Assumed quantity of Saltpetre actually 
used (75% of Gunpowder produced) 456,402   ''
Brimstone 99,957   ''
Percent Brimstone to Gunpowder
Manufactured 10.69%
S U M M A R Y
SALES COST OF
POUNDS AMOUNT SALES
GUNPOWDER
Agents 332,215 $131,175.72 $88,312.60 *
Others 143,040 58,310.99 40,256.17 **
U. S. Government    54,287     20,254.50     15,871.73
529,542 $209,741.21 $144,440.50
GUNPOWDER (MANUFACTURED
WITH U. S. SALTPETRE)
U. S. Government 57,413 6,184.34 5,264.90
REMANUFACTURED GUNPOWDER
(U. S. GOVERNMENT)
Navy and War Departments 265,900 $21,784.19 $24,383.64
Francis Breuil, Philadelphia, Pa. 40,000 13,600.00 11,694.68
Samuel McCall, Philadelphia, Pa.     3,450        276.00        316.36
309,350 $35,660.19 $36,394.68
896,305 $251,585.74 $186,100.08
Original Notes:
* COST OF SALES BY AGENTS ** COST OF SALES TO OTHERS
Cost as above (a) $97,128.634 Cost as above (b) $41,820.20
Adjustment -- Difference between value 
at which inventory in hands of agents 
12/31/09 of 33,150 lbs. was set up on 
books, viz. 
Adjustment -- Difference between value 
at which inventory on hand 12/31/09
of 5,844 lbs. was set upon book,
viz.
 $.5583 per lb. $18,508.00 $.5600 per lb. $3,272.64
and actual cost thereof as 
above, $.2924 (c) 9,691.97  (8,816.03)
and actual cost thereof as 
above, $.2924 (d) 1,708.61  (1,564.03)
$88,312.600 $40,256.17
Source: LMSS, Group 10, Series A, File 418-3, Box 391.
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heading “Details of Manufacturing Costs” in Table 5 are, except 
“Depreciation of Factory Building, etc.,” the expenses incurred 
in the first accounting period.
Tables 4 and 5 show that DPC’s staff of the early 1940s pre-
pared these tables supposing that the ending finished goods in-
ventories were credited to the “Factory” account. Because there 
are no beginning inventories in this first accounting period, 
the cost of the finished goods sold of each category, which are 
recorded in Table 5 under the heading “Allocation of Manufac-
turing Costs,” must represent each category’s cost of sales to be 
recorded in Table 4. However, as to the sub-categories “Sales by 
Agents” and “Sales to Others” within the category “Gunpowder,” 
further calculations for obtaining their costs of sales are made 
in the original notes at the bottom of Table 5. In these calcula-
tions, each cost of sales is obtained by subtracting from the 
real cost of sales the difference between the estimated price and 
the cost of the related finished goods inventories. This process 
of computing the pretended cost of sales indicates that DPC’s 
staff of the early 1940s made the calculations supposing that 
the ending finished goods inventories were credited to the “Fac-
tory” account. In this supposition, the difference between the 
higher estimated price and the cost of each inventory produces 
profit. To record the profit produced in this way, DPC’s staff of 
the early 1940s reduced the cost of sales by the profit for each of 
the two sub-categories. These modified numbers are reproduced 
in Table 4. Thus, in Table 4 profit calculation in the framework 
of the trading account is reconciled with the modern profit cal-
culation formula, namely sales minus cost of sales equals profit. 
That means that the profit recorded on the row “Grand Total” 
in Table 4 must agree with the profit debited to the trading ac-
count in Table 3. However, they are a little different. The differ-
ence, $6,305.84, is explained by the fact that the depreciation 
expense, $6,305.84, is included in the “Manufacturing Costs” in 
the schedule in Table 5, while it is charged not to the “Factory” 
account but to the “Profit & Loss” account in the ledger [Ledger 
“A”].17 It seems certain that DPC’s staff of the early 1940s sup-
posed the same trading account format as does Table3 in under-
party.” R. T. Johnson [1989] does not refer to the related correcting entries. Of 
course, other kinds of correcting entries were also made.
17 It seems that this depreciation does not mean periodical depreciation to 
be charged as manufacturing expense. It rather relate to revaluation of the fixed 
assets. The old DPC did not perform periodical depreciation even in its last years 
[Ledgers N0. 10 and No.1]. Lyman Mills executed replacement accounting [Fu-
jimura, 2004]. The writer supposes the old DPC did the same.
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standing the entries in the “Factory” account in the ledger.
The preceding observation suggests that DPC’s staff of the 
early 1940s knew the traditional accounting system very well. The 
trading account in Table 3 represents a normal practice in the 
traditional accounting system. The accounting system of the old 
DPC should be understood on the supposition that its “Factory” 
account took the complete trading account format shown in Table 
3. The schedules in Tables 4 and 5 well explain cost and profit cal-
culation performed in this complete trading account. Further, the 
cost records in Table 5 show the specific features of the costing 
for financial accounting purposes made in the trading account.
First, the items listed under the heading “Details of Manu-
facturing Costs” suggest that the “manufacturing costs” include 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing costs. The salaries 
of E. I. du Pont and legal expenses may be regarded as general 
and administrative expenses, while the commissions of Peter 
Bauduy are selling expenses. That indicates that the item “Mis-
cellaneous” includes other non-manufacturing expenses as 
well as factory overhead, other than the expenses for charcoal 
wood and cooperage. In any case, both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing costs are recorded in the “Factory” account, 
and in such an account profit is calculated. Manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing costs were not treated differently in profit 
calculation in traditional accounting.
In passing, the above suggests that “cost of sales” mentioned 
earlier was not cost of sales in the strict sense. On the other hand, 
the profits determined in the schedule in Table 4 and the “Factory” 
account may be regarded as operating profit in the broad sense.
Second, the data on the costs by category under the heading 
“Allocation of Manufacturing Costs” indicate that costs, more 
specifically conversion costs, are assigned to only finished goods 
sold or inventoried. In other words, work-in-process inventories 
(as partly completed units) are not the object of costing. That 
suggests that the work-in-process inventories are valued at 
materials costs alone and recorded in the materials accounts, 
namely in the accounts “Saltpetre,” “Brimstone,” and “Charcoal 
Wood.” In fact, the old DPC had no account specifically devoted 
to record work-in-process inventories.18
18 Only one time, work-in-process inventories (as partially completed units) 
were recorded distinctively in the books at the close of the accounting period 
on June 30, 1814. After December 31, 1809, the old Du Pont Company closed 
the books on June 30, 1814, December 31, 1814 and December 31, 1815. These 
periods, namely from January 1, 1810 through December 31, 1815, were covered 
by the other set of schedules noted at the outset of this paper. A compound entry 
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Third, different estimated prices are given to the two 
categories of finished goods inventories in the calculations of 
cost of sales made in the original notes at the bottom of the 
schedules in Table 5. The ledger and journal [Ledger “A” and 
Journal B] record only the total weight and amount of the two 
categories, as shown in the balance sheet in Table 1. DPC’s staff 
of the early 1940s drew these prices from the records in Waste 
Book B. Therefore, the prices shown there are those given by the 
old DPC. It may be presumed that the old DPC determined these 
prices based on market prices. The original notes at the bottom 
of the schedule in Table 5 show that the inventory “in hands of 
agents” on December 31, 1809 is estimated at 55.83 cents per 
pound and the inventory on the factory site for “Sales to Others” 
on the same date at 56 cents per pound. Although these prices 
are much higher than the related sales prices recorded in Table 
4 that are the averages in six years, they seem to reflect the mar-
ket prices of gunpowder at the end of 1809. According to one of 
the six schedules recording detailed data on sales for the years 
1804 to 1809 which will be treated in the following section and 
made on the credit of the “Factory” account on June 30, 1814 was detailed by the 
corresponding entry in the journal where a record of partially completed units is 
found. There, as the inventories at the end of the period, “GP Unfinished in the 
mill @48 Cts $7,603.20” and “GP in the magazine ready put up @52Cts $7,852.00” 
are recorded together with “GP in the hands of several agents” that was valued 
at 56 cents per pound [Journal “B”]. (“GP” is, of course, gunpowder). However, 
it should be noted that not only “GP in the magazine” but also “GP Unfinished” 
were valued by reference to market prices. According to the schedule for the years 
1810-1815 corresponding to that in Table 4 [LMSS], the average sales price per 
pound of “Gunpowder” is $0.5616 and according to the schedule for the years 
1810-1815 corresponding to that in Table5 [LMSS], the average cost per pound 
of the category “Gunpowder” is $0.4278. Therefore, the partially completed units 
were valued higher than the cost of the finished gunpowder and may be presumed 
to have been valued based on or considering the market prices of the completed 
gunpowder. R. T. Johnson [1989, p.77] highlighted the above journal entry and 
wrote as follows: “These nineteenth-century record keepers even went so far as to 
value what constituted ‘Work-in-Process Inventory,’ and recognized completion of 
this in-process powder in ensuring periods.” However, the fact that work-in-pro-
cess inventories were recorded does not come as a surprise. They existed actually 
and physically. The question is how they were recorded. As noted earlier in the 
text, partially completed units were valued at their materials costs and recorded 
in the materials accounts in general (R. T. Johnson overlooked this fact). In the 
case noted in this note, the partially completed units were valued at market and 
recorded in the “Gunpowder Outstanding” account, which was opened in Ledger 
“B” to record the finished goods inventories. It should be noted that the recording 
of partially completed units on June 30, 1814 had no influence on the schedules 
covering the years 1810 to 1815. They have the same formats as the previous 
schedules do.
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its successor for the years 1810 to 1815, the annual average sales 
price of the category “Sales by Agents” is 49.68 cents per pound 
for the year 1809 and 58.09 cents per pound for the year 1810; 
and that of the category “Sales to Others” is 49.80 cents per 
pound for the year 1809 and 56.35 cents per pound for the year 
1810.19 Those annual average sales prices for the years 1809 and 
1810 suggest that the old DPC estimated the inventory values at 
the end of the year 1809 based on the market prices at that mo-
ment. Therefore, the finished goods inventories credited to the 
“Factory” account are not valued at cost but based on market 
prices, at a much higher price than cost in this case. However, 
the entry to record a write-up of the finished goods inventories 
is not made in the ledger. The old DPC gave the value higher 
than cost to the finished goods inventories without recording a 
write-up. The finished goods inventories were valued with a dol-
lar amount that originated outside the books of account.
The above three specific features found in the records of the 
trading account show fundamental differences between the tra-
ditional accounting system and the modern accounting system 
of today that Johnson and Kaplan [1987] characterize using the 
terms “integration “ and “inventory costing.” The practice noted 
as the third point above is what Johnson and Kaplan [1987, 
p.131] note as the practice that was opposed to “integration” 
and “inventory costing.” Johnson and Kaplan note only that 
practice as the practice against “integration” and “inventory 
costing” found in the traditional accounting system. However, 
it should be noted that not only the third point but all the three 
points above are opposed to inventory costing. In inventory cost-
ing for financial accounting purposes, only manufacturing costs 
are regarded as an asset when they are incurred. As noted as the 
first point, manufacturing and non-manufacturing costs were 
not treated differently in the trading account. The differentiation 
between inventoriable costs and period costs did not exist at 
the old DPC’s accounting system. As noted as the second point, 
conversion costs are not assigned to work-in-process inventories 
(as partly completed units).20 That indicates that costs were not 
regarded as an asset when they were incurred. The third point 
indicates the same thing. The finished goods inventories were 
valued based on market prices, at a price much higher than 
19 “Sales of Gunpowder and Remanufactured Gunpowder, Period May 1, 1804 
to December 31, 1809, Inclusive” and “Sales of Gunpowder and Remanufactured 
Gunpowder, Period 1810-1815 Inclusive” [LMSS].
20 This fact itself was perceived by Johnson [1972, p.470].
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costs, without making a write-up. That indicates that costs were 
not regarded as an asset when they were incurred. All the three 
specific features of traditional accounting found in the old DPC’s 
accounting system show that inventory costing for financial ac-
counting purposes that supports today’s integrated accounting 
system was lacking at the old DPC. 
At the same time, the three specific features suggest the 
presence of a consistent logic in cost and profit calculation 
made in the trading account. As noted above, the finished goods 
inventories were valued based on market prices. That means 
that profit was computed on the basis of production. Not profit 
on sales but profit on production was computed in the trading 
account. In this profit calculation, the differentiation of inven-
toriable costs and period costs makes no sense. Therefore, both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing costs were treated in 
the same way in the trading account. Both constituted the costs 
of finished goods. That means that finished goods inventories 
were valued at the total of both costs when they were valued 
at cost.21 It is suggested by the fact that the costs allocated to 
the inventories in Table 5 comprise both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing costs. Further, the fact that conversion costs 
were assigned to only finished goods means that the costs in-
curred during the year represent the costs of the finished goods 
completed during the year. Therefore, the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing costs recorded in the trading account, which 
are shown in Table 5, represent both the costs incurred during 
the year and the costs of finished goods completed during the 
year. These costs were matched against the revenues they gener-
ated. Profit on production was measured in that way in the trad-
ing account.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON
THE OLD DU PONT COMPANY’S ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
Although in a different way from that of today’s methods, 
21 Manufactured inventories may have been valued at cost. According to Fu-
jimura [2000], at Schneider and Company, a French company, (1) work-in-process 
inventories in job costing were valued at full cost including both manufacturing 
and non-manufacturing costs; (2) work-in-process inventories in process costing 
recorded as departmental finished goods were valued at full cost including both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing costs; and (3) work-in-process inventories 
in process costing to be treated as partially completed units were valued at mate-
rial costs only. Some of the complete records concerning job costing that were 
used to value inventories are reproduced in Fujimura [2002].
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the old DPC, in its early years, grasped the costs incurred and 
used the cost data to compute profit. However, aside from 
balancing the accounts on February 11, 1806 without accom-
panying profit measurement, the old company did not close the 
accounts until the end of the first term of association. It did not 
close the books annually despite the stipulation of the deed of 
association noted earlier. That did not mean, however, the old 
company was not able to close the books annually, as will be 
seen from now.
As indicated by an original note in the schedule in Table 4, 
a schedule recording annual sales was prepared by DPC’s staff 
of the early 1940s, which is entitled “Sales of Gunpowder and 
Remanufactured Gunpowder.” Table 6 reproduces only part of 
that schedule. As this table suggests, regarding the sub-category 
“Agents” within the category “Gunpowder,” sales are recorded 
for each individual agent. Although omitted, the data on all 
the categories and sub-categories corresponding to Table 4 are 
recorded in the schedule. In Table 6, only the data of the years 
1804 and 1809, other than those of the total of the six years, 
are reproduced, partly. On the part of the schedule, of course, 
the full data of all the six years from 1804 to 1809 are recorded. 
More importantly, there is a set of schedules in the Hagley Mu-
seum and Library named “Powder Sales Book” in the catalogue 
and covering the years 1804 through 1814 that the new compa-
ny’s staff seem to have relied on in preparing the schedule partly 
reproduced in Table 6. All the data in the schedule “Sales of 
Gunpowder and Remanufactured Gunpowder” are found in the 
old company’s set of schedules that are much more detailed.22 A 
handwritten note on the cover of the old company’s set of sched-
ules suggests that the schedules were filed to the Delaware Court 
of Chancery for the suit of E. I. du Pont and others with Peter 
Bauduy on April 14, 1818. Therefore, the schedules were pre-
pared after the related accounting periods passed and to cope 
with litigation. Nonetheless, the schedules prove that the old 
company was capable of preparing annual data. That indicates 
that the old company was capable of closing the books annually. 
Only it did not do so.
22 The new company’s staff made one modification to the original: the 
$10,085.15 sale in 1809 by McCall is recorded as that of 1810 in the original. It 
seems that the data by category and subcategory in the columns “Quantity” and 
“Sales” in Table 4 were obtained from this old company’s schedule.
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Table 6
SALES OF GUNPOWDER AND REMANUFACTURED 
GUNPOWDER
PERIOD MAY 1, 1804 (DATE PRODUCTION COMMENCED) 
TO DECEMBER 31, 1809, INCLUSIVE
TOTAL 1804 1809
Pounds Amount
Per
Pound Pounds Amount
Per
Pound Pounds Amount
Per
Pound
GUNPOWDER
AGENTS
Buck, A. 550 $  184.04 $.3346
Bowden R. & 
Company 8,050 2,432.13 .3021 125 $  60.94 $.4875
Brujeire & Teis-
seire 12,475 5,435.90 .4357 8,675 4,230.96 .4877
Cazenove, C. A. 24,390 10,163.13 .4167 14,650 6,784.06 .4631
Delaire & Canut 5,750 2,545.26 .4427 4,450 1,988.06 .4468
Dowes, I. D. P. 1,350 465.79 .3450
Drummond, R. 3,500 1,630.51 .4659 3,500 1,630.51 .4659
DuPont, V. deN-
emours & Co.
2,400 787.52 .3281
Girard, A. 92,975 33,779.65 .3633 19,625 9,592.74 .4888
Gundacker, J. 1,656 559.06 .3376
Hancock, John 11,750 5,013.57 .4267 5,350 2,999.16 .5606
Hastings, S. 1,104 409.97 .3713
LaForest, A. 13,715 5,829.36 .4250 3,375 2,017.69 .5978
McCall, Arch 108,700 46,388.99 .4268 13,250 $ 5,137.92 $.3878 18,500 10,085.15 .5451
Mein & Rogers 1,650 566.70 .3435 1,650 566.70 .3435
Mitchell & Shep-
pard 11,550 4,036.49 .3495 950 365.00 .3842
Parent, Chas. 2,200 1,080.00 .4909
Pitray, L. A. 2,250 1,032.37 .4588 2,250 1,032.37 .4588
Shewell, Thos. 12,500 4,478.27 .3583 1,125 384.40 .3417
Snydan & Wickoff 3,725 1,035.62 .2780
Stoney, J. 2,725 837.25 .3072
Sullivan, J. & 
Company
1,000 255.97 .2526
Thurston, J. 1,325 457.19 .3450
Watkinson & 
Company
2,050 714.90 .3487
Whipple, John 2,875 1,056.10 .3673
TOTAL AGENTS 
(25) 332,215 $131,175.72 $.3949 14,200 $ 5,502.92 $.3875 83,275 $41,372.74 $.4968
OTHERS 143,040 58,310.99 .4077 12,000 4,632.25 .3860 23,356 11,630.85 .4980
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
GRAND TOTAL 896,305 $251,585.74 $.2807 26,200 $10,135.17 $.3868 205,431 $63,850.62 $.3108
Note: The original schedule records the data of each year from 1804 through 1809. The data after the subcategory 
“Others” are omitted except those concerning “Grand Total.” The original schedule shows each agent’s office’s location 
as follows: Buck, A., Fredericksburg, Va.; Bowden, R. & Company, Norfolk, Va.; Brujeire & Teisseire, Philadelphia, 
Pa.; Cazenove, C. A., Alexandria, Va.; Delaire & Canut, Charleston, S. C.; Dowes, I. D. P., Albany, N. Y.; Drummond, R., 
Norfolk, Va.; DuPont, V. deNemours & Co., New York, N. Y.; Girard, A., New York, N. Y.; Gundacker, J., Lancaster, Pa.; 
Hancock, John, Boston, Mass.; Hastings, S., Boston, Mass.; LaForest, A., Richmond, Va.; McCall, Arch, Philadelphia, 
Pa.; Mein & Rogers, Newport, R. I.; Mitchell & Sheppard, Baltimore, Md.; Parent, Chas., New Orleans, La.; Pitray, L. A., 
Charleston, S. C.; Shewell, Thos., Philadelphia, Pa.; Snydan, & Wickoff, New York, N. Y.; Stoney, J., Charleston, S. C.; 
Sullivan, J. & Company, Boston, Mass.; Thurston, J., Newport, R. I.; Watkinson & Comapny, Hartford, Conn.; Whipple, 
John, Providence, R. I.
Source: LMSS, Group 10, Series A, File 418-3, Box 391.
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The fact that the books were not closed annually did not 
mean that accounting was not important for management, ei-
ther. Based on a letter from E. I. du Pont to certain merchants 
dated March 18, 1807, R. T. Johnson [1989, p.77] made the 
following remarks: “E. I. did recognize that fluctuations in the 
prices of at least one raw material, saltpetre, influenced the min-
imum amount that could be charged for the final product. They 
must have had some concept of the underlying costs, therefore, 
even though there is no clear indication of this fact.” The let-
ter she quoted reads: (E. I. du Pont wished) “to keep our prices 
as low as the price of saltpetre can afford us.” R. T. Johnson 
presumed that E. I. du Pont had had the knowledge of the cost 
of gunpowder although she could not find out evidence about 
the matter. Evidence that E. I. du Pont could have a precise 
knowledge of the cost of his product was given by the “Factory” 
account and the schedule in Table 5 which have been examined.
The fact that an industrial enterprise recorded costs and 
used the cost data to compute profit indicates that that enter-
prise grasped the unit costs of its products. Therefore, E.I. du 
Pont could ask the lowest possible price to buyers. In doing so, 
estimating unit costs based on the fluctuating price of a major 
material, saltpeter, was an effective way. In fact, the cost data in 
Table 5 indicate that saltpeter accounted for more than half of 
the cost of gunpowder; and in the first accounting period, the 
price of the saltpeter purchased by the old company fluctuated 
between $0.1287 and $0.4086 per pound (in terms of annual 
average prices, it is between $0.1642 and $0.3647).23 It is very 
comprehensible that, in that situation, E. I. du Pont or his ac-
countant was making speedy unit cost estimation in that way. It 
is also comprehensible that the records of such estimations do 
not survive.
E. I. du Pont’s act that the above letter show suggests how a 
competitive market was working at that time. An industrial en-
terprise, a price-taker, well grasped the unit costs of its products 
and asked profitable and salable prices to buyers who bade pric-
es in return. And prices were eventually determined by market 
forces. The fact that E. I. du Pont grasped unit costs indicates 
that a competitive market existed at that time.
CONCLUSION
The old DPC’s accounting system that has been seen shows 
23 “Saltpetre (Ledger Account) 1804 to 1815” [LMSS].
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that there existed a complete accounting system comparable to 
but different from the modern accounting system of today that 
Johnson and Kaplan [1987, pp.130-31] characterize using the 
terms “integration” and “inventory costing.” The specific fea-
tures of costing for financial accounting purposes of that tradi-
tional accounting system and its peculiar logic in cost and profit 
calculation have been detailed. The discovery of this another 
complete accounting system leads to a new understanding of 
accounting history, about which some discussion will be made.
The old DPC, in the beginning, ran only a small factory 
equipped with water-powered machinery and employing less 
than thirty workers for powder-making,24 the cooperage workers 
aside. It was a single-unit, non-integrated industrial enterprise. 
The DPC case that has been seen seems to show a natural out-
come of the application of the double-entry bookkeeping system 
to industrial accounting. In fact, it was the use of double-entry 
bookkeeping that enabled DPC to record the costs incurred and 
to use the cost data to measure profit. Let us review the DPC 
case from this perspective.
First, it must be confirmed that DPC’s accounting system 
complied with the double-entry methods. As has been seen, the 
expenses and revenues were entered in the following accounts: 
the “Factory” and “Profit & Loss” accounts. Although the “Fac-
tory” account functioned as a trading account from the first 
accounting period, it was from the period January 1 to August 
31, 1818 that this account came to take the complete trading 
account format. Here, for simplicity, the “Factory” account is 
supposed to take the complete trading account format from the 
first accounting period. Under this supposition, the “Factory” 
account and “Profit & Loss” account should have been working 
as follows. The manufacturing and non-manufacturing expenses 
were debited to and the related sales revenues and inventories 
were credited to the “Factory” account, the resulting profit be-
ing debited. The profit thus determined in this account was 
transferred to the “Profit & Loss” account. In the latter account, 
as well as the profit transferred, other expenses and revenues 
were recorded. The net profit thus determined in this account 
was transferred to the “Stock” account that functioned as the re-
24 The list of buildings and equipment of the first works was recorded in Waste 
Book B as part of the “Inventory” on June 30, 1814. The entry on the accrued 
wages payable on December 31, 1809 in Journal B records twenty workers. Twen-
ty-eight workers are recorded in “Balance due to Workmen on the 31st December 
1810” in Day Book.
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tained earnings account. The net profit recorded in the “Stock” 
account was transferred to the “Balance” account to which all 
the balance sheet accounts were closed.
 It should be noted that the “Balance” account balanced 
because the “Stock” account was closed to this account. The net 
profit recorded in the “Balance” account was not determined by 
the comparison of the assets and liabilities it recorded. The net 
profit was transferred from the “Stock” account. The net profit 
recorded in the “Stock” account was the result of the revenue 
and expense transactions recorded in the “Factory” and “Profit 
& Loss” accounts. Therefore, it may be said that the presence 
of the “Balance” account in the ledger gives evidence that DPC’s 
accounting system was in accordance with the double-entry 
system.
Second, the preceding discussion indicates that DPC’s 
double-entry system was realized by the presence of the fol-
lowing two accounts, namely the “Factory” and “Profit & Loss” 
accounts. Besides, the following accounts were used to record 
expenses to the “Factory” account on an accrual basis: the 
“Saltpetre,” “Brimstone,” “Charcoal Wood,” “Cooperage,” and 
“Workmen” accounts. Among them, four accounts are inven-
tory accounts. The remaining “Workmen” account is a liability 
account. There was no expense account. Accounts recording rev-
enues and expenses were a rarity at DPC. This situation suggests 
that the DPC case may represent a primitive state of the double-
entry accounting system applied to the industrial enterprise or 
nearly so.
Third, it is visible that the “Factory” account, a trading ac-
count, played a critical role in making DPC’s double-entry sys-
tem work. The trading account is an inventory account in which 
costs are matched against revenues. Such a special account was 
used. The trading account recorded both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing costs without making distinction between 
them and computed profit using these cost data. That was the 
natural outcome of the application of the double-entry system to 
industrial accounting.25
25 In commercial accounting, a merchandise inventory account served as a 
trading account. This practice may date back to the double-entry system that Pa-
ciolo described. According to the English translation of Paciolo’s text compiled 
by Littleton [1933], Paciolo recommended that a sale of merchandise be credited 
to the related merchandise account (p.75) and that a loss be credited and a profit 
be debited to this inventory account “in order to balance it” (pp.67 and 68). That 
practice that an inventory account serves as a trading account may date back to 
Paciolo’s text.
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The old DPC case indicates that double-entry bookkeeping 
was readily applicable to not only commercial accounting but 
also industrial accounting. In fact, Garner [1954, p.8], quoting 
F. Elder’s Glossary of Mediaeval Terms in Business, Italian Series, 
1200-1600, published in 1934, notes as follows: “As early as 
1431, some 63 years before Paciolo published the first printed 
text on double entry bookkeeping, one finds ‘rather complex sets 
of books in use in Medici industrial partnership.’” The complex 
sets of books were kept in accordance with the double entry 
methods from 1441 [Garner, 1954, p.9]. Solomons [1968, p.4] 
notes that “the period from the early fourteenth century down 
to the third quarter of the nineteenth century is largely, though 
by no means only, concerned with bringing the records of indus-
trial activity within the compass of double-entry bookkeeping.” 
More recently, Jones [1985, chap. IV] presents early examples of 
double-entry industrial accounting in Britain, the Cyfarthfa Iron 
works in 1791-1798 and the Mona Mine in 1829-1830. Another 
example in Britain is presented by Stone [1973] as to the Charl-
ton Mills in 1810 and after.26 Edwards and Boyns [1992] present 
much earlier examples, charcoal ironmaking companies in the 
region of Sheffield during the period 1690-1783. The accounting 
26 The two authors have searched for only cost and management accounting 
aspects in earlier industrial accounting. As a result, they have failed to perceive its 
specific features epitomized by the trading account, which this paper has illumi-
nated concerning the old DPC. However, some of the aspects found in the old DPC 
may also be drawn from their works. For example, from Jones [1985, pp.131-133], 
the presence of eight trading accounts (Cyfarthfa Furnace, New Blast Furnace, 
Bar Iron, Castings, Blooms, Refining Furnace, Rolling Mill, and Finers Metal) are 
found in the Cyfarthfa Ironworks in 1791-1798. Stone [1973] calls all the thirteen 
work-in-process and one warehouse accounts at the Charlton Mills trading ac-
counts. However, only the warehouse account is a real trading account. Although 
the entry of this account is described only partly, it may be presumed that the 
warehouse account was an inventory account recording both materials and fin-
ished goods inventories and that this inventory account functioned as a trading 
account. The general expenses charged to the thirteen work-in-process accounts 
included “advertising, legal expenses, taxes and London sales allowance” [Stone, 
1973, p.77]. Therefore, manufacturing and non-manufacturing expenses were not 
differentiated. Further, the figure reproducing one of the work-in-process inven-
tory account shows that partially completed units were valued at materials cost 
only [Stone, 1973, p. 77]. The three accounts (the Smithy, Foundry, and Fitting 
accounts) in the double-entry ledger of Soho Foundry in the late 1790s that Wil-
liams [1997, p.175] presents are trading accounts. The profit or loss determined 
in each of these accounts was “transferred to the general profit and loss account” 
[p.174]. This Soho Foundry’s accounting system is not perceived by Fleischman 
and Parker [1997, chap. 7] who concentrate on accounting records other than 
ledgers and journals in their research into British accounting practices in the 
1760-1850 period.
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system there was taken over by successive entities at Staveley 
and was in use to 1990 [Edwards, Boyns, and Anderson, 1995, 
pp.11, 17, and 36].
The above authors do not notice that the accounting records 
they examined may show the presence of another complete ac-
counting system contrasting with today’s integrated accounting 
system. This represents the existing state of accounting history 
research. The historical existence of another complete account-
ing system in earlier times remains unknown. This paper has 
tried to fill this gap in accounting history. This paper has re-
vealed that double-entry bookkeeping, together with the trading 
account, enabled the industrial enterprise to record costs and 
to use cost data to compute profit for financial accounting pur-
poses, and this in different way from today’s. The traditional ac-
counting system made in this way existed in the time of the In-
dustrial Revolution and may have existed much earlier. It is this 
traditional accounting system that was replaced by the modern 
accounting system of today which Johnson and Kaplan [1987] 
characterize by “integration” and “inventory costing.” Based on 
this finding, a new understanding of accounting history may be 
presented. Accounting history may be described as evolution of 
the traditional accounting system made through double entry 
bookkeeping in which the trading account was of vital impor-
tance and the transition from that traditional accounting system 
to the modern integrated accounting system supported by in-
ventory costing. In both the traditional and modern accounting 
systems, cost were and are recorded and cost data were and are 
used to measure profit for financial accounting purposes, but in 
different ways.
Finally, it seems useful to make the following additional 
comments. First, this paper has reconfirmed that “inven-
tory costing” supporting “integration” was crucial in making the 
modern accounting system of today, which Johnson and Kaplan 
[1987] noted. The transition from the traditional accounting 
system to the modern integrated accounting system should have 
occurred sometime after 1900. It seems worthwhile considering 
the historical significance of accounting theories such as his-
torical cost, the matching concept and the entity theory in this 
context.27
Second, the cost and profit calculations made at the old 
DPC in the early nineteenth century may illustrate the price-
27 About the history of these accounting theories, see Previts and Merino 
[1998, Chap.6].
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taker’s accounting which Adam Smith and economists who 
followed him saw in constructing their theories. Although he ac-
knowledges that the American textile manufacturers in the first 
half of the nineteenth century “relied on double-entry bookkeep-
ing,” Chandler [1977, pp.69-71] presents a negative view on their 
ability of costing. Further, he explains the reason why the textile 
manufacturers were not interested in cost as follows: “there 
was little pressure on the textile manufacturers to improve cost 
data,” for “the manufacturers had as little control over the price 
of cotton as they did over that of their finished cloth” [Chan-
dler, 1977, p.71]. The preceding quotation shows that Chandler 
thinks price-takers do not need reliable cost data, although price 
takers need to know their cost of production to measure their 
financial performance in their profit-seeking activities. Although 
Chandler’s error in fact recognition had been soon made clear 
owing to Porter [1980],28 his erroneous view on the price-taker’s 
accounting was backed by Johnson and Kaplan [1987, pp.30-31] 
and still remains to be criticized by no one but Fujimura [2000]. 
This paper has made clear that Chandler’s theory presented in 
his book Visible Hand is based on the erroneous understanding 
of the price-taker’s accounting. An overall revision of Chandler’s 
theory is necessary.
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Call for Papers 
 Accounting’s Past in Sport
In most countries, sporting organisations are economically and 
socially important. Sports such as basketball, cricket, football 
(in its various forms), golf and hockey contribute significantly 
to shaping the cultures, communities and societies across the 
globe. While covering a diversity of activities, sport is likewise 
delivered and managed by means of a plethora of organisational 
structures from large for-profit corporate bodies to local volun-
teer-based community clubs.  However, one factor common to 
all sporting organisations, both now and in the past, is the need 
to account and to be accountable. 
A special issue of Accounting History on the above titled theme 
is scheduled to be published in the first half of 2015.
Topics for this special issue may include, but are not limited to, 
areas such as:
• Accounting practices in sport and/or sporting organ-
isations
• Accountability and reporting by sporting organisations
• The diverse sources of funding in sport and their con-
sequences for shaping notions of accountability and 
success
• The role of accounting in shaping the development of 
sporting organisations, or sports as a whole
• The interplay between sport and accounting and the 
development of national culture, or community social 
capital
• The relationship between financial (“off-field”) success 
and sporting (“on-field”) success 
• Accountants’ contribution to sport, or the influence of 
sports or sporting culture on accountants and account-
ing practice
• Creative accounting, fraud and accounting scandals in 
sport
Potential contributors are encouraged to interpret the theme 
broadly using diverse theoretical and methodological perspec-
tives.  Submissions are particularly encouraged which explore 
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the multiple, complex and disconnected factors shaping ac-
counting’s past in sport and which seek to identify the im-
pacts of accounting on organisational and social functioning. 
Likewise, papers published in this special issue need not be 
constrained by focusing only on large, national or international 
sports and organisations.  Contributions which focus on ac-
counting and sport in local settings are also welcome.
Submissions must be written in English and forwarded elec-
tronically to the guest editors by 30 September 2013.  Manu-
scripts will be subject to the usual double blind review process 
of Accounting History.
Guest editors:
Potential contributors are invited to contact the guest editors to 
discuss their proposed topics.
Brad Potter, University of Melbourne, email: bnpotter@unimelb.
edu.au
Margaret Lightbody, University of South Australia, email: mar-
garet.lightbody@unisa.edu.au 
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THE VICTORY OF THE PRUSSIAN 
RAILWAY “DYNAMIC” ACCOUNTING 
OVER THE PUBLIC FINANCE AND 
PATRIMONIAL ACCOUNTING MODELS 
(1838-1884): AN EARLY ILLUSTRATION 
OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE SECOND 
STAGE OF CAPITALIST FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING AND A TESTIMONY 
AGAINST THE AGENCY AND THE 
MARKET FOR EXCUSES THEORIES
Abstract: The history of accounting for private railway companies in 
Germany shows that these companies played a major role in the dif-
fusion of historical cost accounting principles and gave birth, togeth-
er with big other joint stock companies, to the “dynamic” or second 
stage of capitalist accounting, at least in continental Europe.
If the representatives of such railway companies did not develop new 
concepts of accounting, notably as concerned depreciation, they had, 
by 1875-1879, elaborated a new theory of accounting (historical cost 
or dynamic theory).This theory had a profound impact at least on the 
German theorists of the late 19th century and early 20th centuries 
such as Simon, Rieger and Schmalenbach.
This new theory was needed to justify a new law favoring sharehold-
ers in a hurry for returns on their investments rather than company 
creditors. It also defeated the ideology of public finance and patri-
monial (or static) theories of accounting. This new theory preceded 
the law which promulgated the new approach and clearly defended 
the private interests of shareholders as opposed to those of the public 
in the strict sense. It appears to contradict Watts and Zimmermann’s 
basic hypothesis of the «theory of market excuses». Agency theory 
seemingly does not to apply either, for the new theory was proposed 
by managers allied to shareholders, specifically those «hurried share-
_________
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank the two anonymous 
referees for their very useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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holders”, against creditors. This is why a kind of «theory of alliance» 
appears to be more consistent with these developments. The main 
reasons for developing the new accounting theory were linked to the 
issue of dividends. It was necessary to find an accounting approach 
which would allow the distribution of dividends at the very beginning 
of an investment cycle. It was also intended to find an accounting ap-
proach which would ensure that profits were distributed as evenly as 
possible throughout the entire investment cycle and among the differ-
ent shareholders who had financed the investment.
Hence, the second stage of the capitalist accounting development 
was not connected to measure of performance or information prob-
lems (monitoring and bonding) but seems to have been caused by 
the need to regulate profits and dividends in the interests of manag-
ers and shareholders. However, as this change took place within the 
framework of prudence, it was impossible, at that stage of capitalist 
accounting, to achieve a perfect smoothing of the rate of accounting 
profit. The solution to this problem was only to be found at the end of 
the 20th century with the onset of the third or actuarial stage and the 
“discovery” of fair value.
INTRODUCTION
Accounting for railway companies is considered to have 
played a major role in the evolution of accounting thought and 
practice. This role increased, at least from a theoretical point of 
view, as leaders of the positivist school referring to Anglo-Saxon 
accounting literature concerning railways, demonstrate that ac-
counting theories are normative and used as excuses for politi-
cal action [Watts and Zimmerman, 1979, pp. 273 and 290].
In America and England the history of railway accounting 
is relatively well known thanks to a wide  range of references 
written over the last seventy five years [Mason ,1933],[Littleton
,1933],[May,1936],[Pollins,1956],[Brief,1966,1967],[Kitchen,197
4],[Boockholdt,1978],[Glynn, 1984],[Edwards,1985,1986,1989] 
and [Bryer,1991]. By contrast, recent literature on the history of 
accounting for German railway companies is sparse and does 
not deal with the subject specifically [Oberbrinckmann, 1990], 
[Schneider, 1987]. There is also some older rather technical 
literature which is rarely referred to because it is written in Ger-
man [Reden, 1843], [Passow, 1919], [Barth, 1953] and [Mieles, 
1932]. However, this history deserves to be brought to light and 
made accessible to a larger public in the context of the modern 
debate about the political and social roles of accounting. It is 
our intention to fulfil this double task of exhumation and rein-
terpretation of the history of German railway accounting. Here 
we focus on the history of private Prussian railway companies 
which have played such a major role in the development of 
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the German railway system. Our period of study starts in 1838 
which coincides with the passing of the first law on accounting 
for railways and ends in 1884 with the passing of the joint stock 
law. The latter law was very important, marking a key turning 
point in the history of German accounting, under the influ-
ence of railway managers and their shareholders. Our objective 
is mainly to respond to traditional questions that have been 
raised in Anglo- American literature. A first group of questions 
concerns the role played by railway accounting in the diffusion 
of new accounting techniques and the reasons why a specific 
system of accounting has appeared. A second group of questions 
focuses on theoretical problems: did the development of the 
Prussian approach to railway accounting influence the devel-
opments on any specific accounting theory? If this is the case, 
does the thesis developed by Watts and Zimmerman according 
to which “accounting theory satisfies the demand for excuses” 
apply in the German or Prussian case? In a more general sense 
does agency theory suit the role played by social actors (manag-
ers, creditors and shareholders) in the development of a new 
accounting philosophy?
Presently, Germany, from an accounting point of view, 
is characterised as a “code law” country [Nobes, 1992]. This 
feature is not new and applies to Prussian railway accounting 
which was strictly regulated with an impressive number of spe-
cific or general laws passed in 1838, 1839, 1843, 1861, 1870 and 
1884. Each law was the ground for lawyers who defended differ-
ent positions concerning accounting. The study of this invalu-
able material will constitute the object of the first part of this ar-
ticle following a brief presentation of the historical background. 
The second part will be devoted to answering the questions we 
have previously listed.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In Prussia, at the end of the 1820s and the beginning of the 
1830s, the very first railway lines were constructed and managed 
by private companies1. This situation lasted up to the end of the 
1840s when the State began either to buy (and manage) some 
companies, such as the Ostbahn and the Saarbrückereisenbahn, 
or to take over the management of some private companies, 
1  Among the very first ones are lines  joining different mines such as the 
Hardsteiner Review Eberfeld line opened in 1829, and the Deilbach Teilstrecke 
opened in 1831 [Steitz 1974, pp. 105-109] all founded by an association of private 
undertakers.
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such as the Aachen-Düsseldorfer and the Bergisch-Märkischen 
railway companies [Mieles, 1932, p. 37]. However, by 1862, the 
role of the State was not yet dominant as illustrated by the fol-
lowing summary [Steitz 1974, p. 90 quoting Kech’s Eisenbahn-
politik]:
fully owned and managed by the State: 1562 km
privately owned but managed by the State:  1355 km
fully owned and managed by private companies: 3050 
km
It was only during the nineties that the State, in the context 
of an economic crisis, took the lead through substantial pur-
chases of private railway companies. This progressive growth of 
government control culminated in the complete nationalisation 
of the last remaining private railway companies. In this study, 
which ends with the joint stock law of 1884, we are only dealing 
with privately owned railway companies.
Through-out this period, and especially during the thirties 
and the forties, the main problem with German private rail 
companies was one of financing. The private companies had 
hoped that the government would finance their operations with 
state-bonds2 but until 1842 this was difficult because of the law 
of “January17, 1820” (Staats-schuldenedikt) which forced the 
Prussian authorities to ask for special authorisation from the 
Parliament [Steitz, 1974, p.170]. So, realistically, up to the for-
ties, private rail companies had depended on private capital. 
The challenge was not so much a lack of capital as a problem 
of profits. As Hansemann, a proprietor of textile and insurance 
companies of Aachen, and one of the founders of the Köln-
Mindener (Cologne-Minder) railway company put it, the crucial 
point was not the capital but the “hope for profits” [Hansemann, 
1837, p. 30]. For most potential capitalists, at least, the expecta-
tion of profits was for rapid profits if not an immediate return 
on their investment [Steitz, 1974, pp. 31 and 52].
This demand for immediate and “guaranteed” profits not 
only clashed with the risk taking approach of “true capitalists” 
but was also in total conflict with the nature of investments in 
2  If they succeeded in doing that, it could be the occasion for some founders 
to get very high profits, along with the leverage effect [Eichholtz, 1962, pp. 154].
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rail companies which require long periods of construction and 
also some difficulties at first to have an effective management. 
As the German history of railways shows, as soon as the hope 
for rapid profits vanished, many capitalists refused to go on 
financing the capital already subscribed3 and sometimes pre-
ferred to demand the dissolution of the company. Among the 
main well known illustrations of this kind of situation, is the 
case of the Leipzig-Dresdener Eisenbahn, whose Magdeburg’s 
shareholders led a campaign in the newspapers in 1839 to de-
mand a general assembly to decide on the dissolution of the 
company. And especially the Rhein-Weserbahngesellschaft case, 
which, in 1844, was driven to dissolution by its frightened share-
holders [Steitz, pp. 185 and 196].
The German capitalist founders of the first big railway 
companies such as Camphausen, the President of the Handels-
cammer (Chamber of Commerce) of Cologne, and Hansemann 
(already quoted) were perfectly aware that they could hardly 
have succeeded in their projects without the help of the State 
and the administration of big towns such as Cologne and 
Münster. They proposed, with different modes, an alliance of 
the private capital with the Junker-state administration. Cam-
phausen, who had led the defunct project of the Rhein-weser 
company, thought that the private companies could build the 
tracks but with the help and control (Regalwalt) of the State and 
that the latter, after a certain time, could take on the administra-
tion [Steitz, 1974, pp. 54-55]. Hansemann, the founder of the 
Cologne-Minden Company, was inclined to think that the private 
capital could build only the most profitable lines (with the help 
of State-loans) and leave the burden of the construction of the 
other lines to the State [Steitz, 1874, p.56].
However different their philosophies were, these captains of 
industry agreed on the distribution of fixed interest (Zinsen) at a 
minimum rate of 3, 5% to shareholders not only after the begin-
ning of the operation but also during the period of construction 
(Bauzinsen). They also admitted the State guarantee in that 
these interests could be paid independently from the results of 
the company (in exchange for various modalities which could 
give the State the possibility of becoming a long term propri-
etor). These modalities were also sustained by economists, 
notably List, who published a leading article in favour of the as-
sociation of the State and the private capital after his come-back 
from the United States in 1832 [Steitz, 1974, p. 51, quoting Mey-
3  It was usual during the thirties and the forties to pay only 10% of the shares.
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er, 1918]. As Steitz showed, the negotiations with the State were 
very hard, notably concerning financing through public loans. 
It is interesting to give an example of their results in the case 
of the Cologne-Minden Company, one of the biggest projects in 
the forties. After lengthy bargaining with the State it was agreed 
in 1843 that the company was to be founded with share capital 
(Fonds im Aktien Kapital) of 13 000 000 Taler and a participa-
tion of the Prussian State amounting to 1/7 of Share capital (it 
means 1 860 000 Taler). The rest of the share capital had to be 
found on the free capital market (under the condition of an ini-
tial payment of 10%). Independently from their source all shares 
would receive an annual interest of 4% during the period of 
construction (Bauzinsen). If there was a need for a supplement 
of fixed assets this excess would either be financed by additional 
share capital (with a participation of the state by 1/4) or by loan 
with the authorization of the board of administration and the 
ministry of finance. 
Beyond financing, the statute of the Cologne-Minden Com-
pany also provided for some definition of income: after the 
opening of the operations the net income (Ertrag) would be cal-
culated by deducting the interests for bonds, the management, 
administration and reparation (Unterhaltung) costs (Kosten) 
and a sum for supplying a special Reserve fund4. This net in-
come would be distributed first as a 3, 5% guaranteed interest 
for shares and the rest as dividends. If it exceeded 5% of the 
capital, the surplus would be shared on the basis of 1/3 for the 
State and 2/3 for private shareholders. Some special provisions 
were introduced concerning the role of the State. The surplus 
paid to the State could be used by the latter to pay guaranteed 
interests (in case of difficulties of the enterprise) or to amortize 
(at nominal value) 6/7 of the capital subscribed by privates own-
ers5.Moreover it was mandatory for the State to proceed to this 
amortization if the return on the share capital was below 3,5% 
when the guarantee of the State was required : in that case the 
State could use the interests received on its share of capital and 
the interests corresponding to the construction.
Beyond this financial data, it is interesting to mention that 
certain clauses of the statutes relative to the administration of 
4  This deduction could not surpass the level of 3% of share capital without the 
permission of the State.
5  According to the calculation made by Hansemann, these reimbursements could take 
57 years before the State could be the sole owner of the company [Steitz 1974, p. 
266].
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the company provided for some prerogatives of the State [Ste-
itz, 1974, p. 266]. The decisions about tariffs, the nomination 
of the head of the board of administration, the main technical 
directors and the chief accountant (Hauptkassierer) required the 
authorization of the Ministry of finance. The State had the right 
to nominate a member of the Directors, who was not obliga-
torily a shareholder but who retained the right to vote. A royal 
superintendent (Kommissar) took part in the general assembly 
with a minimum of 1/7 of the voting power (at the start, with a 
progressive rise of this proportion to 1/4 and even 1/3 after 35 
years). These clauses were written in 1843 after the publication 
of the law of 1838 governing the railway companies but all the 
ideas expressed in the Cologne-Minden statute and the law of 
1838 (see below) had already been expressed as early as 1832 by 
List and also by Camphausen during the long negotiation that 
led to the failure of the Rhein-Weser project from 1837 to 1838 
[Steitz, 1974, pp.  182-201].
The main lesson to be taken from these texts for our pur-
pose is that there was an interaction of different types of influ-
ences at the head of the private railway companies: an influence 
of capitalist owner-managers submitted to the pressure of small 
and “hurried” shareholders and an influence of representatives 
of the State or of regional administrations. This diversity of in-
fluence, of course, was a critical point for the development of ac-
counting as it has already been stressed at the heroic time of the 
first railways by Von Reden, the director of the Berlin-Station 
railway [1843, p. 300], and also later by Mieles, whose declara-
tions are worthwhile quoting: 
“usually, the accounting system of German railway 
companies has been influenced both by the merchant 
and the public finance way of thinking. At the begin-
ning of the railway period in Germany merchants and 
public treasury people gathered together. The Treasury 
accountant6 (Kameralist) had to recognize the mer-
chant objectives ... and become used to the essence of 
merchant vision, the desire of profit. On the contrary 
the merchant had to adapt to the representation of the 
public finance accountants: this explains why a special 
form of accounting arose” [Mieles, 1932, p. 29].
6  Steitz interestingly notes that in the thirties, on the level of the Prussian 
administration, high officers such as Nagler (director of the Post Office) and 
Rother (who led the negociation with capitalists such as Camphausen ) only knew 
the public finance (Kameral) accounting [1874, p. 79].
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We are now going to analyse what was, for early Prussian 
railways, this “special form of accounting” and which rules 
applied to it.
THE EARLY REGULATION OF 1838-1839 AND THE
BIRTH OF THE PRUSSIAN RAILWAY ACCOUNTING
The first clear and general representation of the initial Prus-
sian accounting system for railways companies was given by a 
law published in 1838 and a commentary made in 1839 by the 
Prussian administration. The Law of railways (Eisenbahngesetz) 
of “November 3, 1838” was promulgated at a time when there 
was no strict regulation in Prussia concerning the joint stock 
companies. The main articles concerning accounting were ar-
ticles 29, 33, 34 and 38 which we will reproduce hereafter. 
Article 29 : “The company has to determine its receipts 
(Bahngeld) in order to cover “the costs (Kosten) of 
maintaining and managing of the railway”...;take ac-
count “of a statutory contribution for collecting a re-
serve fund (Reserve funds) for extraordinary outlays 
(Ausgaben) concerning the way and the accessories”; 
“cover other expenses (Lasten) such as the taxes pro-
vided at the Article 38”...; “benefit from a net surplus 
(Reinertrag) including both interest and profit (Ge-
winn) corresponding to an amount not exceeding 10% 
of the capital invested (Anlagekapital) and no less than 
6% of this capital”;
Article 33: “If after deduction of all expenditure (Aus-
gaben), including the annual amount provided for sup-
plying the reserve fund, the net surplus exceeds 10% 
of the invested capital the administration is entitled to 
demand a reduction of the transportation prices”.
Article 34: “For the sake of the execution of the articles 
29-33 the company has to take into account precise ac-
counting (Rechnung) on every part of its undertaking 
(Unternehmung) and to follow for that purpose, the 
indications given by the Ministry of Commerce. The re-
sults of this accounting are to be transmitted every year 
to the administration”.
Article 38: “The railway company must pay a tax (Ab-
gabe) which is based on its surplus after deduction of 
all management and maintaining costs as well as the 
amount of the contribution to the reserve fund”. 
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Some conclusions can be drawn from these articles. The 
main one is that contrary to the uses and the laws concern-
ing the merchants, there was no formal obligation to make a 
patrimonial balance sheet that could include the assets and the 
liabilities. This point has already been stressed by the German 
literature of the late 19th [Schüler, 1879, p. 65] and the early 
20th centuries [Passow, 1919, p. 241]. The law asked the compa-
nies to draw up a cash flow account describing the cash receipts 
(Bahngeld) and the cash payments (Ausgaben). Of course at that 
time there was a lack of precision about the terminology (some-
times expenditure was replaced by cost) but the text clearly 
implied a cash flow accounting system. This was also Schüler’s 
[1879, p. 65] and Passow’s [1919, p. 237] opinions. However it 
was not a pure cash flow accounting. Indeed, the law foresaw the 
possibility (but not the obligation) to deduct a yearly amount 
from the revenue for “future extraordinary outlays”. This 
amount, in our opinion, was clearly an element of expense and 
not a call on the net income7. The whole system seemed to be 
devoted to regularly distributing the extraordinary outlays over 
the periods; if used, this device led to a substantial modification 
of the traditional cash flow accounting system and constituted 
an important step toward an accrual accounting system. 
The other conclusions concern the goal of the system and 
the concept of profit. It seems that the whole accounting system 
was devoted to three main tasks: the evaluation of the profit-
ability of the companies (that must not surpass the upper limit 
of 10% of the invested capital), the calculation of the mass of 
distributable dividends and the determination of the basis of 
taxation. According to the law (§ 29) the profit (Gewinn) was 
calculated after deduction of the interest (Zins) paid to the 
shareholders as a normal and automatic remuneration of their 
capital, independently from any profit. Keyssner [1875, p. 100] 
has shown that this stipulation was the legalization of a former 
practice: he quotes examples of statutes (accepted before the 
publication of the law) containing this conception of profit such 
as those of the Berlin-Postdamer Eisenbahngesellschaft (1837) 
and of the Dusseldorf-Elberfeldergesellschaft (1837). As the fa-
mous lawyer noted [1875, p. 128] this conception was contradic-
7  Passow [1919, pp. 247-248] underlines that the expression “Reserve fund” 
is an ambiguous if not unfortunate one. Generally, in matter of traditional 
commercial accounting (at the time of Passow), a reserve is an accumulation of 
profits; but Passow acknowledges that, as a matter of fact, the Reserve fund may 
be understood as a renewal fund (Erneuerungsfonds) created by deduction of 
expenses from revenue [1919, p. 249].
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tory to the view of traditional jurists inherited from the Roman 
tradition notably of Anschütz and Von Völderndorff so as of 
Puchelt.  In our view, it was promoted by managers and econo-
mists (Keyssner mentions the influence of the economic science 
[1875, p. 127]) to reassure shareholders that their share capital 
was as safe as that of creditors’ investments. 
In brief, to achieve these objectives, the first Prussian law 
on railway companies eliminated the traditional balance sheet 
of the merchants, adopted the model of cash flow accounting 
as the basis (principle) of determination of profits, but provided 
a modification of this model to resolve the problem of extraor-
dinary expenditures. These elements are already important to 
grasp the nature of the initial railway accounting system. How-
ever they are not totally clear: what specifically was this cash 
flow accounting system? Fortunately, the Prussian administra-
tion provided the answer to the question soon after the publica-
tion of the law.
THE PRUSSIAN INSTRUCTION OF JANUARY 1839
As emphasized by Mieles, [1932, p. 10] the main points of 
the explanations furnished by the Prussian Minister of Finance 
deal with distinctions between different cash out-flows. Before 
presenting the solution of the Minister it must be said, in ac-
cordance with Mieles {1932, p. 48], that, normally speaking, 
in the frame of a pure (true) cameral (cash flow accounting) 
system, all the expenditures (with exception of the repayment 
of share capital8) must be treated as diminutions of the profit 
of the year. But the Ministry, in line with legislation or practices 
already widely adopted abroad, decided that one must distin-
guish two kinds of expenditures. Firstly, expenditures that do 
not influence the annual result (erfolgsunwirksame Ausgaben), 
such as expenditures for the construction and also those for 
modernising the tracks (as far as conceded by the government 
and financed by shares).Secondly, expenditures that influence 
the result of the year, (erfolgswirksame Ausgaben), such as 
expenditures for the acquisition of inventories, (Betriebsinven-
torium), for maintaining the tracks, for transportation and for 
administration.
The reason for this “anomaly” in the frame of a cash flow 
8  As noted by Mieles [1932, p. 48] in cameral accounting cash inflows 
corresponding to the payment by  shareholders of the capital can obviously not 
be considered as a receipt for the sake of determination of the yearly  result; 
similarly, repayment of share capital is not an element of expenditure.
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based system is obvious: it was «impossible» to treat the early 
and costly expenditures for the construction of the tracks as an 
element of the yearly result for it would have caused losses and 
prevented the shareholders from receiving any profit over a long 
period of time (if the distribution of dividends were based on 
the accounting figures). Accordingly, the only possible solution 
to this problem was to agree that expenditure for construction 
was not an element of result: this was the first but decisive in-
fringement to pure cash flow accounting. This is the reason why 
Mieles was right to affirm that it was not strict cameral (cash 
flow) accounting but a «special form» of cameral accounting» 
[1832, p. 49]. 
This important concession was able to satisfy the compa-
nies. As we are going to see later on, some German accounting 
laws gave rise to numerous protests. However, this was appar-
ently not the case with the law of 1838: we have not found any 
trace of protestation against this law in German literature. Even 
before the promulgation of the law, it seems that the choice of 
private companies was in favour of a similar type of account-
ing. Schüler [1879, p. 65] says that in the statutes of the older 
railway companies, the result was obtained only «on the basis of 
the relationship between cash receipts and expenditures». Pas-
sow [1919, p. 247] quotes the case of the Rhine-Company which, 
in 1837, had a statute presenting a clause of a reserve fund. 
Mieles [1932, p. 10] deems that the law of 1838 was a «recogni-
tion» of practices that had existed earlier on. After the promul-
gation of the law, from 1838 to 1843, the companies apparently 
respected the schedule fixed by the comparison of receipts and 
expenditures.
According to Passow [1919, p. 247] most statutes provided 
for a reserve fund but there were differences as to the treatment 
of this fund. The majority of the companies drew funds after 
distribution of a minimal dividend9 but some companies did 
this by registering expenses before profit calculation10. Although 
there was formally a big difference between the two kinds of 
formation of the reserve fund, Passow [1919, p. 249] notes that, 
as a matter of fact, both systems aimed at providing for renewal 
of the fixed assets.
9  It is for example the case of the Bonn-Kölner Eisengesellschaft in 1841 
[Passow, 1919, p. 247).
10  Passow [1919, p. 248-249] and Mieles [1932, p. 10] quote the case of the 
Berlin-Stettiner Gesellschaft (1840); there is also the case of the Köln Minden 
company in 1848 for a part of its fixed assets [Mieles 1932, p. 10].
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THE PROBLEM POSED BY THE LAW OF 1843
AND THE MANOEUVRES OF THE ADMINISTRATION
With the law of “November 9, 1843”on the Joint Stock 
Companies (Über die Actiengesellschaften) the Prussian Gov-
ernment made provision for a specific11 regulation of the Joint 
Stock companies, for the first time.  Paragraph 24 of this law 
stated that the board of directors had to keep such accounting 
books as to give “a view of the patrimonial situation” (Übersicht 
der Vermögenslage) and in the first three months of every com-
mercial year had to draw up a balance of the wealth (Vermögen) 
of the company.  Moreover, the paragraph 17 mentioned the 
principle of the fixity of capital. According to one of the best 
specialists of commercial law of the 19th century a strict lecture 
of this law could have rendered impossible for railway compa-
nies to produce mere “management balances”, which means 
results based on cash flows, and have required taking account 
of the values of assets and liabilities [Von Strombeck, 1882, p. 
467]. However, fortunately for the state administration and the 
managers responsible for railways, this law was very imprecise: 
there was no information concerning the valuation of assets 
and liabilities and no determination whether the balance sheet 
would be the basis for the distribution of dividends .This fact is 
stressed by  Schüler [1879, p. 66]. With such a margin of flex-
ibility it was possible for the administration and the managers 
of railway companies to ignore the law and to go on using the 
principles stipulated in the law of 1838.
As Passow shows [1919, p. 232] the Prussian administration 
went on accepting statutes where profits were only based on the 
comparison of receipts and expenditures: this was notably the 
case of the statutes of Bergish-Markish (1844) and the Berlin-
Hamburger railway Joint Stock companies12. A little later on, 
this resistance of the German railway commercial administra-
tion was fostered by the decisions of the tax administration. On 
the 30 May 1853, a tax law on railways (Eisenbahnsteuergesetz) 
stipulated in its article 2 that “the net profit (Reinertrag) of the 
railway firms is considered as the distributable amount ... after 
deduction of administrative, maintenance and management 
costs, together with the necessary contribution to the reserve 
fund and the amounts for the planned retribution and repay-
11  The ALR law was not a specific law on joint stock companies [Laux, 1998, 
p. 41].
12  In the same vein,  Mieles [1932, p. 34] who confirms that the law of 1843 
has not been applied by the Köln Minden and the Nieder Markisch companies.
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ments of the borrowings...». This definition of profit was totally 
in line with the kind of cash flow accounting advocated by the 
Minister of Commerce. As Schüler [1879, p. 66] emphasized, 
this law also disregarded the patrimonial balance sheet.
After this date the Ministry of Commerce continued its 
“play” with the commercial law of 1843: in 1856 this Ministry 
published a list of recommendations to be followed so that the 
statutes of the railway companies could be admitted [Passov, 
1919, p. 239]. This time the administration acknowledged that 
the net profit (Reingewinn) had to be based on the registration 
of the movements of the balance sheet and not on the calcula-
tion of the difference between the receipts and the expenditures 
[Passow, 1919, p. 239]13. But this conclusion remained purely 
formal. Passow [1919, p. 239] shows, on the basis of some pub-
lished statutes, that the Ministry “went on to accept statutes in 
contradiction” with the law of 1843.
The evolution of the situation was however worth noting 
on one single point: the case of “interests” on shares. Under 
the pressure of the lawyers it was decided that there could no 
longer be any interest distributed to the shareholders after the 
construction of the railway but only dividends. However this 
practice of interest could be admitted during the period of con-
struction on the condition that the company could determine 
the period of construction and the rate of interest (article § 17 
of the law): this concession was obviously obtained for the sat-
isfaction of “hurried shareholders” despite the opposition from 
strict-minded lawyers. Keyssner [1975, p. 209] notes that this 
new regulation constrained the railway companies, notably the 
Cologne-Minden Company, to modify their statutes.
THE LATE EVOLUTION FROM 1843 TO 1861: 
TOWARDS A KIND OF “DYNAMIC” ACCOUNTING
In 1838, as we have seen, the supremacy of the cash flow ac-
counting had been admitted for the calculation of the profit for 
railway companies. The registration of a yearly expense for an-
ticipating extraordinary expenses was only a possibility opened 
to the interested companies.  This situation changed at the end 
of the fifties as in 1857 the Ministry of commerce launched an 
inquiry concerning the question of the “funds” of the railway 
companies14. It was apparently intended to clarify the terminol-
13  This acknowledgment is confirmed by a circular instruction of March 29, 
1859 [Von Strombeck, 1882, p. 481].
14  These developments are mainly based on Passow [1919, pp. 249-253]. For 
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ogy, the structure and the goal of these funds and to discuss the 
possibility of a move towards a more systematic use, with the 
directors.
The first result of this enquiry was to distinguish two kinds 
of funds: the reserve funds (Reservefonds) and renewal funds 
(Erneuerungs fonds). The role of the “Reservefonds” was said 
to deal with extraordinary and non customary expenditures 
such as flooding and accidents. The role of renewal funds was 
restricted to cope with the problem of expenditures for renewals 
so as “to permit, as much as possible, the equilibrium (Gleichmäs-
sigkeit) in the “loading” (Belastung) of the proprietors of shares 
at any time” (text quoted by Passow [1919, p. 252], underlined 
by the author). This was clearly an instrument to get regular div-
idends. As Passow says [1919, p. 251] these propositions “seem 
to satisfy the directions of the railway companies”. This could 
explain that only a year after a circular of “January 27,1958” 
was issued by the Ministry of Finance, regretting that a renewal 
fund was not provided for in all statutes and asserting that the 
reserve funds were not sufficient to take account of the regular 
wear and tear of the fixed assets. This administration stressed 
that it was not possible to speak of a distributable profit without 
an allocation to a renewal fund so as to assure the sustainability 
(Nachhaltigkeit) of the dividends. Consequently, it logically de-
manded that the railways directions measured the importance 
of the yearly allocations for the reserve and the renewal funds in 
conformity with the views of the inquiry. It also required prov-
ing the respect of the disposition of this circular to get the agree-
ment of the Ministry for the determination and the payment of 
dividends. Unlike the law of 1843, this text had an immediate 
practical repercussion. According to Passow [1919, p. 252], just 
after the promulgation of the circular, the new statutes15 regu-
larly provided for a renewal fund.
To conclude, apparently, in Prussia, at the end of the fifties, 
the situation for railway companies seemed to be clear: the ini-
tial cash flow accounting has been transformed in a kind of ac-
crual accounting devoted to the “regulation” of dividends, which 
means, according to the Schmalenbach’s famous qualification, a 
kind of “dynamic” accounting [Richard, 1998, p. 576]. But this 
was without taking account of the “misfits” of the commercial law.
the same view and the same conclusions see also Mieles [1932, p. 11].
15  Even some “old railway companies” such as the Rhein Eisenbahngesellschaft 
in 1858, the Bergish in 1859 and the Türingische Eisenbahngesellschaft in 1862 
decided to build a renewal fund [Mieles, 1932, p. 12].
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THE COMMERCIAL LAWS OF 1861 AND 1870 AND THE 
UNAVOIDABLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN COMMERCIAL 
AND RAILWAY ACCOUNTING
At the beginning of the sixties, lawyers from different states 
were called up to lay the foundations of the first Commercial 
Code for the whole of Germany. As a result, the law of “June 24, 
1861”16forced all merchants (Kaufleute) to follow the rules of 
the General German Commercial Code. The aim of this Code, in 
line with the French Commercial Code of 1807, was to protect 
the interest of creditors by drawing up a balance sheet which 
enables the comparison of the market value of assets with the 
bulk of debts, in the hope that the difference between these two 
amounts could reach a maximum amount, in order to avoid any 
problem of payment of debt in case of a failure. This type of ac-
counting, which received the name of “static” accounting in con-
tinental Europe, [Moxter, 1984; Richard, 2005 b], was mainly 
expressed in the article 29, 30 and 31 of the Code.
This type of legislation was clearly reinforcing the argumen-
tation of those who, on the basis of the Prussian law of 1843, as-
certained that the railway companies had to make a patrimonial 
balance sheet. However, the defenders of the “special” railway 
balance sheets could have pleaded the fact that railway compa-
nies were not merchant people or companies. But this last hope 
was also lost with the second step of the commercial legisla-
tion: the law of “June11, 1870”. The articles 5 and 208 of this 
law extended the rules concerning merchants and commercial 
companies to every kind of joint stock (public) company, includ-
ing railway companies. As stressed by Schüler [1879, p. 66] the 
presentation of this law (Motiven) clearly expressed that “the 
making of purely operating (Ertrags) balances and the distribu-
tion of purely annual surpluses (blossen Jahresüberschüssen) is 
inadmissible”. Following the article 217 “Only the profit left can 
be distributed among the shareholders, according to the annual 
balance sheet (which means the patrimonial balance sheet), after 
an eventual deduction for creating a reserve fund if it is pro-
vided for by the statute".
Thus, at that time, the situation was clear: the German 
railway companies had the choice of either respecting the law 
or fighting to change it. They chose the second option because 
it was, as we are going to see, "impossible" to accept the tradi-
16  This law was applied in 1862 in Prussia [Mieles, 1932, p. 12].
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tional commercial rules17  18
THE FIGHT OF THE RAILROADS AGAINST THE STATIC 
LAWS OF 1861 AND 1870
This battle lasted about ten years from 1873 to 1883 and 
mobilized practitioners as well as theoreticians along five main 
stages corresponding to various declarations and articles.
The first attack was launched, not surprisingly so, by the 
main contesters, the managers of railway companies. In 1873 a 
special commission was nominated by the Prussian government 
to study the problems connected with the railway concessions 
(Spezial Kommission zur Untersuchung des Eisenbahn-Konzes-
sionwesens). Among the participants was Scheele, the president 
of the Reichseisenbahn, who declared that “a part of the stipula-
tions of the law of 11 June 1870, especially those concerning the 
balance sheet, the calculation of dividends and the bankruptcy 
are not suitable for railway companies”. He added that the value 
of assets” should not be obtained on the basis of their separate 
components, but according to their value in use (Nutzen), it 
means the profitability (Ertrag) derived from their global entity” 
and that this was “important for the payment of dividends, the 
determination of balance sheet and the problems of insolvency”. 
He also stressed, in order to justify these assertions, that, for 
railway companies, “it can be considered that the assumption 
of a going concern (vermuthete Fortbestand des Unternehmens) 
is integrated in the law” and concluded that “the fixed assets... 
must be considered as stable items (stabile Posten) without any 
impact of future reductions of value” (Declarations taken from 
appendix of the report by the special Commission  published in 
stenographic report of the debate of the House of deputes, first 
17  According to Mieles [1932 , pp. 31-32] the study of the practice during the 
period 1861-1884 shows that there is an appearance of the commercial balance 
sheets (under the name of “general balance sheets”) in Prussia : this is notably the 
case of the Rheinishe EBG(in 1862), the Berlin-Potsdam Magdeburg EBG, the 
Berlin-Anhalten EBG, and later the Bergisch-Märkish EBG. However, it seems 
that the railway companies did not totally respect the “play” of the new laws and 
tried to introduce some “fictitious items” within the new balance-sheets that had 
nothing to do with the legal balance-sheet. According to Mieles this rise of the 
problems with commercial balance sheets is the reason which caused Scheffler 
to intervene (see below).
18  It should be noted however that the 1862 law, while reiterating the 
prohibition of interests on shares, went on authorizing the payment of these 
interests during the period of construction: on this point the lawyers had taken 
account of the interests of railway companies.
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session of the 12th legislature period 1873-74, third volume, 
pp. 1638 and followings, with some words emphasized by the 
author). To end with the subject of this special commission, it is 
worth while noting that to a question concerning the desirability 
to maintain the existence of interest for shares during the period 
of construction the consulted expert mandated by the railway 
companies replied that the consent of interest was “obvious” 
and that this interest “is part of the fixed assets” [Faucher, 1873, 
p. 41]. The last part of the answer testified that, for this expert, 
(as well as the majority of companies) the accumulation in the 
asset side of interest paid to shareholders during the period of 
construction was not creating a fictitious asset contrary to the 
opinion of many lawyers (see below). All these ideas were appar-
ently largely shared by the directors of railway companies19
The second attack emanated from the judicial side. Two 
years after the commission one of the leading commercial 
lawyers of Germany published a long article and reiterated 
after Scheele that “the distribution of dividends is not to be con-
nected with patrimonial balances but only with the annual 
calculation of operating profits (Jahresbetriebsberechnungen)” 
[Keyssner, 1875, p. 135] . He stressed that anything else is "im-
possible" especially "the determination of the value of the expen-
sive assets taken one by one independently from each other" [p. 
133]. He also added that if a kind of value is to be considered for 
the balance sheet' "it must be a value derived from the profits 
(Ertrag) taking the probable duration of the firm" into account 
[1875, p. 142] and that, as a practical means “the costs form the 
starting point" [1875, p. 133]. In spite of these basic similarities 
it seems that Keyssner provided for two new elements in the 
battle against the old accounting system. First, he emitted the 
idea that the comparison of assets (at value) with debts and the 
maintaining of a minimum of capital were not obligatorily the 
best means to protect the creditors: "the joint stock company 
could have lost the half of its capital and nevertheless offered 
an entire security to the creditors, the enterprise is alive if it 
is capable of getting a revenue" [p. 143]. This was practically a 
19  See also the declarations of Schüler, Director of the “Deutsche 
Eisenbahnbaugesellschaft”, according to whom the appliance of regulations valid 
for merchants could be “stupid for enterprises whose object is not handling” 
[Schüler, 1878, p. 66]. Schüler agreed that the valuation of tangible assets and 
financial participations should basically based on value in use («Macht zu 
Nutzen») but, insofar as these values are very difficult to obtain, it is better to 
content with acquisition costs [ p. 67]. In any case the recourse to market value 
could be “a calamity” [p. 67].
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new conception for the time according to which the protection 
of creditors was obtained so long as the current revenues cov-
ered the current expenses. Thanks to that position, it "could be 
possible to distribute dividends to the shareholders even if the 
whole of the capital is not covered by assets" [Keyssner, p. 143]. 
Second, he enlarged the scope of the reforms in proposing this 
scheme for all joint stock companies (and not only railway com-
panies) "the obligatory patrimonial (the one that calculates the 
liquidation value for the owner of the business) balance sheet 
could disappear" and be replaced, for the sake of distribution of 
dividends, by an another type of balance sheet allowing for "an 
equal division of profits" [p. 144].
The third and neuralgic element of the new course was an 
article published in 1878 by another lawyer, J. von Strombeck 
(from Magdeburg) whose ideas also played a significant role 
in the course of the battle. Von Strombeck, as well as all the 
preceding actors, admitted that the problem of distribution of 
dividends for joint stock and especially railway companies was 
a crucial one and that it was very important to find some means 
to cope with the problem of “the necessary weak returns in the 
first year of operation” and to “avoid any influence of fluctuation 
of prices on the stable assets” [1878, I, p. 17]. He also asserted, 
as did Keyssner, that, from the part of creditors, “the agreement 
of credits should not be based on the importance of the capital 
in its relationship to the wealth (patrimonium) but on the profit-
ability of the fixed assets” and that the traditional legal position 
was not a convenient one [1878 I, pp. 3 and 23]. These two first 
elements allowed him to declare, in line with his predecessors, 
that the legal (“static”) balance sheet based on market values 
was not convenient for shareholders (for the distribution of divi-
dends) and even for creditors, especially in the case of railway 
companies [1878 I, p. 3].
The originality of Von Strombeck seems to rely on the fact 
that he proposed a way of reasoning for a systematic construc-
tion of various types of balance sheets.  According to him the 
content and the valuation of the various assets of companies 
depended on the “aim” (Gegenstand or Zweck) of this com-
pany or of this balance sheet20 [1878 I, p. 4 and 1878 I, p. 94-95]. 
Thanks to this basic principle he distinguished three fundamen-
20  On the beginning of the article (p. 4) the Von Strombeck’s classification 
deals with different types of companies; but on pages 2 and 29 he specifies that 
inside a same company various types of assets are to be found which can be 
classified along his principles.
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tal categories of fixed assets for joint stock companies [1878, I, 
p. 4]. The first class comprises assets devoted to the “use in a 
permanent propriety” [1878 I, p. 4]. Concerning this kind of as-
sets (companies using this type of assets) the rest of the article 
shows that there is no question of making valuations based on 
the market values: the assets should appear as stable assets (sta-
bile Grundvermögen) with a valuation at cost. For most of these 
kinds of assets their usage creates a depreciation (Entwerthung 
aus Abnützung) which must be, as in the case of railroads, com-
pensated by a restoration (Instandhaltung) owing to a deduc-
tion out of revenue so that the assets remained stable [1878 I, 
pp. 5-6]. The second class comprises assets intended to be sold 
[1878 I, p. 6] and forms the variable fixed assets. These assets, 
as illustrated by numerous examples throughout the article, 
are valued at their exit value (Veraüsserungswerth). The third 
class is specifically devoted to the assets of insurance companies 
[1878 I, p. 7]. According to the latter, this kind of company has 
to treat its assets according to the principles laid for the second 
class [1878 I, p. 33]. According to these rules, the fixed assets of 
railway companies and many joint stock companies could be 
valued at cost, which was satisfactory to avoid price fluctuation 
and their incidence on the distribution of dividends [1878 II, p. 
76].Von Strombeck, differing from other specialists, was aware 
that this type of balance sheet was contradictory to the law and 
proposed to change it not only for railway companies but also 
for all joint stock companies [1878 II, p. 106] He was convinced 
that these questions and especially the question of the basis for 
distribution of dividends were of public interest [1878 II, p. 84] 
at least for railway companies.
The fourth attack against the static law was launched in 
187921 by Hermann Scheffler, a railway director of the Braun-
schweig Company. Scheffler was very conscious that the whole 
affair on the discussion of various balance sheets was funda-
mentally a social conflict opposing the “creditors” who want 
what he called an “objective value” (objektiver Werth”), which 
means market value, and the “proprietors” (in our view the 
shareholders for railway company) who want cost value [1879, 
p. 34]. He recognized that there was a competition of many pos-
sible principles of accounting [1879, p. 20]. He also thought that 
the construction of a balance sheet depended on the aim the 
assets are detained for but he added that this aim was connected 
21  According to Mieles [1932, p. 13] Scheffler had presented his thesis as soon 
as 1875.
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to an analysis of the purposes of the various stakeholders. Accord-
ing to him the value of an asset that only a proprietor is inter-
ested in, (such as a machinery) is the subjective value for this 
proprietor, which practically speaking, means the cost [1879, p. 
23].On the contrary, for objects to be sold, which is of interest to 
other people than proprietors, the value is the “objective value”, 
which basically means the exit (market) value [1879, p. 24]22.
Interestingly, Scheffler was a strict defender of the theory 
of cost value for “objective” elements: he made it clear that 
“no circumstantial event, no variation of price, no variation 
of profitability and other external time related conditions can 
change the cost value of assets for use: only the loss due to use 
must be taken into account and notably with the formation of 
systematic annual depreciation [1879, pp. 26-27]. Even material 
inventories such as rail inventories are not to be impaired [1879, 
p. 40]. More surprisingly, at least for the traditional lawyers but 
also even for the railway managers of the time, Scheffler was 
persuaded that every intangible long term investment must be 
treated as a fixed asset to be depreciated, even foundation costs 
and education costs [1879, p. 39]: he was a defender of what has 
been called afterwards, at the time of Schmalenbach, the pure 
dynamic school!
All these ideas were connected to the problem of profit regu-
lation; Scheffler notably said that the cameral (cash) accounting 
is “not rational because it can cause a considerable fluctuation 
of profit” [1879, p. 14]. If he did not explicitly mention the 
case of the static patrimonial accounting it is obvious that all 
his work was intended to abolish this type of accounting. It is 
worthwhile noting that, according to Scheffler, the demolition 
of this type of accounting was not necessarily connected to the 
replacement of the law: he thought that the articles 29 and 31 of 
the 1870 law were sufficiently vague about the concept of value 
(Werth) so as to admit the cost as a basis of accounting founda-
tion for joint stock companies [1879, p. 20]. In this case a simple 
evolution of the case law would have been sufficient.
The last part of the story once again concerns von Strom-
beck whose second article devoted to the question of the mak-
ing of balance sheet for joint stock companies in 1882. Von 
Strombeck, like Scheffler, recognized that the problem with 
the static balances was not one of practical valuation difficulty: 
22  Scheffler (p.24) however distinguishes two kinds of objective value: the first 
one for long term resale (based on actuarial calculation) and the second one for 
short term resale (based on market value).
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it is always possible if one has decided to apply this theory to 
find market values, even if necessary, to liquidate value (Ab-
bruchwerth) [1882, p. 491]. No, the problem was a conflict of 
interests between shareholders and creditors implying two kinds 
of ways to determine a profit [1882, pp. 460, 494 and 495]. Von 
Strombeck was aware that abandoning the patrimonial balance 
sheet and its objective value could be dangerous because the 
new theory  of creditor protection by  the sole observation of the 
operating cash flows may, in case of crisis, have as consequence, 
the disappearance of the companies [1882, pp. 494-495]23. But 
a special balance sheet was “required” for dividends [1882, p. 
461]. This “dira necessita” (strong necessity) “must lead to the 
system of stable accounts” [1882, p.  495]. Differing from Schef-
fler, he maintained that the 1870 law was clearly in favour of 
market values and not liable to an interpretation in favour of 
cost, he underlined that there was no  other way to change  the 
law: it was even “a matter of public interest” [1882, p. 483)].
THE VICTORY OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERS
AND THE NEW 1884 LAW
This victory was obtained in two steps, the second one be-
ing the definitive one. The first break against the 1870’s legisla-
tion was obtained in 1879 with a case from the ROHG (High 
Imperial Tribunal) handling the valuation of fixed assets of 
railway companies. It was declared, in line with the Scheffer’s 
thesis, that the valuation at acquisition cost was not strictly 
contradictory to the law (ROHG, 1879, Bd 25, p. 307). Even if 
important, this decision was restricted to the case of railway 
companies and subjected to criticism according to some lead-
ing lawyers who deemed it was a denial of the spirit of the law. 
Obviously this case was not sufficient to solve the problem. The 
definitive solution to the problem was given by a change of the 
law. A new law, the 1884 law (Aktienrechtsnovelle vom “July 18, 
1884”, RGBI, p. 123), was specifically dedicated to joint stock 
companies, and added new articles to the corpus for joint stock 
companies, notably the articles 185 a and 185 b which are very 
important for the question treated and which deserve to be 
quoted fully.
The article 185a requires that for the construction of the 
balance sheet, the four following rules (referring to article 31) 
23  In a very modern way he “answered” to this anxiety by asserting that 
creditors must make a personal  valuation of the risks they take before lending to 
a business [1879, p. 35]. Scheffler presumably influenced Von Strombeck.
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must be applied:
1. Shares, obligations and merchandises which have a 
stock market or market price may be valued up to 
this price... but if this price is above the acquisition 
or the production cost this cost is the maximum 
limit not to be exceeded.
2. The other assets (elements) composing the wealth 
(“andere Vermögens Gegenstände”) are to be valued 
to the limit of the acquisition or production cost.
3. Fixed assets and other items which are not devoted 
to reselling but to durable use... may be valued, with 
no consideration to an inferior value (geringeren 
Wert), at the acquisition or production cost, under 
the condition that a systematic deduction for their  
use (Abnützung) or a corresponding allocation to a 
renewal  fund (Erneuerungs fonds) will be made.
4. The cost of organisation and administration may not 
be registered as assets and must appear for their full 
amount as expenditure (Ausgabe) in the calculation 
of the annual profit.
According to the official justification of the law itself [Mo-
tiven zu Novelle 1884] this new legislation was composed of two 
very distinct elements. The first element was the recognition of 
the principle of prudence: from 1884 onwards, for joint stock 
companies, it was no longer possible to recognize non-realised 
profits. This was in line with the evolution of patrimonial (static) 
accounting in continental Europe and justified, as was the case 
in France about twenty years ago, by scandals related to the 
distribution of dividends on the basis of potential profits. If the 
new law had been limited to the recognition of this principle, it 
could not be said that the shareholders had succeeded in intro-
ducing a new philosophy of accounting in their favour.  This can 
be explained by the obligation to take account of potential losses 
on behalf of diminution of values which would have remained 
and caused problems.
The very original element of this law was represented by the 
§ 3 of article 185 a that gave the possibility to joint stock com-
panies to avoid the impairment of fixed assets (at their lower 
market values) and to use a cost valuation assorted with a sys-
tematic depreciation. The explanations (“Motiven”) of the law 
are very clear that this new device for fixed assets was dictated 
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by a question of dividends: “if the company had been obliged to 
take account of market values even for this kind of assets, whose 
selling price are subject to considerable fluctuation of prices due 
to the relationship of supply and demand, without their value in 
use (Nutzungswert) could be changed, it would have resulted a 
full untrue distribution of profits” [Motiven, p. 301]. The “Mo-
tiven” were also very clear that this part of the legislation was 
an exception to the general “static” rules which remained in 
place: “the project of law, in relationship with the paragraph 31 
of the Commercial Code, takes as a basic principle, that all pat-
rimonial assets are to be valued at their value (it means market 
value) but no higher than their acquisition or production cost" 
[Motiven, p. 303]. But this exception was the only exception: the 
generalisation of a system of distribution of costs as proposed 
by Sheffler for intangible long term expenses was not accepted 
as it was notably clearly expressed for organisation and admin-
istration costs (see supra article 185a-4).
THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE INFERRED BY THE 
PRUSSIAN RAILROAD ACCOUNTING
       In our opinion the events described above clearly show 
that the “time of railways” was the beginning of the death for 
cash flows (“cameral”) and patrimonial (static) accounting 
styles, at least in Germany. We have seen that under the influ-
ence of public accountants, at the very beginning of this period, 
the thirties, a kind of cameral accounting had generally been 
applied to railway companies. It is important to stress that this 
cameral accounting was not a pure one for it was decided to 
treat the initial expenditures (for constructions and purchase 
of rolling stock) not as elements of results (as should normally 
have been the case) but as an investment: it was, to use Mieles’s 
expression, a “modified” cameral accounting. This already mon-
grel accounting was again changed in the fifties with the more 
and more massive introduction of a kind of depreciation ac-
counting instead of the registration of expenditures at the time 
of renewals. Towards the end of the period studied it can be said 
that, as far as private24 railway companies are considered, the 
cameral accounting was over or very nearly so: this was the first 
victim of the railway accounting battle.
In the seventies, railway directors and some lawyers con-
nected to them, led another successful fight against the applica-
24  This assertion is untrue for state-owned railway companies up to 1927.
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tion of static (market oriented) accounting, which was at the 
time, the dominant kind of accounting. In 1884, as a result of 
this last fight, static accounting was no longer obligatorily ap-
plied for fixed tangible assets for all joint stock companies. It 
was also the beginning of a (long) agony for static accounting 
and the first clear introduction of very important elements of 
historical cost accounting. Concerning this last point (the break-
through of a kind of dynamic accounting in 1884) there is not 
much debate among historians. For example, Walb [1933, p.5] 
deems that there is a kind of return to the solutions of the ALR, 
after 90 years. These solutions were largely marked by a refusal 
of market value [Richard, 2005c], and Barth [1953, p. 117] and 
constitute a “decisive breach” (entscheidende Bresche) in the 
common market value (gemeinenWert) for balance sheet valu-
ation. However, Schneider, [1995, p.151], while commenting on 
the 1884’s law, is more struck by the appearance of the principle 
of prudence (lower of cost or market rule) than the development 
of any kind of dynamic accounting.
THE REASON FOR THE CHANGE
There is considerable debate concerning the reason for 
change, in comparison to the points previously developed. First 
we are going to highlight what appears to be the opinion of Ger-
man historians before giving our own interpretation. 
Barth insists upon a technical point of view: the patrimo-
nial (static) theory would have failed and needed to be replaced 
because in “many cases, especially for fixed assets it is almost 
impossible to find a reliable market value” [1950, p. 53 and 
also similarly 1953, pp. 116 and 147]. He also adds a second 
argument: even if these technical difficulties could be solved, it 
would result in «a totally arbitrary income which has nothing 
to do with the real profits (Erträge) of the enterprise” [1953, 
p. 116] because rising prices could eventually trigger the dis-
tribution of unrealised profits [1950, p. 52]. It seems to us that 
this second motive is not important for our case for the static 
lawyers, beginning with first the French and 25 then the Ger-
man lawyers, had been able to respond to this type of criticism 
(thanks to the lower of cost of market rule) with no change to 
their basic philosophy of accounting style for the protection 
of creditors. So, to conclude, the technical problem remains 
Barth’s main argument.
25  According to Dupin notably as quoted by Barth himself [1950, p. 52]
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The Schneider’s thesis is another one which means com-
petence problem. Schneider [1995, pp. 132-133] stresses that 
throughout the twentieth century “the discussion of financial 
accounting was dominated by lawyers” who were unaware of 
merchant book keeping and that, as an exception, was unfamil-
iar with double book keeping which led a commercial lawyer 
(meaning Keyssner who led this fight against static accounting) 
to calculate distributable profit separately from the balance 
sheet".
In our opinion all these arguments cannot explain the 
real reasons of the change. As far as the technical argument is 
concerned, it is interesting to note that von Strombeck himself, 
a strong partisan of the "system of stable accounts", however, 
acknowledged that "the reason for its adoption was not so much 
the difficulty to find a true valuation of fixed assets as rather the 
possibility to use, in particular for the distribution of dividends, 
a mass of results only depending on the utilities produced by 
stable wealth (patrimonium)” [1882, p. 464]. He added that "in 
the case of a patrimonial balance sheet,  the biggest difficulty 
and the uncertainty to find an objective value must not deter 
from proceeding with a valuation and that, in case of doubt... at 
worst, one can use the liquidation value" [1882, p. 491]. 
As for the argument of competence, one can wonder why 
lawyers such as Keyssner and Strombeck could inevitably 
discover the virtue of merchants' bookkeeping while their col-
leagues, authors of the 1870's legislation, were unable to take 
this step. Our explanation is that, beyond a question of compe-
tence, there was a question of social environment: these men 
"discovered stable accounts" (to use the von Strombeck's expres-
sion) because they were the spokespeople for railway managers 
and shareholders and expressed their needs. 
But what were these needs? What was the reason for this 
"impossibility" to use the patrimonial type of accounting as 
evoked by Keyssner [1875, p. 133]? What was this "dura neces-
sita" mentioned by von Strombeck [1882, p. 482] forcing to 
adopt the system of stable accounts? Our answer is that "stable 
accounts" (a marvellously eloquent expression) were necessary 
to give stable dividends to shareholders, a sine qua condition 
to collect funds and to develop railway companies and big joint 
stock companies. The importance of the stable dividends ques-
tion is not only acknowledged by German historians of railway 
economics. At that time this question also constitutes the very 
framework of reasoning for all the defenders of dynamic ac-
counting versus static accounting. Whether it is the case of 
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Keyssner [1875, p. 144], of von Strombeck [1878 II, p.76] or of 
Scheffler [1879, p. 14] their common fear was price fluctuation 
and its influence on dividend distribution. Even the documents 
explaining the motives for the 1884 law, have, as we have seen, 
evoked the problem of dividend stability. Our conclusion is that 
the birth of a specific type of accounting for railway companies 
and the promulgation of a specific law for joint stock companies 
was due to the need for greater dividend stability. This could not 
have been reached with the previous types of accounting.
This stability was not only required for the sake of one par-
ticular shareholder. It was also required for distributing invest-
ment products equally among the different shareholders who 
had been participating in this investment all through the period. 
To summarize, the birth of historical cost dynamic accounting 
in German legislation was a product of shareholders craving for 
stable and equally distributed dividends over time.
THE EXISTENCE OF A THEORY
The previous developments have shown that during the 
period 1870-1884 all the main actors of the struggle against the 
patrimonial accounting defended a kind of historical cost (dy-
namic) accounting. One interesting question is to know if they 
have succeeded in the creation of a (new) theory of accounting. 
This question had already been raised by German authors no-
tably by Walb, Barth and Schneider who disagree over this. We 
are relating their position before expressing our own opinion.
As early as 1983, Walb, in his history of the balance sheet 
dogma, deems that Scheffler “has made an important step in 
matter of accounting theory” [1933, p. 11]. He thinks that Schef-
fler had “conscious dynamic objectives” [1933, p. 15] and had 
finally “opened the road for the whole of the future evolution” 
[1933, p. 17]. Also Mieles [1932, p. 13] insists upon the influence 
of Scheffler on the thoughts of the great theorist, Simon. On the 
contrary,  according to Barth, it was only after the publication of 
the 1884 law on joint stock companies that the theory of balance 
sheet tried to find a justification for the use of cost  valuation in 
matter of balance sheet dressing” [1953 I, p.  117]. Barth thinks 
that the movement of ideas towards the historical cost account-
ing system before 1884 was not  conscious, only inspired by 
practical point of views [1953 I, pp. 156-157].
If we concentrate our study on Scheffler, who benefited 
from the whole intellectual contribution of  Keyssner and von 
Strombeck, we may observe that, in order to justify  his position 
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in favour of an historical cost accounting, Scheffler uses the 
concept of goal (Zweck) to distinguish different types of assets 
(assets for permanent  use, assets for sale). He also deducts a 
type of valuation from this classification (valuation at cost for 
assets for use, valuation at market price for assets for sale) and 
infers from the two previous points an adequate treatment for 
the main types of assets. Is there any big difference, for these 
main elements with the ideas expressed after the First World 
War by theoreticians of the dynamic balance sheet such as 
Rieger and Schmalenbach? Not in our opinion. It would seem 
that Scheffler was an even more consequent theoretician than 
Schmalenbach in so much as he deducted the treatment as as-
sets of intangibles expenditures such as organisational costs 
from his theory. As a matter of fact Scheffler, as well as von 
Strombeck, were, contrary to Barth’s view, perfectly aware of 
the fact that they lived a battle of ideas about conflicting modes 
of calculation of profits (see notably von Strombeck [1882, p. 
460]). They were even conscious that they defended the interests 
of shareholders against those of creditors. Their articles not only 
suggest a list of practical wishes: they also constructed along a 
hypothetical-deductive reasoning, and offered the framework of 
a social theory for historical cost accounting.
For the first time in Germany, if not in the world, the frame-
work of a social theory for historical cost accounting was clearly 
expressed.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PRUSSIAN RAILWAY 
ACCOUNTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL 
LEGAL ACCOUNTING
A classical, if not dominating thesis, is that railroad ac-
counting has played a major role in the development of ac-
counting concepts, especially concerning depreciation, and 
more generally in the development of modern accounting 
theory. The traditional references are those of Holmes [1975] 
and Boockholdt [1977]. But a German author had expressed the 
same thesis as early as 1933: “the theory of balance sheet was 
driven to more clarity by the enterprises with large fixed assets 
especially railways. This evolution made of the profit and loss 
statement the main statement” [Walb, 1933, p. 7 and 17]. As 
Walb’s assertions were never translated into English, his views 
were condemned to oblivion.  According to Holmes [1975, p. 
18] “depreciation was a knotty problem for these early railroad 
accountants. They argued over it... but in the end it was from 
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the very ashes of their disagreements that a modern concept of 
depreciation arose, Phoenix like, fifty years later”. Boockholdt 
while sustaining the same idea [1977, p. 14] enlarged it: “many 
of the basic concepts of accounting theory such as disclosure, 
matching measurement of cash flow, had origins in railroad ac-
counting” [1977, p. 9]. However this thesis has been contested 
by Lemarchand after his study of the historical development 
of railroad accounting in France. According to Lemarchand, in 
a general way, if it is likely that, in matter of management, the 
railway companies have had an influence on the working of en-
terprises belonging to other sectors; it does not seem so obvious 
that their accounting behaviour could truly have had an influ-
ence likewise. [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 525]. 
If we take the example of systematic depreciation (with 
distribution of cost over the period of use of the fixed assets) 
it could hardly be maintained that this concept has been cre-
ated by railway accountants both in France and in Germany. In 
France Lemarchand has shown that, as far as practice is con-
cerned, some examples of such a systematic depreciation  can 
already be found in the 18th century (especially in the second 
part) : depreciation of  horses at the “Forge d’Oberbruck et Man-
ufacture de fer blanc de Wegsheid” in 1739 [Lemarchand, 1993, 
p. 97], depreciation of furniture (by 5%) by the “Company Rey 
and Magneval” in 1751 [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 69], depreciation 
of tools, buildings and horses by the “Manufacture de toiles 
peintes de  Rey” between 1763  and 1792 [Lemarchand  1993, 
pp. 73, 74,98], depreciation of tools by 5%) by the “Manufacture 
de quincaillerie de la Charité sur Loire” in 1767 [Lemarchand 
1993, p. 227], depreciation of machinery (by 4%) by the “Manu-
facture du Logelbach” in 1775 [Lemarchand, 1993, p. 227], 
depreciation of furniture and tools (by 1/24%) by the “Manufac-
ture royale de velours de coton de Sens” in 1778 [Lemarchand, 
1993, p. 1].
The original German feature in this respect can be found as 
early as 1794: it is also possible to find a legislation (Allgemeine 
Preussische Landrecht - ALR - second part § 545) in Prussia con-
cerning the calculation of profit of commercial companies with 
a clause enouncing that (in case of no special stipulation by stat-
ute) the corporate fixed assets are to be systematically depreci-
ated [Barth 1953; Lion 1928; Schneider 1987; p. 443; Schneider 
1995, p. 129]26. Of course this kind of (optimally) dynamic ori-
26  See also Richard [2005 c] for a comparison of German and French situations 
in the context of evolution of the fair value concept.
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ented legislation was soon rebutted by the static ideas of the Na-
poleonic Code of Commerce [Richard 2005 b and c], which was 
translated into German in 1808 by Daniels [Bösselmann, 1939, 
annexe 4]. The French code was notably applied in the Rhine 
provinces even after the collapse of Napoleon27 [Steitz, 1974, p. 
26] and inspired the endeavours of a commercial codification of 
States such as Württemberg in the thirties [Barth, 1953, p. 67]. 
This may explain why, in Prussia, the law on joint stock compa-
nies published in 1843 no longer mentioned the possibility of a 
systematic depreciation of fixed assets and presumably diverted 
to a static viewpoint. Nevertheless it seems almost unbelievable 
that, at the beginning of the 19th century, the Prussian merchant 
and lawyer elite was unaware of the ALR and of its mention of a 
dynamic style of depreciation. Furthermore, as Schneider dem-
onstrates [1987, p. 451], it was “not usual to see systematic de-
preciation based on percentage of fixed assets before the second 
part of the 18th century”. A number of books can also be found 
(rarely during the 18th century but more frequently at the begin-
ning of the 19th century) that describe the principle of such a 
depreciation, the first author being Magelsen [1772, p.76]. The 
conclusion is that railway accountants and managers have, in 
no way, contributed to the creation of the concept of dynamic 
depreciation. But, on the contrary, they have played a very big 
role in the dissemination, the theoretical justification and the le-
galization of this concept. They contributed to the dissemination 
because the majority of railway companies, that represented the 
biggest companies at that time, applied this type of depreciation 
at the beginning of the sixties. They play an important role for 
the theoretical justification thanks to the publications of railway 
managers or lawyers closely related to them. They succeeded 
in legalizing through the articles of the 1884 law as a result of 
the pressure of railway lobbyists. To summarize, there has been 
dynamic depreciation and more largely dynamic theory, a domi-
nant approach of accounting. 
THE VALIDITY OF THE “MARKET FOR EXCUSES” 
HYPOTHESIS
In their article about the demand and supply of accounting 
theories Watts and Zimmermann [1979] outline their hypoth-
27  The result of this situation was that until 1861 Prussia had two law 
territories: the West part under French law commercial legislation and the East 
part under ALR, which was not a specific commercial legislation [Steitz 1974, p. 
26].
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esis of a market for excuses according to which, in a regulated 
economy, they “expect to observe changes in accounting theory 
when a new law is passed which impinges on accounting prac-
tice” so that “accounting theory has changed after the introduc-
tion of government regulation” [1979, p. 289 emphasis added]. It 
is clear that they base their reasoning on the case of  US railroad 
legislation : it is their hypothesis that regulation of profits (pri-
marily of the railroads) “created a demand for theories rational-
izing depreciation as an expense” and that “without regulation 
there was no necessity for depreciation to be a charge systemati-
cally deducted each year in determining net income. However, 
because rate regulation was justified in terms of restricting the 
economic profits of monopolists (or eliminating ruinous compe-
tition) regulation created a demand for justifications arguing for 
depreciation to be treated as an annual charge to profits” [1979, 
p. 293]. They concluded that accounting theories are gener-
ally “normative” because “they are used as excuses for political 
action (i.e. the political process creates a demand for theories 
which prescribe rather than describe the world).” [1979, p. 273].
In the case of the German legislation for railway companies 
we do not find any evidence of a market for excuses hypothesis 
.In contrast to Watts and Zimmermann’s hypothesis it seems 
that the change in accounting theory appeared before rather 
than after the law which this theory intended to defend and 
that this theory was describing an already existing practice. The 
sequence of the German case is the following: at the beginning 
Prussian railway companies produced a special type of balance 
sheet and had a concept of profit oriented to their needs. This 
practice had been largely incorporated within the law of 1838, 
the fundamental law concerning rail companies. This was im-
proved through various administrative regulations from 1838 
to 1862, aiming notably at a systematic form of depreciation. 
Throughout this period, to the best of our knowledge, there 
has been no article or book presenting a theory in defence of 
this legislation or control. The reason for this absence of theory 
seems obvious: the legislation was basically in line with the 
practices or the desired practices of the managers and share-
holders of railway companies. Thus there was no reason to jus-
tify anything.
The scene completely changed in 1862 and 1870 when a 
new law developed by lawyers working for the interests of credi-
tors (rather than shareholders) obliged the rail companies to 
produce balance-sheets in total contradiction with their vital in-
terests. As a reaction against these laws and in order to get a new 
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law more favourable to their interests, the railways managers 
and a few astute lawyers sharing the interests of shareholders 
against creditors wrote a significant list of articles in the seven-
ties which, in our view, should be considered as founding a new 
theory of what we call “dynamic accounting” or “historical cost 
accounting”. This theoretical weapon in favour of a new law 
succeeded in 1884 with a law which offered  all joint stock com-
panies (and not only railway companies) the possibility of  using 
the dynamic theory for tangible fixed assets for the first time in 
Germany.
As a conclusion, the German case shows that the theory 
came before the introduction of a new law and was used to pre-
pare it. Furthermore, this theory largely describes a practice in 
line with shareholders’ interests and was frankly advocating the 
basic interests of these shareholders. There was no attempt to 
disguise the needs of short term and regular dividends for hurry 
and worry shareholders under the umbrella of “excuses”. Based 
on this case, our hypothesis is that accounting theories may be 
considered as a weapon to demolish existing practices or regula-
tions rather than an excuse or justification for existing legisla-
tion or practice.
THE VALIDITY OF THE AGENCY THEORY
Agency theory, as represented by the fundamental article 
by Jensen and Meckling on the theory of the firm [1976], ex-
presses three main ideas. Firstly, in the firm, the basic conflict 
opposes on the one hand the managers and on the other hand 
the “outside” equity owners and the creditors. The possibility 
of a conflict between the outside equity owners and the credi-
tors is only marginally indicated in two backside notes [1976, 
pp. 337 and 339]. In fact the opposite applies, bondholders and 
outside equity owners are treated together as potential victims 
of the managers (1976, p. 338). Secondly, the basic conflict can 
be solved by the signature of contracts concerning the monitor-
ing activities, the bonding activities and the emission of shares: 
these contracts can be fair because creditors and outside share-
holders have the possibility of knowing the manoeuvres of man-
agers in advance. Even the suppression of unlimited liability is 
accepted by the creditors by means of a fair contract [1975, p. 
331]. Thirdly, as implied by these two former points, account-
ing can be considered as an information device solicited in the 
course of the issuance of fair contracts between managers and 
outside claimants.
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The history of the Prussian railway accounting illustrates 
that these ideas do not correspond to reality28. The main con-
flict in Germany opposed the creditors on the one hand and the 
outside shareholders and the managers on the other hand. One 
could speak of a “theory” of alliance between managers and 
shareholders and not of a “theory” of agency. The losers of the 
battle, the creditors, were not in a position to sign any compen-
satory contract. They had to accept the (partial) disappearance 
of static accounting because they were weak and they did not 
have the power to resist the alliance of shareholders and manag-
ers.
Accounting, in the course of this battle, was not considered 
as a source of information on managers’ actions but as a means 
of improving their situation as well as the shareholders’ situa-
tion in the matter of distribution of dividends. The new dynamic 
theory was not devoted to calculating the performance but to 
regulating the distributable profit. In short, the issue was not a 
question of “fair” contracts or “fair” information but of the ex-
ercise of harsh power for the sake of the development of a new 
kind of capitalism.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE ROLE OF THE PRUSSIAN 
RAILWAY ACCOUNTING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CAPITALIST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
On the  basis of the French  experience, it has been sug-
gested that after the beginning of the industrial revolution (at 
the end of 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries) the 
capitalist models of regulated financial accounting went through 
three main stages of development : static, dynamic and actuarial 
ones [Richard, 2005 b and c]. The history of accounting of pri-
vate rail companies in Germany shows that in this country the 
rail companies played a major role in the spread of historical 
cost accounting principles. In addition, these companies and 
big other joint stock ones, largely contributed to the birth of the 
“dynamic” second stage, at least in continental Europe. If the 
representatives of these rail companies had not invented new 
concepts of accounting, in particular concerning depreciation, 
they did, as early as 1875-1879; elaborate a new theory of ac-
counting (the dynamic theory). This new theory had a profound 
impact, at least on German theorists such as Simon, Rieger and 
28  For another example of this disconnection between agency theory and the 
historical reality see Ding and alii [2008].
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Schmalenbach of the late 19th century and the first part of the 
20th century. It was needed to justify the publication of a new 
law favourable to the interests of impatient shareholders rather 
than those of creditors and to defeat the ideology of public fi-
nance and patrimonial (static) theories. As this theory appeared 
before (rather than after) the law which promulgated the new 
approach and was clearly advocating the defence of the private 
interest of shareholders (not those of the public in the strict 
sense), it would seem possible to assert that the Watts and Zim-
mermann’s basic hypothesis of the “theory of market excuses” 
does not fit with these historical developments.
According to these developments, the main reasons for de-
veloping the new accounting theory were connected with prob-
lems of dividends. Firstly it was imposed by the necessity to find 
accounting procedures which would allow the distribution of 
dividends from the very beginning of the investment cycle even 
in the absence of revenue. Secondly it was fostered by the desire 
to find an accounting model which would enable the distribu-
tion of profits generated by an investment evenly throughout the 
investment cycle and amongst the different shareholders taking 
part in the financing of this investment.
Hence, the second stage of development of capitalist ac-
counting may have been caused by the question of distribution 
of profits and dividends and not of information. However, as 
this attempt took place within the framework of the principle of 
prudence, it was impossible, at that stage of accounting capital-
ism, to achieve a perfect device for the regulation (smoothing) 
and the rise of the rate of accounting profit: the beginning of 
the solution was only to be found at the end of the 20th century 
with the third actuarial stage and the “discovery” of fair value 
accounting [Richard, 2004, 2005 b and 2005d].
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